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In early 1998 Bangladesh adopted on recommendation by the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) the disclosure review system in respect of prospectus
registration replacùig the merit review systern. According to the new system, a Company
offering shares to the public for sale must make "full and fairy7disclosure of al1 material
information. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in giving consent to the
issuance of shares, is required to ensure that the requisite information has been disclosed
in the issuer7sprospectus. It does not have any power to look into the rnerit of an
o f f e ~ gWhether
.
this systern would benefit investors as well as the national econoniic
development of Bangladesh is evaluated in the present thesis by comparing Ontario law
with Bangladesh Iaw.
The fundamental difference between Ontario Law and Bangladesh law is
that the former is based on the combination of the disclosure theory and the "blue sky"
(merit review) theory while the latter is based on the disclosure theory alone.
Accordingly, the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) exercises twofold powers: it
reviews the disclosures contained in a prospectus and also determines the merit of the
offering. In other words, it ensures that "full, true and plain" disclosures are made in a
prospectus, and at the sarne time it examines the o f f e ~ to
g see whether any element
jeopardizing the public interest is present in the offering. If it determines that any factor
exists which suggests that it should be precluded in the public interest, it will refiise to
receipt a prospectus.

This thesis argues that the characteristic feature of a security transaction is
that it involves risks a range of risks for investors including fraud risks which result from
misstatement or understatement of materiai facts. Prospectus disclosures eliminate many
of the risks arising fkom lack of information, and offer various investment opportunities
to people who, depending on their differing risk bearing capabilities, make investment
decisions in light of such disclosures. Thus the disclosure regime has the effect of
creating an environment of investment competition in the securities industry. As a result,
resources are mobilized into the productive sectors, which eventually brings economic
development of a country. From this perspective the disclosure approach recently adopted
by Bangladesh seerns to be encouraging. But the success of this system depends largely
on the assurance that the risks offered by prospectuses are "normal" business risks of
profit and loss, and that "abnormal" business risks are precluded. Since the SEC does not
have any preclusion jurisdiction, it is argued that it cannot protect the investors against
abnormal business risks. If investors suffer any losses resulting from such risks, they may
lose confidence in the securities industry of Bangladesh. Thus, a compromise between the
two approaches of disclosure and merit review, as in Ontario, has been suggested for
Bangladesh both fiom investor protection and economic development perspectives.
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1 PRELUDE
The People's Republic of Bangladesh, bom on 16 Decernber 1971, is a
developing country with the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US $ 3 3 billion and
annual per capita GDP of US $265.' It has a heavy foreign loan and a deficit budget. For
the last four financial years (FYs) its GDP growth has been within the range of 4% to

6%'; in FY 1996/97 it was 5.9%' and in the FY 1997198 it was ~ . 6 %For
. ~ the FY
1998199 it was forecast to be 6.2%.5 It has a very low saving and a poor investment rate.

In the FY 1997198 its gross domestic savings and investment were merely 7.9% and
16.3% of the GDP r e ~ ~ e c t i v eInl ~the
. ~same period Bangladesh had an inflation rate of

6.3%'. a budget deficit of 5.4%' of the GDP and a foreign debt of US $ 14,813.0 million
or 43.7% of the GDP'.
1

Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE), Bangladesh: Introduction to the Dhaka Stock
fichange, @haka: DSE, 1998) at 1.
See Asian Development Bank (ADB), Asian Developrnent Outlook-1998 (Hong Kong:
Oxford University Press, 1998) at 117, and infra notes 3 and 4.
Bangladesh Bank, Barshik Report (Annual Report), 1997-98, @haka: Bangladesh
Bank,Feb.1999) at 2. .

'

Ibid.
7

Supra note 2.
Supra note 3 at 14.
Supra note 3 at 4.
Supra note 3 at 3.
Supra note 3 at 7.

To add to its fiscal difficulties, Bangladesh has a small capital market. In
the calendar year (CY) of 1992 there was a market capitalization of barely US $.3 14
billion, and in CY 1996 it increased to US $4.6 billion.10Following a scamll in 1996 the
market experienced a decline of capitdization. As of June 1997 market capitalization fell
to US $2.5 billion." At the end of March 1998 it m e r declined to nearly US $2.3

See ADB, Report and Recornrnendation of the President to the Board of Direclors on
a Proposed b a n and Technical Assistance Grants tu the People's Republic of
Bangladesh for the Capital Market Development program, (ADB:Manila, 1997) at 58
(hereinafter ADB Reporî),
" In 1996 an aMcial profitable (secondary) share market was created by the
manipulation of share pnces by some dishonest insiders of companies and at the same
t h e the bank interest rate decreased. This Ied many investors to withdraw money from
the banks and to invest it in the share market. But when the manipulation was detected, a
meteoric fall of share prices took place in the market. Ovemight many investors lost
everythhg. A World Bank report highlights this episode as below:
'O

The lack of transparency and accountability combined with a frai1
regdatory framework and indigent infrastructure paved the way for market
manipulations during July-November 1996.During this period, share
prices multiplied nearly four times; market capitalization jumped from a
tiny fkaction to around 20 percent of GDP,increasing almost three-fold;
the price-earning ratio soared to 80; and law and order situation was
created when 20 to 30 thousand unemployed students, mastans (hoodlums)
and others gathered every day outside the Dhaka and Chittagong stock
exchanges @SE and CSE)to trade shctres, hoping that they wodd get rich
overnight. For some the fantasy indeed became a reality, but for most of
the half a million retail investors, who assumed a position in the market
with cash taken out of their savings and fixed deposits, real asset sales and
borrowings, it turned into a nightmare. Since mid-Novernber 1996, share
prices moved mostly in one direction- d o m - and the price index has now
dipped below the bourses' starting point in mid-1996. Bangladesh Annual
Economic Update 1997 (South Asian Region, the World Bank: October
1997) at 25.

'* Supra note 10.

billion (approx. Tk. 111 bi~lion).'~
The ratio of market capitalization to GDP in 1992 was
merely a 1.3% and rose to 12.9% in 1996.'"~ of March 1998 that ratio fell to about 7%
of the GDP and about 8% of the GNP compared to 16%and 37% of GNP in Pakistan and

India respectively, the two neighboring securities markets of ~an~1adesh.l'
In the prïmary
market, initial public offerings (IP0s)l6 raised about US $2.7&on

in 1992.17This

amount increased to about US $44.5 million in 1996,18followed by a fall to about US $17
million (Tk.800 million) in 1997.19 In 1996 24 IPOs of US $54.94 million worth were
issued." In the foIiowing year only 12 IPOs of US $12.55 million were offered." Thus in
these two calendar years, on average, only 18 IPOs of about US $33.75 million were
issued, whereas to meet the investment need of the country 100 IPOs of nearly US $276
million ( approx. Tk. 13000 billion) are requiredmz2
In the secondary market , on the other

See "Secondary Market AfTairs" SEC Quarterly Review 4:3 (Jan.-March 1998) at 8.
Taka (Tk.) is the currency of Bangladesh. As of February 1998 US $ 1= 46.30 taka.,
supra note 3 at 122..
l4 Supra note 10 at 6.
I5 'Yhrrent Issues in Bangladesh Capital Market" Portji'olio 1:6 (April 1998) 7 at 7.
l6 "Initial Public 0ffering7' is the process pursuant to which the f m t offer and
distribution of securities of an issuer to the public, either through an underwriter or
occasionally directly by the issuer, is made by way of a prospectus.. . An IPO may consist
of or include a secondary distribution of securities held by an existing .shareholder.": G.
R. D. Goulet, Public Share m e r i n g s and Stock Exchange Listings in Canada, (North
York, Ontario: CCH Canadian Lunited, 1994) at 569
I7 Supra note 10 at 6.
I8 Supra note 10 at 6.
l9
See F. E. Cookson, and M. E. Hauque, "Bangladesh Capital Market: Current Issues
and Options" Porrfolio 1:8 (June 1998) 1lat 12.
20 Supra note 1 at i 1.
21 Supra note 1 at 1 1.
Supra note 19 at 11.
l3

"

hand the annual tumover of securities in 1992 at the stock exchangesD was about US
$1 lmillion, which rose to over US $700 million in 1996.'~ Up to March 1998 it stood at
about US $0.805 million ( Tk. 37.84 million).'5 The number of listed companies is
increasing every year. In 1992 there were 145 companies listed on the Dhaka Stock
Exchanges E SE).^^ This number increased to 183 in 1995 when the Chittagong Stock
Exchange (CSE) was e~tablished.'~As of March 1998 both the bourses had 203
companies on the iïsts in total.28The number of listed securities is also increasing ; it was
153 in 1992~'and rose to 223 in 1998:'

Ail the statistics given above make it clear that Bangladesh is a poor

economy with a very low contribution fiom the securities industry to the GDP. In view of
this scenario the Asian Development Bank (hereinafter ADB), with the ultimate aim of

eradication of poverty and improvement of living conditions, has underscored the need
for reform, on the highest priorïty basis, in the Bangladesh financial sector (banking
sector and capital market) because "(w)ithout efficient financial markets the mobilization
the Govemment of
of additional resources for development will slow d ~ w n " ~Sunilarly,
'.

'3 Bangladesh has two stock Exchanges, viz. the Dhaka Stock Exchange Ltd. and the
Chittagong Stock Exchange Ltd.
24
Supra note 10.
Supra note 13 at 2.
26 Supra note 10.
Supra note 10.
28 Supra note 13 at 2.
29 Supra note 10.
30 Supra note 13 at 2.
31 Supra note 2 at 118. Stiglitz considers the financial markets of a country the brain of
its economic system and says that "if they fail, not only will the sector's profits be Iower

"

Bangladesh considers "the development of the domestic capital market to be critical to its
overall resource mobilization effort vital for the future growth and development of the
country's ec~nomy"~'.Accordingly, the Govemrnent recognizes the need to introduce
capital market r e f o r ~ n and,
s ~ ~ following the 1996 security market scam, adopted a reform
program called the Capital Market Development Program (CMDP) with the broad
objective '%O develop a fair, transparent, and efficient market"34. To this end Bangladesh
received a financial loan and technical assistance gants from the ADB on the
recomrnendation of an ADB report (hereafter ADB ~ e ~ o n ) . ~ '

The ADB Report put forward its recommendation after reviewing the state
of Bangladesh capital market and the concerned institutions. One of its fmdings was that
in the area of IPO approval the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereafter SEC), the
securities market watchdog of Bangladesh, was applying a system based on merit

than would otherwise have been, but the performance of the entire economic system may
be impaired.": J.E. Stiglitz, "The Role of the State in Financial Markets," Proceedings of
the World Bank Annual Conference on Developrnent Econamics 1993, (World Bank:
Washington, D.C., 1994) at 23, cited in A. Hossain and S. Rashid, "Financial Sector
Reform", in M.G- Quibria, ed. The Bangladesh Economy in Transition, (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1997) 22 1 at 221. In particular, the importance of the securities markets
in the nationai economy of a country lies in the k t that they "channel individual
institutionai savings to private industry and thereby contribute to the growth of capital
investment". S. Rep. No. 91-1218,at 2, quoted in T. W. Joo, "Who Watches the
Watchers? The Secunties Investor Protection Act, Investor Confidence, and the
Subsidization of Failure", (1999) 72 S. Cal.L,Rev. 1071 at 1081.
32 Supra note 10 at 48.
33 Supra note 10 at 2.
34 F. Narayan, "The Capital Market Development Project" Portjiolio, supra note 15 at 14.
35 Ibid. For the title of the report, note 10 supra.

regulation instead of fidl disclosure of information through prospectus? This caused
considerable delay in getting approval to IPOs frorn the

SEC^', which ranged from 6-12

~ n o n t h sIt. ~also
~ revealed that in 95% of cases its assessrnent of issuers' projections
contained in prospectuses tumed out to be wronga3' Sometirnes the concerned officiais
intentionally delay in approvïng the prospectus with an intention of being (illegally)
"~atisfied".~~
At the end of the year it lends approval to prospectuses en masse. As a
result, the market gets flooded by Initial Public Offerings @
O
' s.)

Because of so many

lPOs coming together in the market at a time the issues are less subscnbed and the issuer
fails to implement its commitments as forecast because of a shortage of funds. This, in

turn, affects the investors who get less or no di~idends.~'
According to media reports
dwing the Iast few years only 5% of companies have disbursed dividends as forecast in
their prospecnises.42 Thus, on the whole, the investors and the public lost their confidence

in the market, which deteriorated when the 1996 share scam took place.
In consideration of the aforementioned finding of the ADB Report the SEC
decided to give up the "merit review" policy and to adopt the "full disciosure" poli~y.43I,

Supra note 10 at 13. For discussion of the concepts of "disclosure" and "ment
regulation", infra notes 179-189 and accompanying texts.
37 Supra note 10 at 13.
38 "SEC-er behishebi karmokando" ('bhesponsibIe Activities of the SEC') Share Bazar,
(a Bengali national magazine), 4:8 (16 July 1998)3 at 4.
39 Ibid. at 5 .
Ibid
41 Ibid.
" Supra note 38 at 5.
" K.U.Ahmad, "Informational efficiency in the Stock Market", The Daily Star (a
national daily) (27 July 1998) at 4.
36

early 1998 it started asking issuers to provide full disclosure of information in

prospectuses and advised the investing public to make their investment decisions in light
of such d i s c l ~ s u r eIt. ~formally
~
adopted the disclosure review system in January 1999 by
(hereinafter PIR).
rnaking the Public Issue Rules, 19982~
Under the new legal arrangement the investors in Bangladesh have been
given the whole responsibility of making investment decisions in light of the disclosed
information by the issuers in prospectuses, The SEC no longer shares the responsibility, it
merely ensures full and fair disclosure of material i n f ~ r m a t i o nBut
. ~ this disclosure
system poses different kinds of problems, For example, it is difficult for the investors,
particularly the lay investors, to assess the ment of a securïty which is ever speculative in
nature.47 In rnaking investment decisions they need to purchase services of the market
intermediaries like investment advisors, Such institutions are, however, newly developed
in Bangladesh and as such their services are hardly reliable.48In addition, the accuracy of
information disclosed in prospectuses is questionab~e.49Legal remedy against any
questionable disclosure or misstatement in prospectuses is far beyond the reach of the

"

See T.I. Khaiili, M.A.Kashem and M.S. Rahman, "Restoring Lost Confidence" Star
Magazine (a supplementary of the Daily Star ), (3 April 1998) 4 at 6.
NO. SEC/Sec. 7/P/R-98/ MO, Bangladesh Gazene (supplementary), (25 Jan. 1999) 121.
For discussion of the concept of full and fair disclosure of matenal information, infrn
notes 29 1-198.
47 Supra note 38 at 35. For the nature of a security, NIfra notes 76-1 18 and the
accompanying texts.
48 Supra note 38 at 35.
49 supra note 38 at 35. Also see M. Rahman, Letter to the Editor, The Holiday (a national
weekly) (26 June 1998) at 2,
45

46

investors because it involves costs and tirne?' The only remedy availed of is the
administrative action by the SEC, namely imposition of fines on the responsible
c ~ r n ~ a n i e sBut
. ~ ' this does not help the investors. If a Company is penalized for
misstatement, the fines will be received by the government, not by the investors, Due to
ali these factors the investors have lost their attraction for investment in s e c ~ r i t i e This
s~~
aspect of the problem connected with the disclosure regime in Bangladesh necessitates
the present endeavor.

This thesis will examine the above problems with a view to making
recommendations as to how they can be addressed. It will do so by a comparative analysis
of a well developed regime, namely Ontario. The reason behind choosing Ontario for
cornparison is that it is the biggest securities market in Canada, and its law and policy
with respect to securities regulation are basicaliy foilowed in other provinces. Its
economy depends on these markets "to piay a pivotai role in the capitd formation and
wealth creation process.. .(generating) significant jobs in the financial services se~tor"'~.
Given this role the OSC wants them (the markets) to be "efficient, open and fair"" so that

For a general view of the problems in civil litigation, see R. Rahman, Civil Litigation
in Bangladesh, @haka: Nuruzzaman Choudhury, 1986).
See "Regulatory Matters- Penalty Imposecl" SEC Qunrterly Review (kt.-Dec. 1994)
19.
" Financial Express (a national daily) (18 July 1998) at 1 ; n i e Bangladesh Observer (a
national daily) (5 July 1998) at 1 .
53
Ontario Secunties Commission (OSC),A Changing Commissionfor a Changing
Market- 1997 OSC Annual Report (hereinafter 1997 AnnuaZ Report),(Ontario: OSC,
1997) at 7 .
50

'

54

Ibid.

(a) "capital c m be raised and securities traded quickly and without
unnecessary costs or impediments";
(b) "current, complete and comparabIe public information about
issuers and market activity are available"; and
(c) "custorners interests corne first and investors are protected fiom
market abuses".55
As a measure of investor protection Ontario securities law requires the

full, mie and plain disclosure of information relevant to investor decisions? It prescribes

forms detailing the matters to be contained in the prospectuses of different types of
companies. Each of the forms sets outs so rnmy matters that if it is tmly complied with,
there may be litde undisclosed. Non-disclosure or partial disclosure or false disclosure is
remediable by an investor suit for damages which is easy and less time consuming. As a
result, in rnost of the cases information provided by companies is found to be full and
true, though not aiways in plain terms? Besides, the OSC has a discretionary
jurisdiction, though not often used, to refuse a prospectus in public interest and on some
other specific grounds, which serves as an investor protection shield. Thus the Ontario
investors enjoy the benefits of both disclosure and, to some extent, ment review. As a
result, in Ontario there is an increasing demand for 1 ~ 0 sIt. indicates
~ ~
that the investors

Ibid.
Ontario Securities Act(OSA), R.S .O. 1990, c. S-5,S. 56.
D. L.Johnston and K.D.Rockwell, Canadian SecuBties Regulation, (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1998) at 8 1.
Supra note 53 at 1 1.
55
56

"
'*

have confidence in the securities markets which, in turn, contributes to the formation of
capital and the economic progress of the province.
The present work is an attempt to find out, through cornparison, what
types of information are subject to prospectus disclosure and what role the respective
securities commissions of Ontario and Bangladesh play in this regard- In other words, it
will be considered whether disclosure required by the Iaws of Ontario and Bangladesh is
enough to guarantee the investor protection or whether further interventions by the
securities commissions are needed to ensure investor confidence. After discerning the
similarities and disparities between the Ontario and Bangladesh laws, prescriptions to the
problem prevalent in the latter would be suggested to import from the former, where
appropriate. The proposed cornparison is justified given the facts
(a) that the matters to be compared (disclosure and the roles of the OSC and SEC) have a
comrnon function under both the systems, namely to provide information to the
investing public conceming an investment enterprise and thereby to ensure its
protection59;
(b) that both Ontario and Bangladesh belong to the same legal and economic family,

namely cornmon law system and market economy system.

59 This functional affinity is the core of comparative research. To quote Bogdan, 'The
compared legal d e s and institutes must be comparable to each otherfinctionally: they
must be intended to deal with the same problem." :M. Bogdan, Cornpurative Law,
(Sweden: Norway: Law and Taxation Publistiers, 1994) at 60.

The whole work is divided into four Sections .Section 1 constitutes the
present part of the thesis. Section 2 makes comparisons between the disclosure regimes of
Ontario and Bangladesh. This Section has three sub-divisions: Sub-section 2.1 gives an
introductory idea to the central theme of the thesis. It explains the circumstances
necessitating prospectus registration both in Ontario and Bangladesh. The purpose is to
see if the prospectus registration renders similar functions under both the jurisdictions.
Sub-section 2.2 looks into the theoretical foundations of prospectus regulation with a
view to revealing how Ontario and Bangladesh conform or d s e r in this regard. Sub-

section 2.3, which constitutes the centrepiece of the Section, is designed to discern the

actual sirnilarities and disparities between the concerned laws. Section 3 provides a
critical evaluation of the comparisons of the concerned laws and the underlying theories.
Section 4, the closing part, contains the conclusion of the thesis and sets forth some
recornmendatione for refonns of laws, where necessary

2 PROSPECTUS DISCLOSURE AND THE ROLE OF THE OSC

AND THE SEC- COMPARISONS

2.1 CONTEXTUALUING PROSPECTUS DISCLOSURE AND THE ROLE OF

THE SECURITIES COMMISSIONS

2.1-1 INTRODUCTION
The central focus of the thesis is the role of the securities commissions of
Ontario and Bangladesh with respect to disclosure through prospectus. It deds with the
extent to which information should be disclosed to the investors and whether the
commissions should review the ments of the securities offered by the prospectuses.
Discussion of matters like these in the forthcorning parts of the thesis presupposes, as a
preliminary, an inquiry into the meaning and purpose of a prospectus, the nature of
transactions requinng a prospectus, and the involvement of the respective securities
commissions of Ontario and Bangladesh in this respect. The following discussion is
being directed to that end.

2.1.2 ONTARIO

The OSA does not contain a definition of bcprospectus".60A prospectus is
generally understood as a document that contains detailed information6' concerning the
issuer? its business, management and s e c ~ r i t being
y ~ ~ distnbuted&l etc. so that the
potential investor(s) c m make an informed decision on investment in security. It is "the
principal ticket to freely tradable sec~rities'"~.It is the "principal" ticket because
60 However, a dictionary of Canadian law defines it as "[alny prospectus, notice, circular
or advertisement of any kind whatsoever,. .. whether in writing or otherwise offering to
the public for purchase or subscription any shares or debentures of any company".
Daphne A. Dukeiow and Betsy Nuse, The Dictionary of Canadian Law, 2d ed. (Carswell:
Scarborough, 1995) s.v, "prospectus". This definition is almost the reproduction of S. 30
of the English Companies Act, 1900,63 & 64 Vict. c.48, and S. 95 of the (Ontario)
Companirs Act, 1907, S.O. 1907 c. 34. It may, however, be said to be an obsolete
definition in view of the modern securities law of Ontario. First, under the modem
securities law of Ontario prospectus is not meant to be anything like advertisement,
notice, etc., which rather, if made in furtherance of the sale of securities, will be called
"trading7' in securities. See the texts accompanying notes infra notes 119-134. Second,
today prospectus is not meant to distribute securities to the Public. Because the word,
"public" triggered interpretive problems, the legislature deleted it fiom the statute with
reference to prospectus requirement in 1981. For details, see infra note 73. Third,
according to the modem law a prospectus is required to distribute securities. But the
given defuiition only covers a narrow area of securities, narnely shares and debentues.
Thus an infinite variety of securities are left outside its fold.
Information required by the OSA will be discussed in Sub-Section 2.3, below.
62
ccksuer77
means a person or company who has outstanding, issues or proposes to issue,
a security. : OSA, R.S.O. c.S.5, S. l(1) "issuer".
63 For the meaning and definition of "security", see the text accornpanying infra notes
76-1 18.
see texts accompanying in@ notes 135-146.
For the meaning of ccdistribution77,
Dillon, "The Prospectus Exemptions, Process and Presentation", Basic SecuBties,
(Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, April 1988)l at 1 excerpted in H.L. O'Brien,
Securities Regdation Cases and Materials, vol. 1, (Halifax: Faculty of Law, Dalhousie
University, Fall 1995) at 623 (Course materials prepared for law students of Dalhousie
University).

nonnally a person or Company can carry on a di~tribution~~
in securities o d y by having a
prospectus approved by the O S C . ~
There
~ are exceptions to this provision. First,
exemptions fkom the prospectus requirement are available under the

OSA^^ or Regulution

or the OSC Rules. 69 Second, they rnay be granted by the OSC at its discretion where
statutory exemptions are not applicable7*Thus though prospectus is the general
requirement for issuing securities, there are exceptional situations in which this
requirement does not apply. This arrangement, c d e d the "closed system", was introduced
in Ontario on 15 M a c h 198 1.7' Prior to that date distributions of securities to the public

66 For the meaning and definition of "distribution" in securities, see the text
accompanying infra.notes 135- 147.
67 OSA. R.S.O. 1990 c.S.5, S. 53(1).
68 OSA, R.S .O. 1990 cS5, ss. 72-73.
69 Ontario Securities Act Regulation (OSAR), R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 1015, S. 14;
OSA, R.S .O. 1990 c.S -5as am., 143. For the rule-making power of the SEC, see infra
note 603.
70 1
.S. 74(1).The discretion enjoyed by the OSC with respect to prospectus
registration impacts on the Ontario securities industry. The following comment is quite
appropriate in this respect:

the Act (OSA) is devised in such a way to make the securities industry in
Ontario beholden d2y in and day out to the Commission (OSC). They are
either there trying to find that they fit within the requirements of the
registration provisions or that the prospectus meets the requirements of the
regdations and the forms which are required by the commission, or they
are there seeking to expand and enlarge upon one of the areas of the
exemptions so that they can see whether they escape the net of the
Securities Commission, or they are there begging the Securities
Commission to exercise the extremely wide discretionary powers vested in
the commission. Legislature of Ontario Debates- Oficial Report
(Hansard), 31 (6 Aprii 1978) at 1291 (Mr. Renwick).
71 For details see H.G. Emerson, "Business Finance under the "Closed System" of the
Ontario Securities Act: Statutory Scheme and Pitfalls", in Law Society of Upper Canada,

were oniy possible by filing a prospectus with the OSC unless exemption pro-*visionsdid
apply.72In other words, non-public distributions were kept out of the scope off prospectus
regdation. However, it was not clear who was the "public" that needed protection, which
created "a minefield of interpretive diffi~ulties"~~.
To replace such difficulties with
"'simplicity and ~ e r t a i n t y the
" ~ ~present system was set up.
--

-

-

Special Lectures -Corporate Law in the BOS, @on Mills: Rechard De Boo Picblishers,
1982) 29 at 35-45.
OSA,S.O. 1978 c. 47, S. 5 1. Before this act (effective fiom June 1978) prmspectus was
required where there was a primary distribution of securities to the public.: O S A , R.S.O.
1970 c. 426, S. 35. Because the word "public" was debatable, Merger Report
recomrnended for its removal from the OSA.: Report of the Comrnirtee of the Ontario
Securities Commission on rhe Problerns of Disclosure Raised for Znvestors b y Business
Combinations and Private Placements, (Ontario: Department of Financial and
Commercial Affairs, Province of Ontario, Feb- 1970) (Merger Report), at p-.
3.20. See
for the interpretive debates, infia note 73.
73
Johnston and Rockweil, Securities Regulation in Canada, supra note 57, a t 70. For
example, in several cases "public" was interpreted differently. Nash v. Lynde,. [1929]
AC. 158 (H.L.) is the leading English case in which the word was considered in
reference to securities legislation. There it was rnaintained that a document a s a
prospectus should be "shown to any person as a member of the public and as an
invitation to that person to take some of the shares referred tomtherein. (Per Lord
Hailsfiam L.C., at 164). Viscount Sumner said, ""The pubIic", ...is of course a general
word. No particular nurnbers are prescribed. Anything from two to infniry maay serve:
perhaps even one, if he is intended to be first of a series of subscribers, but makes further
proceedings needless by himself subscribing the whole. The point is that the offer is such
as to be open to any one who bnngs his money and applies in due form, whetner the
prospectus was addressed to hun on behalf of the company or not." (at 169) (emphasis
added). Further, in effect he said that "friends, even if they are business friends" do not
constitute the public and, therefore, a single private communication among them is not a
prospectus. (at 168).Thus close friends and business associates were excluded h m the
definition of "public". This is known as "friends and business associatesyy
test-. In R. v.
Empire Dock Ltd. (1940), 55 B.C.R.34 (C. C.), one of the earliest Canadian w e s , it was
observed by Lennox Co. J. that "the meaning of the words 'the public' cannot be tied
down to a specific quantity". (at 37). The US Supreme Court enunciated a t e s t called
"need to know" test in its decision in the SEC v. Ralston Purina Co. (1953), 3846 U S
119,73 S.Ct. 98 1. In thzt case the defendant company sold its securities of worth $

''

,

Under the closed system, if the exemption-bypasses are not open, no
person or company can trade in a security without a prospectus provided such trade is a
2,000,000 to its own employees under a stock investment plan. Some of the employees
held positions in the company and the others were more junior employees, e.g., foreman
entrusted with the duty of supervision at the lowest level- .The Court held it would be
superfluous if a prospectus information were provided to the first categories of employees
because they did know of them by virtue of their position in the company. Rather the
other employees devoid of the positional advantage had a "need to know" of them. The
Corn said, "The design of the statute (The Securities Act, 1933) is to protect investors by
promoting fidl disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment
decisions. ... An offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is
transaction 'not involving any public offering"'. (at 124-125, footnote omitted). It also
said that "the statute would seem to apply to a "public offering" whether to a few or
many." (at 125, footnote ornitted).Thus the Court means that whoever has or have a "need
to know", irrespective of the number, must be supplied with a prospectus while securïties
are offered for sale. In R. v. Piepgrass (1959), 29 W.W.R.218,23 D.L.R. (2d) 220, 125
C.C.C.364,3 1 C.R. 2 13 (Alta C.A.) the Alberta Court of Appeal said, "It is clear fkom
cases and from the authorities cited that it is impossible to defme with any degree of
precision what is meant by the term "offer for sale to the public"" (Per Macdonald J. A.,
23 D-L.R. at 228). Of course, it applied the '%ends and business associates" test and held
the accused liabie because the persons (five in number) to whom they sold shares "were
not in any sense friends or associates of the accused, or persons having comrnon bonds of
interest or association-" (23 D.L.R. at 228). In R. v. McKillop , Cl9721 1 O.R. 164,4
C.C.C.(2d) 390 (Prov. Ct.) a small group of persons
were termed as pubiic. An offer of sale of shares to them was held to be an offering to the
public. Both Ralston Purirza and Piepgrass were referred to in this case. The court laid
down that

In my opinion the sales made by the accused to the various named
individuals were not of a strictly pnvate nature. In other words, shares
were not only available to those particular people to the exclusion of al1
others. While it is true that the individuals who purchased the shares
constituted a s m d number in proportion to dl residents of this
community, nevertheless, they were not a favoured few, so far as
possessing knowledge of the availability of the shares was concerned. (1
0-Rat 168 and 4 C.C.C. at 394, per Greco, Prov. Ct. J.).
74

Merger Report, supra note 72.

distribution of such sec~uity?~
The definitions of "security", "trade" and "distribution"
are the key to understanding the nature of securities transactions as well as the
significance of the need of a "prospectus".

Securitv:
The OSA enurnerates a list of 16 instruments to be included within the
fold is so expansive that it
ambit of " s e c ~ r i t y " .That
~ ~ list is not however, e x h a u ~ t i v eIts
.~~
may entail "anything that acts like a security, even if not specified in the definiti~n"'~.It

OSA,R.R.O. 1990..c.S.5, S. 53(1).
76 Ibid., S. l(1) ~bsec~rity".
77 Section l(1) in defining "securïty" uses the word "include" instead of "mean" and thus
the definition is inclusive in nature. However, as to whether the definition is exhaustive
or not there is a debate between Alboini and, Johnston and Rockwell while commenting
on the decision in Re George Albino, Feb. 19911 14 O.S.C.B. 365. In this case a question
arose whether "the phantom stock plan" (a long term incentive plan) was a secunty or
not. One cornmissioner held in the affirmative, one in the negative and third one declined
to decide the issue. On the basis of this decision V. P. AIboini says that " the definition
(of security) has been treated as if it were exhaustive": V. P. Alboini, Securities Law and
Practice, 2d ed,, (Toronto: Carswell, 1984), vol. 1, at 0-29. His interpretation seems to be
grounded on that it was a 2: 1 majority decision. But Johnston and Rockweil differ with
Alboini in that his interpretation was "incorrect" as "[olnly one commissioner used the
reasoning" (that the phantom stock plan was not security): Johnston and Rockwell, supra
note 57 at 25 n. 15. In fact, declining to decide an issue, in law, should not, it is
subrnitted, be interpreted to have amounted to a negative decision. As such the decision in
the present case cannot be said to be a 2: 1 decision. Thus Johnston and Rockweli's
argument may be said to be correct.
78 Johnston and Rockwell, supra note 57 at 125. In this comection Iacobucci is worth
quoting, "If the definition is not sufficiently wide to catch what are thought to be
securities, then obviously the objectives of the statute will not be attained". :F. Iacobucci,
'The Definition of Security for Purposes of a Securities Act", Proposuls for a Securities
Market Law for Canada, (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1979) at 230,
excerpted in H. L. O'Brien, ed. Secunties Regulation Cases and Materials, (Halifax,
Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University, Fall 1995) at 404. This purposive approach to
75

is so broadly interpreted because the Securities Act is a remedial legislation?9 The
Supreme Court of Canada made this point clear when it said that "(s)uch remedial
legislation must be constnied broadly, and must be read in the context of the econornic
reaiities to which it is addre~sed"'~.
The court had in mind the basic policy objective of
the securities legislation, namely the protection of the investing public.81Thus in George

Albino it was reiterated that "[ilf the particular set of legal nghts and obligations under
review was found to be a security, the investing public would be protected through fidi,
true and plain disclosure of al1 material facts in a prospectus"82.
interpreting the meaning of "security" has been taken by courts of US and Canada in
various cases.: see infra note 101-113 and the accompanying texts.
79 Remedial legislation is "(a) statute having for its object either to redress some existing
@evance. or to introduce some regulation or proceeding conducive to public good".
Benjamin W. Pope, Legal Defnitions, (Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1920) SV.
"remedial legislation". As to how a remedial statute should be constnied Maxwell lays
down that "remedial statutes.. .are to be construed liberaily and beneficially, so as to
prornote as completely as possible the suppression of the rnischief intended to be
remedied, and to give Me and strength to the remedy". :P.B. Maxwell, The Interpretation
of Statutes, (Colorado: Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1991) at 203.
80
Paczfic Coast Coin Exchange v. OSC (1977), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 112 at 127; 80 D.L.R.
(3d) 529 at 538. What is meant by "economic reality" in the present context? It has been
defined by the Supreme Court of Hawaii in State Commission of Secunfies v. Hawaii
Marker Center. 485 P. 2d. 105 (Hawaii Sup. Ct. 1971) at 109 as the "subjection of the
investor's money to the risks of an enterprise over which he exercises no managerial
control". This formula was borrowed fiom R.J. Coffey, "The Economic Reaiities of a
"Security": 1s There a More Meaningf'ui Formula?", (1967) 18 W. Res. Law Rev. 367.
See PacificCoast. 2 S C R 112, at 126; 80 D.L.R. (3d) 529, at 538. For this point see
also Hawaii, ibid.
Re George Albino, supra note 77 at 427.

*'

''

However, Gillen groups the aforesaid 16 branches into three, to wit,
. ~ ~ the
common securities, less common securities and non-exclusive s e c ~ r i t i e sWithin
"common" category are included, fïrst, different kinds of shares, and bonds, debentures
and other evidence of indebtedne~s.8~
The expression "other evidence of indebtedness"
covers all forms of debt instruments, eg., Ioan cornmitment letters sold for a substantial
considerati0n.8~Second, it (the common category of securities) covers documents which
. ~ ~ option is a
are evidence of option, subscrïption or other interest in a s e ~ u r i t y"An
contractual right to purchase or sell a security at a specific exercise pnce"87, e-g., warrants
and rights. "Subscription" refers to forms which one can sign up in order to buy
e . ~the
~ "common"
securities. The term "other interest" is of very wide s ~ o ~Third,
There is no
securities also include those which are "cornmonly known" as sec~rities.8~
well accepted definition of c'cornrnonly known" securities. The US Supreme Court laid
down a test of determination of such securities, narnely the "character the instrument is
given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and economic
inducements held out to the prospect"".

For example, a basic pyrarnid scheme was held

-

83 M.R. Gillen, Securities Regulation in Canada, 2d. ed., (Scarborough: Carswell, 1998)
at 107.
OSA, R.S.0.1990, c. S.5, S. l(1) "security" (e).
85 LI. S. V. Austin, 462 F. 2d 724 ( 1 0 Cir.),
~
cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1048 (1972).
86 OSA. R S . 0 . 1990, c. S.5
Alboini, Securities Law and Fraccice, supra note 77 at 0-38.
88 R. V. Hansen (1973), 12 C.C.C. (2d) 368 (B. C.Prov. Cf.).
OSA. R.S.O. 1990 c. S.5, S. l(1) "security" (a).
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corporation, 320 U.S. 344 (1943) at 352-53,64 S-Ct. 120
at 124.

"

"

to be a security of such kind? The "Iess comrnon category" includes "items al1 of which

would normally involve an initial payment, which will be used to produce some future
r e t ~ r n s " ~e.g.,
~ , a certificate of interest in oil, natural gas or mining leaseY3 an income or
annuity contract not issued by an insureP4 and a document evidencing an interest in a
scholarship or educational plan o r trust?' The last category, narnely the non-exclusive
category, includes the following:
(i) "a document evidencing title to, or an interest in, the capital, assets,
property, profits, eanllngs or royalties of a person'"6;

(ii) "a profit sharing agreement or ~ertificate"~~;
(iii) "an investment contract other than investment contract within "the

meaning of the Invesmtent Contracts AC^'*.
9L

SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, 348 F. Supp. 766 @. Ore. 1972.).
"A pyramid scheme is a scam. One person (the top of the pyramid) starts it. That person
convinces others to give him or her money in exchange for some kind of product or
service. Those purchasers are the second level of the pyramid. They recover their money
and make a profit by selling the sanie good or service to more people. The base of the
pyramid expands as more people buy into the scheme. Higher levels receive a percentage
of sales on lower levels. Eventually, the pyramid collapses, as there is nobody left to
invest. When that happens, the people at the bottom of the pyramid lose al1 of their
investment. The person at the top often chooses this time to flee the country with his or
her proceeds." :Johnston and Rockwell, supra note 57 at 27.
92 Gillen, supra note 83 at 108.
93 OSA, R.S.O. 1990 c. S.5, S. l(1) cbsecurity"(j). In Emery English, [Jan. 19661 O.S.C.B.
27, the OSC held a sale of a fiactional interests in certain oil leases as trading in
securities.
94
Ibid., S. 1(1) "security" (m).
95 Ibid., S. 1(1) "security" (O).
% Ibid., S. l(1) 4bsecurity"(b).
97
Ibid., S. l(1) "security" (i).
98 Ibid., S. l(1) ''security" (n).

AU of these sub-categories are "sufficiently broad and vague enough to capture dl that
'
documents evidencing
needs to be regulated" under the Ontario Securities ~ c t . ~Thus

"interests in property" may relate to nurnerous transactions of daily life. l W They bave
been judicialiy interpreted to concern transactions with the purpose of investment only
inasmuch as the basic policy objective of the act is to protect the investing public. roi A
profit sharing agreement is recognized as being included within the branch of "investment
contract19102 which also rernains undefined in the OSA. Judiciai interpretations of the term
have, however, been made in USA and Canada In SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing

colo3the

defendant offered leases and assignments that conveyed interest in property. The COU^
interpreted the transaction as "investment contact" looking into the nature of the
instrument concerned. It said that "(i)n applying the acts of this general purpose, the
coui-es have not been guided by the nature of the assets back of a particular document or
offenng. The test ratber is what character the instrument is given in commerce by the
Gillen, supra note 83 at 110.
lm Supra note 83 at 110.
101
OSC v. Brigadoon Scorch Distributors (Can.) Ltd-, [1970]3 0.R 714,14 D.L.R. (3d)
38 (Ont. H.C.). In this case warehouse receipts for scotch whisky traded through a
broker was held to be a security because the purpose of the purchase was not
consumption, rather investment. Earlier, in R. v, Dalley, El9571 O.W.N. (C.A.) 123 an
agreement evidencing the sale of a fiactionaï interest in the rights of prospecting
petroleum and natural gas in a land was held by the Ontario Court of Appeal as a security.
It said, "The agreement was designed ... to serve the same purpose as corporate shares
would have served., .,namely as evidence of tiùe". (per LeBel J.A.) at 125.
'O2 n i e OSC declined to admit "profit sharlng agreement" beyond "investment contract"
in Raymond Lee, [June 19781 OSCB 119 at 125,saying that "Literal application of this
clause ... (to designate such agreement a separate branch of security) would expand the
application of the Act (OSA) into realrns limited by the imagination of counsei".
99

term of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the econornic inducements held out to the
prospect .104 In this respect it (the court) was guided b y the broad policy of the Securities
97

Act, 1933. It said, "Courts will construe the details of an act in confonnity with its

dominating general purpose, will read text in light of context and will interpret the text so
far as the rneaning of the words fairly pennits so as t o carry out in particular cases the
generally expressed legislative policy .105 This broad purposive approach has been
97

adopted by courts to interpreting the meaning of "security" in general and "investing
contract" in particular. In SEC v. WJ. Howey

CO.'^^ the U.S. Supreme Court had to

decide only the question whether a scheme that involved no actual participation of the
investor was an investment contract. It set forth a test c d e d common enterprise test to
determine "whether the scheme involves (1) an investment of money in (2) a comrnon
enterprise (3) with profits to come (4) solely from the efforts of others .107 Subsequentiy,
97

this test had been applied in a lot of cases in US both a t the state and federal ievels. One
author establishes by research that the Howey test is ccincompleteor misleading" in that
(1) it defies the nsk of Ioss of the initial contribution made by the purchaser; (2) the

phrase bbcornrnon
enterprise" is ambiguous (e-g. an organization where there must be
more than one investor, whereas the risk of Ioss may exist even if there is a single
investor); and (3) compared to the risk of loss of onginal investment much emphasis is

.

'O3

'"
'O5
'O6

320 U.S.344 (1943), 64 SCt. 120.
Ibid. at 352-353.
&id. at 350-351.
328 U.S. 293 (1946).

put on the inducement of future profits whereas the risk is "the single most important
economic characteristic which distinguishes a security from the universe of other
transactions 7,.108 Then the author presents hïs own formula extending the meaning of
' ~ in Srate of Hawaii v. Hawaii Marker ~ e n r e r'O'
"economic realities" of a s e ~ u r î t y .Later,
one of the basic questions was whether the minimal participation of the investors in an
enterprise would mean that they did not expect profits '3olely" from the efforts of others
o r promoters. The Supreme Court of Hawaii found a problem with the word "solely" used
in the cornmon enterprise test established in the Howey quoted above. It termed the
Hawey test as "mechanical" to protect the investors and interpreted the word "solely"

fiom broader statutory policy perspective so that investors even with minimal
participation in the management of the enterprise be protected. Then it laid down a test
for determining the nature of security transaction, which is known as risk capital test in
line with the definition of "csecurity"
proposed by Professor coffey.'

That test reads as

follows:
An investrnent contract is created whenever:
(1)

An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and

(2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise,

and

by the offeror's promises
or representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a

(3) the hinùshing of the initial value i s induced

Ibid. at 301.
'O" R.J. Coffey, "Economic Realities of a "Security" : 1s There a More Meaningful
Formula?", supra note 80 at 374-375.
logFor Coffey's definition of "security", infra note 118.
I l o Hawaii, supra note 80.
I l 1 Infra note 118.
'O7

(4)

valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the initial value, wilI
accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation of the enterprise, and
the offeree does not receive the rïght to exercise practical and actual
control over the managerial decisions of the enter-rise.' I 2

In Pncific ~oast'" the Supreme Court of Canada applied both Howey and Hawaii tests in
determining whether a particular transaction was an investment contract. It emphasized
upholding the policy objective of the OSA (i.e. investor protection) in interpreting
securities transactions even beyond those tests, if necessary. To quote De Grandpre J.:
It is clearly Iegislative poiicy to replace the harshness of caveat emptor in
security related transactions and courts should seek to attain that gc'al even
if tests carefully formulated in prior cases prove ineffective and must
continudy be broadened in scope. It is the policy and not the subsequently
formulated judicial test that is decisive. l4

'

The foiiowing definition qualifies the tests discussed above: l Is
An investment contract is a contract whereby a person, having been led to
expect profits, undertakes to participate in the risk of a venture by a
contribution of capital or loan, without having the required knowledge to
carry on the venture or without obtaining the nght to participate directly in
decisions concerning the carrying on of the venture.' l6

Hawaii, supra note 80 at 109.
Pacifie Gold Coast, supra note 80.
'14 2 S.C.R. 112 at 132.
See Johnston and Rockweli, supra note 57, at 30.
l l6 Quebec Securities Act (QSA), Q.S. 1982 c. 48, S. 1 "'an investment contract"(emphasis
added)
Il2

As appears from this definition, investment in the nsk of an enterprise in the management
of which the investor does not have any actual control is the chief feahwe of an
investment contract.lL7This is also true of any security transaction in general.'18

Trade:
Like "security", "trade" is defined inclusively under the OSA. In the first
place it includes "any saie or disposition of a security for valuable consideration",
Il7 This basic feature is defined as "economic reality" of a security transaction. For the
definition and interpretation of the concept, supra notes 80.
See supra notes 80 and 90-108 and the accompanying text. Coffey, supra note 80 at
377 defines "security" based on the "economic reality" concept as below:

"'

'

"security" is:
A transaction (except an isolated transaction not involving an offering
to the public) in which
a person ("buyer") fumishes value ("initial value") to another
("seller"); and
a portion of initial value is subjected to the nsks of an enterprise, it
being sufficient if(a) part of initial value is furnished for a proprietary interest in, or
debt-holder claim against, the enterprise, or
(6) any property received by the buyer is cornmitted to use by the
enterprise, even though the buyer retains specific ownership of
such property, or
(c) part of initial value is furnished for property whose present
value is determined by taking into account the anticipated but
unrealized success of the enterprise, even though the buyer has
no legai relationship with the enterprise; and
at the time of the transaction, the buyer is not familiar with the
operations of the enterprise or does not receive the nght to participate
in the management of the enterprise; and
the funiishing of initia1 value is induced by the seller's promises or
representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a
valuable benefit of some kind, over and above initial value, will accrue
to the buyer as a result of the operation of the enterprise.

whatever may be the modes of payment (Le., marginal, installrnent or o t h e r ~ i s e ) .The
~'~
purchase of a security cannot be said to be a trade within this definition, "at least with
respect to distributions of se~urities"'~~
because the object of securities regulation is to
regulate the sellers and protect the buyers.12' "(A)nysale or disposition" in question refers
to both primary and secondary market transactions (of sale or

disposition).'^ Secondly,

the term, '?rade" includes transactions on behalf of others. Within this category are two
types of transactions, namely (1) "participation as a floor trader in any transaction in a
security upon the floor of any stock exchange"'= and (2) "any receipt by a registrant of an
order to buy or seil a security"lz4.The former refers to a floor transaction on an exchange
by an agent of a broker and the latter to a registered dealer's receipt of an order to buy or
n the latter kind of trade c o n f m s that a purchase or an
sel1 from a client- The d e f ~ t i o of
order to purchase a security is not a trade but receipt of an order for purchase is-I3
Penultimately, "trade" includes "transfer, pledge or encumbrancing of securities (by
control persons) ... for the purpose of giving collateral for a debt made in good faith?
The last branch of the definition encompasses "any act, advertisement, solicitation,
119

OSA, R.S.O. 1990 c. S.5, S. l(1) "irade" (a).
note 83 at 122.
12' W.W. Cameron, "Regulation and Distribution of Securities in Ontario" (1954) 10
U.T.L.J. 199 at 199.
122 Gilien, supra note 83 at 122.
OSA, R.S.O. 1990 C S , S. l(1) "trade" (b).
124
Ibid. S. l(1) "trade" (c) Here "registrant" means a person or Company registered or
required to be registered" under the OSA.: OSA. ibid., S. 1(1), "registrant".
12' Aiboini, s u p note 77 at 0-69.
120 Gillen, supra

'"

conduct or negotiation directiy or indirectly in furtherance of "any of the above
mentioned branches of t r a d e ~ . The
' ~ ~ orbit of this branch is difficult to draw. For its
application the basic requirement is that there be some act in furtherance of a trade or, in
other words, before the completion of a trade."'

An offer to sell,

'" providing a Est of

~,'~~
published before and
narnes of prospective purchasers of a s e c ~ ~ r i tadvertisements
after incorporation of a company with the effect of soiiciting the public,131etc. are
examples of trading within the meaning of this branch. But if an act takes place "after"
the completion of a trade, that WU not be attracted by the definition.l3'

OSA, R.S.O. 1990 CS,
S. l(1) %ade7' (d). A person holding more than 20% of the
voting securities of the issuer seems to be a control person under section l(1)
"distribution" (c) of the OSA.
'27 OSA. R.S.O.CS,
S . l(1) "trade" (e). As to why this branch has been brought within
the definition of "trade" Gillen wntes,
The pre-sale process may involve a varïety of pre-sale activities before the
customer actually buys. The sales pitch may involve various pressure
tactics and possibly subtle misrepresentations. There is a risk that the
buyer may rely on these pre-sale representations or be influenced by presale pressure tactics, To prevent the potential loss in confidence in the
market ftom such activities, securities acts regulate these activities as well.
Gillen, supra note 83 at 123,

Ibid.
Alboini, supra note 77 at 0-67.
"O OSC v. Luccis & Co.. June 1962 O.S.C.B. 1.
13' R. v. Golden Sharnbrock Mines Lrd.. [1965] O.R. 692, [1965] 3 C.C.C.72 (0nt.C.A.).
The ads were published by a private company. On that ground it was argued that it was
not a made within the rneaning of the OSA. The court did not accept this because they
constituted "a representation intended to induce the person solicited to purchase". Thus
"solicitation" to purchase was an act in furtherance of trade (sale).
32 Re Ontario Secunties Commission and C.A.P. Ltd., ( 1 972) 1 0.R 205 (H.C.). Cf.RSussman, F1;arch 19931 16 O.S.C.B. 1209.
12*

'"

'

It should be noted that ail the branches of trade have one cornmon
ingredient, to wit, consideration, both actuai (e-g., sale) and contempIated (e.g., an offer
to sale).133Transactions involving such considerations as envisaged by the OSA are too
many to mention. The Legislature, with the purpose of protecting the investing public in
mind, has "chosen to define it (trade) broadly in order to encompass dmost every
conceivable transaction in securities",

134 in

the same vein as it has done with respect to

the term of "security" itself.

Distribution:
A trade in securities, as defined above, (e-g., sale, disposition, or offered

for sale or disposition) will be called a distribution in any of the following circumstances

and will give rise to the need of a prospectus:
1. A trade in securities will amount to a distribution if they have not been previously
issued."'

In other words, a person or Company issuing securities fiom treasury wiil be

said to distribute securities and will, therefore, be required to file a prospectus with
- -.

Absent consideration a gift is not a îrade.: Huntingford, W. Thomas and Anchor
Machine & Manufacturing Ltd. (1990), 13 O.S.C.B. 3478.
134 R. v. Sussman, supra note 132 at 20-2 1. (emphasis added).
135 OSA, RS.0. 1990 C H ,S. l(1) "disîribution" (a).In Durham Securities Corporation
Ltd. there was a distribution of securities in British Columbia. Within two days from the
date of completion of the sale a registrant in Ontario purchased a considerable number of
those secwities mostly fkom the original purchasers and then resold them to Ontario
residents. The OSC disregarded the difference of two days between the original
distribution in British Columbia and the resale in Ontario and considered them happening
"concurrently". On this basis it did not view the shares to have been previously issued.
133

the OSC for its acceptance. This is the most common type of distribution
necessitating a prospectus- 136.
2. If securities, previously issued, have been redeemed or purchased back by or returned

to the issuer as gifts and the issuer trades in them ( e-g., resells or offers for resale), it
will be a distribution requhing a prospectus137.The prospectus is so required because
in such cases the issuer "may well have access to information that is not available to
the
3. Where a control person of an issuer releases securities from his or her or its holdings

and trades in them, that will arnount to a distribution and a prospectus will be
required.I3' A "'controlperson" is a person or company or combination of persons or
companies who, by holding sufficient number of any securities of the issuer, c m
matenaily affect the control of the issuer.'" A holding of more than 20% of the
outstanding voting securities of the issuer is, in absence of evidence to the contrary,
deerned to give a person or company the said ("control person") position.141In such a
Therefore, the sale by the Ontario registrant was held illegal as he did not file a
prospectus with the OSC. pet. 19901 13 O.S.C.B. 5109.
13' Gillen, supra note 83 at 124:
137 OSA, R.S.O. 1990 c- S.5, S. l(1) c6distribution"(b).
13' Gillen, supra note 83 at 125.
13' OSA, R.S.O.1990 c. S.5, S. l(1) Lcdistribution'7
(c). In Company X, Re (1995), 18 0. S.
C. B. 797, the ControIling Shareholder, holding 80% of shares, sought exemption from
prospectus requirement for sale of rights. The OSC dismissed the application, because the
sale constituted a distribution and required fiing and delivery of prospectus.
140 See Johnston and Rockwell, supra note 57 at 69..
141
OSA, R.S.O. 1990 c. S.5, s- l(1) "distribution" (c). "Voting security" is a non-debt
security attachinp voting right under a l l circumstances or under particular circumstances
that exist. OSA,R.S.O. :990 c. S.5, S. l(1) "voting security".

case a person to be a control person need not to have actual control. It will suffice if it
can be established that his or ber position is such that he or she should materially
affect contr01.'~~
Thus in Re Deer Horn Mines Ltd.. the 14.6% security holder argued
that it did not have control, the OSC held it sufficient to materially affect control of
the i s s ~ e r . A
' ~prospectus
~
is required of a control person distrïbuting securities with a
view to compelling him to disclose information susceptible to the price of securities,
which he may have known by virtue of his position in the issuer's company.
Otherwise, he rnight have concealed such information and made unfair profits.i"
4. As said earlier, exemptions from the prospectus requirement are specified in the OSA

or R e g ~ l a t i o n ' or
~ ~are
, granted by the OSC applying its discretionary powers.'" The
rationaie for such exemption provisions may be that the purchaser is such a person
who does not need the prospectus information for his or her protection- If that
purchaser resells bis securities, the subsequent purchaser may, however, require such
protection. In that case the subsequent sale wiU be a "distribution" necessitating a
prospectus. '47
Thus, as shown above, the OSA defines "security" and "trade" in an
inclusive fashion. Also the judiciary, in interpreting them, takes a very broad approach in
I 42

Merger Report, supra note 7 2 at 4.02.
[Jan. 19681 0.S.C.B.12.
See Gillen, supra note 83 at 126.
145
OSAR, 1990 Reg. 10 15,S. 14; OSC Rules, Rule 46-501.
'46 OSA., R.S.O. 1990 c. S.5, S. 74(1). For the rationale of such exemptions, see Gillen,
supra note 83 at 127.
147 OSA. R.S.O. 1990 c. S.5, S. l(1) ccdisVibution77
and S. 72(4), (5) and (6).

pursuance of the legislative policy of protecting the investing public in consideration of
the economic reality of securîty transactions, namely risk in the investment in an
enterprise in which the investor exercises no effective managerial control. In so doing the
courts seem to be "oversolicitous" to bring even "doubtful" schemes within the fold of
"security", which the legislature has left undefined.14* AS a result, perhaps there W Ube
found no instance where a person has been refused a remedy because the transaction in
question is not a security within the stanitory d e f i n i t i ~ n . Similarly,
'~~
"trade" is

has, however, been defined exclusively to rnean any
interpreted b r ~ a d l"Distribution"
~.~~~
one of the four kinds of issuing of securities as mentioned above.'''

If in a given situation

a document can be identified as a "security" and a transaction as a "trade" falling within
any of the four types of distributions, it will be incumbent on the issuer to meet the
prospectus requirement. In other words, if there is a distribution of a security, "(t)here can
be no question but

...the filing of a prospectus"1s2because "its acceptance by the

Commission (OSC) is fundamental to the protection of the investing

LaSkin C.J. in Pacifc Coast Coin Exchange,supra note 80 at 117.
14' See W.V.R. Smith, "Securities Regulation in Ontario"(1968) 4 Texas Int'l. L.F. 454
at 461.
lSo See the text accompanying supra note 134.
lS1 See the text accompanying supra notes 135-146.
lS2 Per Henry J. in Jones v. F.H. Deacon Hodgson Znc, [1986] 9 O.S.C.B. 5579 (H.C.),
at 5590. In this case the plaintiff purchased some shares from the defendant investrnent
dealer who offered shares for sale as part of a distribution of securities, but no prospectus
was fded with the OSC pnor to such distribution as required by section 53(1) of the OSA.
Subsequently the purchaser sought a declaration from the court to the effect that absent
prospectus the contract of purchase and sale of securities was void. On that basis he
claimed back the money he paid to the defendant as purchase pnce. Henry J. held the
transaction nul1 and void in view of S. 53(1) which clearly prohibits distribution of
14*

2.1.3 BANGLADESH
In Bangladesh the Public Issue Rule (PIR) defines "prospectus" as "any
document prepared for the purpose of comrnunicating to the general public a company's

plan to offer for sale its se~urities"~~~.~ccordin~
to The Companies Act, 1994 (CA),the
issuance of an application form for shares or debentures of a Company must be
accompanied by a prospectus unless such form is issued (a) in connection with a bona

fide invitation to a person to enter into an undenuritkg agreement with respect to the
shares or debentures, or (b) in relation to shares or debentures which are not offered to the
public.L" Reading this provision together with the prospectus definition it rnay be simply
securities without filing a prospectus the purpose being the protection of the investing
public. The statutory purpose was the core of his consideration. In his own words, "While
the coua should be reluctant to interfere with contracts freely made, in this case the
overridingconsideration is the need to support the fundamental purpose of the statute as a
matter of public policy to protect the integrity of the regulatory scheme of the Act;. .." (at
560 1). A contrast is found in a British Columbia case based on similar facts in which the
Court of Appeai declined to hold the non-cornpliance with the prospectus filing provision
of the British Columbia Securities Act, S.B.C., 1967, c.45, S. 37, void a b initio because
that would ailow the companies that issued shares without filing prospectus "to escape
their obligations to perform their agreements (of sale)". Ames v. Investor-Plan Ltd.
(1973), Cl9731 5 W.W.R. 451,35 D.L.R. (3d) 613 (B.C.C.A), at 618. This decision was
criticized by a commentator who concluded that "In a case of non-compliance such as
Ames there is every reason to hold that the purpose of the legislation and protection of the
public require that such contracts be declared prohibited and illegal and therefore
voidable (but not void as in Jones) at the option of the purchaser." (footnote omitted and
emphasis added). Stanley M. Beck, "Securities Regulation- Failure to File ProspectusValidity of Contract- Exclusiveness of Statutory Remedy" comment (1974) 52 Cm. Bar
Rev. 589 at 598.
lS3 Jones, ibid. (per Henry J.).
PIR, r. 2(d). (emphasis added).
Is5 The Cornpanies Act,1994 (Act No. 18 of 1994) (hereinafter CA 1994).S. 135(3).

'"

put that when a company offers securities to the general public for sale, it must publish a
prospectus.156From this general requirement the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) may, however, g a n t exemptions.157Thus, absent exemptions, an offering of
securities to the public for sale requires filing a prospectus with the SEC. The meanings
of "securities", 'offer for sale" and "the public" are essential to understand the context of
prospectus requirement in Bangladesh.

Securities:

The Securities and Exchange Ordinance(SEO),1969 defines "securities"
to mean any of the following instruments.
(a) govemment s e c ~ r i t i e meaning
s ~ ~ ~ prornissory notes (including
treasury bills), stock-certificates, bearer bonds and al1 other securities
issued by the Government except a c u r r e n ~ ~ - n o t e ' ~ ~ ;
(b) instruments which create a charge or lien on the assets of a

company. 160
(c) instruments acknowledging loan to or indebtedness of a company,
e.g., debentures, debenture stock.I6'
See D. Keenan, Smith and Keenan 's Company Law, (London: Piiman Publishing,
1987) at 111.
Securities and Exchange Ordinance,1969,Ordinance No. XVlI of 1969, (hereinafter
SEO), S. 2D(1).
Is8 SEO, 1969,S. 2(l)(i).
The Securities Act, 1920 (Act No. X of 1920),S. 2(a).
160 SEO, S. 2(1)(ii).

'"

'"

(d) Any stock, transferable shares, script, note and bond.I6'
(e) Investment contract. lci3
(f) Pre-organization certificate or s u b ~ c r i ~ t i o n . ~ ~ ~
(g) Any interest or instrument commonly known as "security .165
79

(h) Any certificate of deposit for, certificate of interest or participation

in, ternporary or intenm ceaificate for, receipt for, or any warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the above?'

The types of securities have, as discussed earlier, their counterparts in Ontario law, albeit
the latter provides a longer list of securities. However, the most striking point of
difference in this respect between the laws of Ontario and Bangladesh is that the former
defines securities inclusively while the latter exclusively, i.e., in defining "securities" the
OSA uses the word "include7' but the SEO uses "mean". Therefore. while interpreting
"securities", the Canadian courts (particularïy Ontario's) take a broader view and
sometimes define securities beyond the branches named in the OSA. In so doing they take
into consideration the statutory objective of "investor protection" and the "econornic
reaiity" of securïties transactions.16' Like Ontario the securities legislation of Bangladesh

162
163

166
167

zbid., S. 2(a) (iii).
Zbid.
Ibid.
Zbid.
Zbid.
Ibid.
Supra note 80.

has a broad objective of providing protection to the investing public.

'13

Needess to say,

in both the jurisdictions the nature or the "economic reality" of securities transactions
should also be same because the said reality is universally associated with every security
transaction. Therefore, it may be argued that in Bangladesh "securities" should be defined
and interpreted inclusively alike in Ontario. In other words, the SEO should use the word
"uiclude" instead of "mean" to define "securities and an amendment to that effect is
desirable so that no transactions quaiimg the "economic reality" test can be cmied on
without a prospectus and the investing public can be protected thereby.

Offer for Sale:

In Bangladesh a prospectus is required for the sale of securities of a
Unlike Ontario, Bangladesh law is silent with regard to the need of a
prospectus for the resale of securities, e.g., for resale of securities after buyback by an
issuer, resale by a control person.'70 In other words, "offer for sale" of securities in the
present context means oniy an offering of a company's treasury securities for public sale.
Any other disposition of securities (e.g., pledge by a control person as in Ontario) does
not require the publication of a prospectus.

The Public
168

See the prearnbles to the SEO and the Securities and Exchange Commission Act, 1993
(hereinafter SECA).
169
Supra note 156.

There is no definition in the securities law nor is there any judicial
interpretation avaiiable in Bangladesh on who constitutes "the public" to the context of
securities law. In Canada, as seen earlier, the term "the public" created interpretive
difficulties and, therefore, was eliminated from the OSA with respect to securïties
registration. 17' The same is me in Bangladesh.

2.1.4 CONCLUSION

It appears frorn the foregoing discussion that unlike the Ontario
counterpart Bangladesh law defmes "securities" very narrowly. It calls for a prospectus
when there is a sale of treasury securities, which is the most common fonn of
"distribution" of securities in Ontario. But Bangladesh law falls apart from Ontario law in
that the latter requires a prospectus also for s e c o n d q offerings (e-g., resale by a control
person). Nevertheless, the fundamentai points of similarity between the two iaws in this
respect are that prospectuses perform the same function of making disclosure information
to the buyers of securities with the purpose of protecting their interests, and that. unless
exemptions are availabie, prospectuses must have to be fded with the respective secunties
commissions, namely the OSC and the SEC. It may be noted in this comection that
neither of the securities laws of Ontario and Bangladesh does define "disc1osure~'-Black's

Lmv Dicrionary defines it in terms of the securities law as "the revealing of certain
financial and other information believed relevant to investors considering buying

'O

The texts accompanying notes 136-148 supra.

secuities in some venture"."'

The basic principle in this regard is that a prospectus must

disclose whatever information is required by the law under which it is issued. This was
underlined in the English case of Roussel1 v. ~urnham.'" In this suit the defendant
company issued a prospectus on 14 Nov. 1906 offering 70,000 shares to the public for
subscription. Among others, tt mentioned 1000 shares as the minimum subscnption upon
which the allotment of shares might be made. It also contained a description of the
materiai contracts, which included the narnes of the parties thereto and their dates,
character and effect. On 26 November of the same year a French translation of that
prospectus was published, in an abridged form, in a French newspaper, Le Journal. In the
latter there was missing the statements of, inter aliu, the amount of the minimum
subscnption, the names of the parties to and dates of sorne of the material contracts. It,
however, contained a statement which ran, in translated form, as thus- "The company is
in a position at once to allot 1OOO shares according to the provisions of its articles, but

15,000 shares have dready k e n subscribed". The plaintiff, a Frenchman, filled out the
application form prïnted in the Le Journal seeking an aiiotrnent of 700 ordinary shares.

He was ailotted those shares for which he paid in part. Subsequently, a cal1 for the unpaid
money was made, but he declined repudiating the allotment and demanding back the
money he paid. The company tumed down his request, which gave rise to a Litigation. The
plaintiff chiefly reLied on the ground that the Le Journal contained no information about
--

17'
'71
173

- -

Supra note 73..
Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed., s-v.'cdisclosure~'.
(1909) 1.Ch. 127 at 13 1 (per Parker J.).

the minimum subscription upon which directors rnight proceed to allot shares under S. 4
of the Companies Act. 1900.He also pleaded that the prospectus in question should be the
one on which he actually relied; that the defendant had published another prospectus
which fulfilled the statutory requirements was immaterial. The defendant based its
defense on that it thought the plaintiff, when applied, relied on the reai prospectus instead
of the advertisement in the French newspaper. The Court, however, upheld the plea of the
plaintiff. Parker J. interpreted the above quoted statement ('The Company is in a position
at once to allot 1000 shares.. .") as to suggest that the minimum subscription on which the
directors couid go to allotment 1ûûû shares, but he doubted if such an irnplied statement
arnounted to name the minimum subscription. He underlined the importance of narning
the minimum. He observed that

But evenif there is such an implication as is suggested, 1do not think it
would be a ~ ~ c i ecornpliance
n t
with the Act. The provision is inserted
for the protection of applicants for shares, that they know the extent of the
nsk which they run having regard to the old practice of going to allotment
where no suffkient capital bas been provided for working expenses. ....it
appears to me that the statement which the Legislature contemplated was
an express statement, and not one which c m be implied or inferred from
other statements in the prospectus.174

In other words, Parker J. underscored that whatever information is asked by the law must
be disclosed by an issuer in its requite f o m or fashion. In R. v. ~ a r v i n ' a.
~ a~newspaper
,

ad, instead of providing full information required by the Companies Act. 1907'~~~
stated

174 Zbid.
'71
176

at 132-133.
18 0.L.R 49.
S.O. 1907, c. 43.

the name of a mining company, the nature of the mining ciaims owned by it (the
company), the names of the directors, etc. directing the public that "For full particulars
apply to J.W. Garvin & Co.. ..or to any well known Toronto brokers". This was held to

be a prospectus within the rneaning of S. 95 of the Act. But since it did not contain alI
requisite information, the court held it be a violation of the Act. Merdith CJ. maintained
that "it (prospectus) shall contain the information which the Act (OntarioCornpnnies Act,

1907) requires to be inserted in a prospectus .If7
Y,

The next Sub-Sections will examine the extent of disclosure and the role
of the securities commissions in each jurisdiction.

2.2 PROSPECTUS DISCLOSURE AND THE ROLE OF THE OSC

AND THE SEC: THEORETICAL BASES

2.2.1 INTRODUCTION
Since prospectus regulation in Ontario and Bangladesh is the centrepiece
of the present work,it is necessary to look into the theoretical assumptions underlying the
laws of the respectivejunsdictions. It will help to understand on what rationales are based
the respective laws of Ontario and Bangladesh. The loopholes and shortcornings of laws
originate fiom the defects of the underlying theones and, therefore, any reforrn to the laws
needs re-thinking of those theories. T ' u s before going into the comparative study of the
-

lT7

Supra note 175 at 55.

legal provisions conceming prospectus regulation it is necessary to inquire into their
theoreticai rationdes. To quote Eagleton, where the "taken-for-granted activities begin to
falter, log-jam, corne unstuck, run into trouble,. ..theory proves n e ~ e s s a r y " ' ~ ~ .

The theories underlying the laws of Ontario and Bangladesh are presented
below in bnef followed by the history of their adoption in the respective jurisdictions.

2.2.2 CENTRAL MESSAGE OF TEE THEORIES

In Canada (and, therefore, in Ontario) securities regulation in general and
prospectus regulation in particular are based on the fusion of two theoretical flows,

namely the disclosure theory and blue sky t h e ~ r ~Bangladesh
.'~~
corporate and secunties
law is underpinned by the disclosure theory. The United Kingdom (UK) and the United
States of Arnerica (USA) are the birth places of the disclosure and blue sky theories
respectively. ''O

The disclosure theory posits that the sale of securities by a corporation be
allowed without governmentd or administrative interference provided full disclosure of
information conceming the securities is made to the prospective investors. The first and
foremost end served by this theory is to provide information to the investors and thereby

to make them independent in making their investment decision in light of the information

17' Terry Eagleton, ï?ze Signijkance of Theory, (Oxford, ZJK: Cambridge, Mass. USA:
Basil Blackwell, 1990) at 26.
17' Goulet, supra note 16 at 79.
J.P. Williamson, The Securities Regdation in Canada, (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1960) at 4 and 11.

'"

disclosed by the issuer. The government or government agent entmsted with the
responsibility of overseeing the securities markets, namely the securities commission, is
required to ensure that such disclosure is made. It does not, in a paternalistic manner,
determine the merit of the offerings and thereby not decide for the investors as to whether
investment should be made or net."' Thus while the United States of America (USA) at
the federal level opted for this theory a s the basis of the Securities Act of 1 9 3 3 ' ~the
~ . then
President Franklin D. Roosevelt emphasized that "(t)here is ... an obligation upon us to
insist that every issue of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be
accompanied by full publicity and information, and that no essentially important eiernent
attending the issue shail be concealed from the buying public."'83 The ultimate purpose is
to "to protect the public with least possible interference to honest business .184 "The
77

purpose of the whole (disclosure system) is to provide an equality of opportunity for all
investors in the market place, to sellers as well as b ~ ~ e r s . As
" ' ~such,
~ through disclosure
of information an open and transparent market would be established where the potential
Gorder, with respect to disclosure review, writes, c'[A]dministrators f'us on whether
the registration statement is misleading in my material respect or whether it omits any
matenal information. They may demand that the issuer change the level of disclosure but
may not affect the terms of the offering. Once the information contained in the
registration statement is complete, accurate, and not misleading, the administrators must
approve the registration statement, regardless of their opinion of the terms of the
offering.": G. Gorder, "Compromise Merit Review- A Proposal for Both Sides of the
Debate", (1984) 60 Wash. L. Rev. 141 at 143 note 14.
182 15 U.S.C. 77a (1995).
183
77 Cong. Rec. (March 29, 1933), at 955 (Message from President Franklin D.
Roosevelt).
18'

lW

Ibid.

lg5

Merger Reporî. supra note 72 at para. 2.0 1.

investors, in order to own a securïty, would compete with each other to reach an
"'equilibnum price". This "equilibrium pnce", also called "accurate price77186,
"shouid
refiect as nearly as possible the securïty's 'intrinsic

In other words, if a

securïty's price reflects its fundamental value, it will be called an accurately priced
security. Such a security, in tuni, ensures "that (investment) capital is properly allocated,
77

and this is good for society in generai

188

-

The blue sky theory, on the other hand, postulates that the ment of
securities be assessed by the securities commission or concemed govemment body
applying its discretion before the securities are offered to the public for sale. On its
judgment of merit it should refuse permission f o r sale if it considers it (the sale) against
the public interest. To quote one author, this h e o r y requires "examination of the
proposed security by the regdatory agency to determine the economic viability of the
security and underlying enterprise before allowing the issue to be offered to the
The purpose of blue sky legislation is, like that of disclosure law. to protect the
investors, but in a "paternalistic" manner.

2.2.3 HXSTORY AND RATIONALE FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE THEORIES

IN ONTARIO AND BANGLADESH
lg6 See R. A. Robertson, "In Search of the Perfect Mutual Fund Prospectus", (1999) 54
Bus. Law. 461 at 468-69.
A. R. Rodier, "Prospectus Disclosure Under the Proposed Securities Act in Ontario:
Problem in a Changing Environment", (1985) 23 U.W.O.L.Rev.2 1 at 23.
Ig8 Robertson, supra note 186 at 468.

'"

2.2.3.1 Ontario
The concept of corporate disclosure dates back to the 19" century English
history of company law following the repeal of the Bubble Act. 1720'~' in 1825"' which
-
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Iacobucci, supra note 78 at 229.
6 Geo. 1, c. 18, cited in L. C. B. Gower, P r i n c i ' s of Modern Company Law, 5th ed.
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1992), at xlvii.
19'
Securities regulation in the sense of provisions concerning the licensing of brokers
was fmt intmduced in 1285 by the a statute of Edward 1. By the end of 17" century share
trading and stock-broking were common in London. In 1697 the legislatue passed ""An
act to restrain the number and iil practice of brokers and stock-jobbers." : 8 & 9 Wm. 3
(1697) c. 32, quoted in L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, (Boston and
Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1983) at 1. During frrst and second centuries of the
18" century mushroomed the number of companies. Of them the most influential was the
South Sea Company which was granted monopoly by the British Government to trade
with South Amenca and the Pacific Islands. The company flotations boom is popularly
called the "south sea bubble". Fraudulent stock promotion by such cornpanies (including
the South Sea Companies) were rampant, In order to check this "garnblingmania" the
Parliament, instigated by the South Sea Company, passed the Bubbie Act in 1720.
Gower, ibid. at 25. It declared mischievous undertakings void and illegal (S. 18), and
imposed penalties on brokers dealing in securities of illegal companies (S. 21). see,
Gower, ibid. at 26. However, the passage of the Bubble Act Ieft an adverse impact on the
business of South Sea Company alongside the business of other speculative enterprises,
though the real purpose of this statute was 'hot to tone down a speculative boom in shares
of other joint stock cornpanies but to reduce their cornpetition with South Sea Company
for public funds". Goulet, supra note 16 at 83. The public lost confidence in the stock
market, which caused a meteonc fa11 of the share prices of the South Sea Company. The
Company could not recover from this position and ultimately it dong with its
contemporaries burst out Iike bubbIes in the sea. A poem reflects on the fate of the South
Sea Company and its contemporaries, and their effect on the then society as follows:
"The Bubbles now are banished from the Light,
And hide their heads in Realms of Endless Night.
Life vanishes away like to a Dream
And what is now become of the South Sea Schemes."
A Gideonette ,The Art of Stockjobbing,(London: 1746, G.L.P.C., XVIIl-46-3, quoted in
Armand Budington, The English Business Company afrer the Bubble Act 1 720-1800,
(New York: The Commcriwealth Fund, 1938) at 24.

'"

was the "first attempt at a Company ~ c t " l ~in' England. In fact, the Joint Srock

Companies Act of 1844"~was fust to provide for the "modern prospectus
requirement

194

and thereby to introduce a mechanism of disclosure as a "safeguard

against f r a ~ d " ' ~Through
~.
this legislation "(m)odern securities regulation began in
England9,196. For the next four decades no significant development took place. In 1889,
when a question arose as to a director's liability for misstatement in a prospectus, the
House of Lords held that it was a good defence for the director that he (the director)
believed, in good faith, in the truth of the statements, however unrea~onable.'~'In the
following year the Directors ' Liabiliw Act

'*, which was passed to respond to the said

liability decision, provided for liability of directors and promoters for any loss, resulting
from an untrue statement in a prospectus, sustained by any subscriber of securities on the
faith of the prospectus.

In 1894 England examined the rationale of "merit review" of securities
(which was subsequently introduced in the USA as blue sky Law discussed below) and
ultirnately rejected it after a Commission report that said:
--
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Gower, supra note 190 at 26.
lg3 7 & 8 Vict. C. 110 & 111, cited in Gower, supra note 190.
lg4 Loss, supra note 191 at 2. The Bill of the 1844 act was prepared by William
Gladstone, then President of the Board of Trade, who can be called the father of modem
company law as it introduced three basic principles. First, it provided for incorporation by
registration instead of special act or charter. Second, it distinguished company froni
private partnership requiring companies consisting of more than 25 memben to register.
Third, it provided for full publicity of information. :See Gower, supra note 190 at 39.
lg5 Gower, supra note 190 at 39.
'% Williamson, supra note 180 at 4.
Ig7 Deny v. Peek (1889), 14 A.C. 337 (H.L.).

Your Cornmittee may observe that they have disrnissed from their
consideration every suggestion for a public enquiry by the registrar or
other official authority, into the soundness, good faith, and prospects of
undertaking at this or any other stage of a company's formation. To make
any such investigation into the position of every new company cornplete or
effectua1 would demand a very numerous staff of trained officers, and lead
to great delay and expense, while an incomplete or perfunctory
investigation would be worse than none. It would be an attempt to throw
what ought to be the responsibility of the individual on the shoulders of
the State, and would give a fictitious and unreai sense of security to the
investor, and might also lead to grave abuses.'99
The Companies Act of190dOO followed, which contained greater disclosure
requirements. This Act, after amendment in 1907, was replaced by the Companies

(Consolidation)Act of 190820'fuaher widening the scope of disclosure. To quote Mulvey:
The purpose of the legislation is not to regulate or supervise the actions of
directors of companies, but to afford the investing public a means of
ascertainhg the true inwardness of flotations and by means of annual
staternents and reports of directors and auditors to disclose to the
shareholders h m time to tirne the methods by which the &airs of the
company are conducted."'

'The English expenence through 1908 laid the basis for Canadian
legislation"203Securities regulation in Canada started in the guise of corporate legislation
in late 1 8 7 0 s . Particularly,
~~
Ontario introduced securities regulation in 1891 by adopticg

Ig8

53 & 54 Vict. C. 60, cited in Gower, supra note 190, at xlviii.

One clause of the Report Cd. 7779, 1895, quoted in T. Mulvey, "Blue Sky Law",
(1916) 36 Can. L. T.37 at 4563 & 64 Vict. C. 48, cited in Gower, supra note 190 at xlviii.
201 8 Edw. 7, C. 69, cited in Gower, supra note 190 at xlviii.
202 Ibid.
203 Supra note 180 at 8.
*O4 Goulet, supra note 16 at 84.
lg9

the English Directors' Liability Act of 189P05.In 1897 it required the delivery of financial
statements to the shareh~lders.'~~
In 1907 Ontario Companies Actzo7,based on the English

Componies Act of 190Pm, was passed. It provided for wider scope of prospectus
disclosure compared to the English act?

In 1912 the Ontario act introduced, arnong

others, a provision of public offerings by u n d e ~ m t e r s . ~
After
' ~ 1912, the "blue sky"
legislation discussed below was added to the disclosure legislation of Canada in general
and Ontario in particular.
Blue sky law"' was first introduced in the state of Kansas of United States
in 1911.212In Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co. 2'3 it was stated that the aim of the law was to

Ibid. at 85.
Ibid.
'O7 S.O. 1907c.43.
208 Supra note 20 1.
209
Goulet, supra note 16 at 85-.
Ibid.
21 1
It is not certain when and how the term "blue sky law" did actudy originate-But the
fiequent use of the term in different literature leads to the conclusion that it refers to antifiaud law. A Canadian author, for exarnple, in an attempt to define blue sky law wrote:
'O5

'O6

The State of Kansas, most wonderfully prolific and rich in farming
products, has a large population of agriculturists not versed in ordinary
business methods. This State was the hunting ground of promoters of
fiaudulent enterprises; in fact their fkaud became so barefaced that it was
stated that they would seli building lots in the blue sky in simple.
Metonymically they became known as blue sky merchants, and legislation
intended to prevent their fiauds was called Blue Sky Law. supra note 199
at 37.
In a study of the primary materials in this comection, Macey and Miller discovered that
the earliest use of "blue sky" was fiom 1910. They quoted a press release issued by then
Kansas Banking Commissioner, J.N. Dolley, (who is caiied the father of Blue Sky Law)
as complaining that '6enormousamount of money the Kansas people are being swindled
out of by these fakers an3 'blue-sky' merchants.' ": Letter fiom J.N. Dolley @ec. 16,

stop "speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of 'blue s e ; ' " or
"to stop the sale of stock in fly-by-night concems, v i s i o n q oil wells, distant gold mines,
and other like fraudulent exploitations." In Kansas the law required both securities and
securities salespersons to be registered with the State Bank Cornmissioner who was the
controlling and supervisory authority with regard to securities. On application for such

19IO), reprinted in Brief for Appellees at 33, Merrick v. N. W-Halsey & Co., 242 US.
568 (19 17) (No. 413) in J.R- Macey and G.P. Miller, "Origin of the Blue Sky Law",
(1991) 70 Tex.L.Rev. 347 at 360 n. 59, The authors vetted some other materials, but
failed to find the exact time and place of the origin of the term. At last they reached the
conclusion, though "highly speculative", that
the phrase could not have been newly minted in 1910 without some
explanation appearing in the historical record. Since the term evidently
came out of Kansas, it seems most likely that it had long been in use there
to describe some other type of fraudulent conduct outside the securities
area, rnost likely fraudulent land promotions during pioneer days, and was
sirnply borrowed for the context of securities fraud laws. (at 360)
212
Kansas is said to be the mother place of the blue sky legislation because in USA it
was first to enact the statute of c'comprehensive'7type. Otherwise, Connecticut would
have deserved that credit since it had a blue sky act in 1903, but that was a brief one- : see
L.Loss and E. M. Cowett, Blue Sky Law, (Boston: Toronto: Little, Brown and Co.,1958)
at 5 and 7. The Kansas statute came into force after the Populist Party had won election in
1910. In that election J.N. Dolley, a retired grocerer and a bank director, gave support to
and worked hard for the said Party. In recognition to his contribution Dolley was
appointed Bank Cornrnissioner by the newly elected government. With the knowledge
that many "unsophisticated" investors had lost much money in dealings in fiaudulent
securities he initially established a department in his office to c a r y out investigation into
publicly offered securities. People intending to invest in a particular security were advised
to inquire his office of its soundness. In this process people could be warned beforehand
of fraudulent security issuer and thereby could Save their hard eamed money. To gain
better result Dolley felt that his department should have the power to register securities
and securities salesmen and that power should be backed by a statute. Then followed the
Kansas act effective from 15 March 1911, which was known as "An Act to provide for
the Regdation and Supervision of Investment Companies and providing penalties for the
violation thereof '. T.Mulvey, Canadian Company Law,(Montreal: John Love11 & Son
Ltd., 1913) at 733.

permission the Cornmissioner made a detailed examination of the state of affairs of the
issuer and its security proposed to be offered. If he or she was satisfied mainly that the
issuer, with fraudulent intent, was not soivent and the proposed secunty was not sound,
he or she could refuse the p e ~ ? ' 4and save the people from losing money in fraudulent
or "blue sky" con~ems."~
A company, if registered, was obliged to subrnit semi-annual
reports and to maintain various records with the Commissioner who could cancel the
registration for "sufficient" cause.'16 Thus the Cornmissioner "fathered the paternalistic
approach to state security regulation"217.
Later on, the concept of "blue sky law" became popular and entered other
jurisdictions of US and Canada. As of today, it has been borrowed almost in ail States of
Arnerica and al1 provinces of Canada. Manitoba was fnst to introduce it through the
37 S.Ct. 217 (1916) at 221-222.
But, if said bank commissioner finds that such articles of incorporation or
association, charter, constitution and by-laws, plan of business or proposed contract,
contain any provision that is unfair, unjust, inequitable or oppressive to any class of
contributors, or if he decides from his examination of its affairs that said investment
company is not solvent and does not intend to do afair and honest business, and in his
judgment does no? promise afair return on the stocks, bonds or other securities by it
offered for sale, then he shall n o t i e such investment company in writing of his findings,
and it s h d l be udawful for such company to do any further business in this state.. . .":
Kan. L. 1911, c. 133, s.5, quoted in Loss and Cowett, supra note 212 at 8 n. 24.(emphasis
added)
J.N. Dolley revealed that '4estimate that it (Kansas Blue Sky Law) has saved the
people of this state at least six million dollars since its enactrnent". :The report of the
State Banking Commissioner, published Sept. 1, 1912, quoted in supra note 172 at 38.
But "(t)here were no statistics or other evidence in the office of the Bank Commissioner
in May, 1913, upon which such a statement could be founded". Mulvey, supra note 199
at 39.
"6 Supm note 180 at 12.
" 7 LOSSand Cowett, supra note 2 12 at 9.
"3
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'6

passage of the Sale of Shares Act of 1 9 1 2 ~ which
'~
was "an exhibition of paternalism"'*g
for other provinces of Canada That "exhibition" impacted on the subsequent legislation
of other provinces. Ontario incorporated blue sky provisions in the Securiy Frauds
It typically contained provisions concerning deterrence of
Prevention Act of 192g~'.
h u d in security trading, and Licensing of traders. It did not cover the issuing aspect of
new securiw, which stiii rernained in the Company law area"'
However, a landmark development in securities legislation took place in
1945. When in 1940s "(f)raudulent stock promotion was getting out of hand and the
govemment was faced ...with c r i t i c i ~ m "within
~
and without, Ontario passed the

Securities Act of 1945~" which was, in fact, the first modem security statute for

s ana da-^^ It followed the Urquhart lZepor?

prepared in 1944. The striking feature of

S.M. 1912, C. 75.
Muivey, supra note 212 at 734S.O. 1928, c. 24.
Goulet, supra note 16 at 88.
732
Williamson, supra note 180 at 30.
S.O. 1945, c. 22.
224
Supra note 222.
225
Report of the Royal Ontario Mining Commission, 1944 (Urquhart Report) In early
1940s the Ontario govemment paid special attention to rnining industry given its
prominent role in the economy and formed this commission headed by N.C. Urquhart, a
director of Noranda Mines, to study problems it was facing . It found out, inter alia ,that
lack of governrnent encouragement and failure of the prevailing securities act to prevent
frauds were the main causes of decline of the mining industry in Ontario. Its main
recommendation was to repeal the existing securities legisiation and enact a new act with
provisions relating to, among others, full, tme and plain disclosure of information to the
investing public and curbing down the powers of the Securities Commission. The Ontario
Legislature, however, accepted its disclosure motif only, and rejected the proposa1 about
circumscribing the OSC. M. G. Condon, Making Disclosure: Zdeas and Znterests in
Ontario Securities Regulation, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998) at 17-24.
'18
219

"'

the act is that it adopted full, tme and plain disclosure provision"6 on the one hand, and
entrusted the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) with a discretion to enforce that
provision, on the other."'

OSA. 194.5.c.22,

S.

The discretion provision, in addition to disclosure, allowed the

49(1) lays down the disclosure provision as follows-

No broker or salesman shall trade in any security either on his own
account or on behalf of a person or company where such trade would be in
the course of a primary distribution to the public of the security until,
(a) a clear

and concise statement in the form prescnbed by the
regulations dated and signed by every person who is, at the
time of the filing, a director or promoter of the person or
company issuing the security or an underwriter or optionee of
the security, containing ajùll, tme and plain disclosure of al1
material facts including details of al1 options and any other
information that rnay be prescnbed by the regulations, has been
filed with the Commission and a written receipt therefor
received from the registrar; (emphasis added). ..........

(b)
227

Zbid.,

S. 52 provides for the discretionary power of

the OSC as follows:

The Commission rnay in its discretion accept for fduig any statement or
correcting statement, balance sheet, profit and loss statement or report
submitted for filing under section 49 and direct the registrar to issue a
receipt therefor unless it appears to the Commission that,(a)

the statement or any balance sheet, profit and loss statement or
report which is required to accompany the statement,
(i) fails to comply in any substantial respect with any of the

requirements of section 49;
(ii) contains any statement, promise or forecast which is

misleading, fdse or deceptive; or
(iii) has the effect of concealing material facts;

(b) an unconscionable consideration has been paid or given or is

intended to be paid or given,

OSC "to enter the realm of substantive regulation of issues of securities""*.~hus for the
first tirne, through this enactment, a compromise between the disclosure and blue sky
theories was worked out by the Ontario Legislature. This rendered the act "more than a

(i) for promotional purposes; or
(ii) for the acquisition of property; or

the proceeds from the sale of the securities which are to be paid
into the treasury of the company, together with other resources
of the company, are insuEcient to accomplish the objects
indicated in the statement; or
(d) such escrow or pooling agreement as the Commission deems
necessary or advisable with respect to securities issued for a
consideration other than cash has not been entered into.
(c)

This discretion provision has been retained in the subsequent arnendments of the act with
some additional situations of exceptions. A literal interpretation of the section may Iead to
the conciusion that if the exceptional situations existed, the OSC would not have any
discretion, rather it must refuse to accept the prospectus: see Baillie, "The Protection of
the Investor in Ontario", (1965) 8 Cm. h b , Adm. 172 at 220. This interpretation has
some inherent problems with regard to the exercise of the discretion by the OSC director.
Baillie, whiie interpreting the discretion provision contained in s 44 of the OSA, R.S.O.
1950, c.35 1 said, " since many of the circurnstances are matters of opinion rather than
determinable fact, it rnakes jurisdiction dependent upon his own state of mind, although
he is the person exercising the jurisdiction; aud it places upon him the responsibility for
deciding new criteria, other than the circumstances spelled out in the section, upon the
b a i s of which to exercise his discretion." Baillie, (1965) 8 Can. Pub. Adm. 172 at 220.
Then he refers to the OSC's perception that "it has a discretion only as to the existence of
the circumstances" specified in the section. (at 220). However, the purpose of such
discretion is to "insure from the outset that the pubIic offering is being made on a fair and
equitable basis". :O.E. Lennox, "Securities Legislation and Administration", in Law
Society of Upper Canada, Special Lectures- Company Law,(Toronto: Richard De Boo
Limited, 1950) 8 1 t 85.
228 Baillie, ibid., at 175.

full disclosure s t a t ~ t e " Recently
~~.
an author has reflected on this development as

foliows:
Disclosure of corporate information to shareholders had been a feature of
Company legislation pnor to 1945. The significance of the Securities Act
of that year lay in the fact that power to enforce the provision of
information to prospective investors in the course of a prirnary distribution
of securities was granted to an administrative agency. The 1945 act was
the first piece of secwities legislation in Canada to adopt as a guiding
principle the requirement that those wishing to make an initiai distribution
of securities to the public provide 'fiill, true and plain disclosure' of ali
material facts relating to the issue. The OSC then had to embark on the
task of forging its authority and identity in this new realm of
administrative activity, involving control over issuers of securities as well
as market inter me dia rie^.^^^
The aforementioned new theoreticai standing of Ontario, which may be
coined as the "Amphibianism", has been carried forward to underpin the subsequent
legislative changes till today. After 1945, the most remarkable reform to the OSA
occurred in 1966 at the backdrop of securities ~ c a n d a l of
s ~1960s
~
as they were worthy of
"commanding substantial public attention"?

Before the amendment, several

Commissions were formed to study different problems having bearing, direct or indirect,

Ibid. at 232.
Condon, supra note 225,at 4 1.
231
Two events taking place in early skties may be referred to. The first concerned the
insider trading of Canadian Oil Company's shares before its takeover by Shell Oil in 1962
in absence of any law governing insider trading. Second, there was a decline in the price
of shares of WindfaIl Oils and Mines Ltd. in July, 1964. The price fell from $5.60 to 80
cents in one day whereas it rose from 65 cents o d y at the beginning of that month "amid
rumours of an important mineral find in the area near Timmins, Ontario,. .. which proved
fdse." Both the events "underlined the principle that a free and efficient marketplace
could operate only in an atmosphere of full public disclosure".Toronto Stock Exchange
(TSE), Toward an Ideal Market (Toronto: TSE, 1983) at 15-16.
229

on the securities market. Those Commissions in their reports"3, despite the differences of
their investigation areas, emphasized commonly on more disclosure provisions in the
Thus
OSA, though they linked it (disclosure) to different regulatory ~bjectives?~
disclosure was suggested as "a testament to its versatility as a regulatory strate&'?
While underlining the importance of disclosure as a means of attaining the various
regulatory objectives, al1 but the Kimber Report refused to concede a role to the OSC
anphing more than a facilitative one?

The Kimber Report advocated for broader

discretionary powers of the OSC. For example, it suggested that the OSC be granted
powers to refuse acceptance of a prospectus for filing by a company if it (the company)
232

Condon, supra note225 at 55.
Report of the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance (Porter Report), (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 1964),Report of the Attorney General's Cornmittee on Securities
Legislation in Ontario (Kimber Report), (Toronto: Queen' s Printer, l965), Report of the
Royal Commission to Investigate Trading in the Shares of Windfall Oils and Mines
Limited (Kelley Report), (Toronto: Queen's Pnnter, 1965), and Report of the Royal
Commission Appointed tu Inquire into the Failure of Atlantic Acceptance Corp. (Hughes
Commission), (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1969). Porter Commission's main concern was
to review the fünctioning of the financial system of Canada. Securities market was a
comgonent of the broad subject of inquiry. In its study the Commission focused on the
developrnent of the secondary securities markets with emphasis on the public confidence
so that stock ownership increase. Kimber Cornmittee was entnisted with a study to review
the "the provision and working of securities legislation in Ontario" in general and to look
into the problems of takeover bids, insider trading, degree of disclosure, etc. in particular.
The Kelley Commission was constituted to find out what caused the fa11 of share price of
the Windfall Oils and Mines Ltd. in 1964, and whether there was any breach of the iaw.
The Hughes Commission embarked on an inquiry into the activities and bankruptcy of the
Atlantic Acceptance corporation.
234 The Porter Report connected it with increased ownership of shares and investor
protection, Kimber with public confidence and market efficiency, Kelley with public
protection and Hughes with public confidence and stability. Condon, supra note 225 at
62-63.
Condon, supra note 225 at 63.
233

f d s (a) to provide insider trading reports,=' (b) to cornply with the requirements of
annual and interirn reportingx8 and (c) to comply with proxy provisions.'39
The rationale of the Kimber Report's proposal for broader powers of the
OSC may be sought in its argument for its (OSC's) independent status as an
administrative agency instead, under the erstwhile arrangement, of its subordination as a
branch of the Department of the Attorney ~eneral.'~'It argued that such relationship
might be justified during the early years of the securities legislation when its (securities
~ ~observed
'
that "(t)he
legislation) main purpose was the prevention of f r a ~ d s . It
administration of securities legislation should not be directed pnmarily to criminal and

quasi-criminal law enforcement but rather to the enhancement of the position of the
--

--

-

--

- -

.-

-

a
' Ibid. at 63.
237 Kimber Report, supra note 233 para. 2.3 1(e).
Ibid. ara. 4.07(0.
~ 4 ' Ibid. para. 6.27(0.
The OSC, established in 1937, was a component of several government bodies like
the Legislature and the Department of the Attorney General- It was converted into a
branch of the latter alone by securities act amendments of 1962-63. Such subordinate
status of the OSC accompanied different hazards in its smooth functioning. For instance,
it could not appoint experienced people fiom the security industry because the d e s of the
parent department conceming recruitment and salary did not pennit so. Secondly, people
had to face hassles in discharging their offîcial responsibilities. Investigation procedure is
worth mentioning. When a concemed OSC personnel wanted to rnake investigation, h e or
she had to have an order fiom the Attorney General in that respect. On completion of the
investigation the decision of fiamuig charges depended on the Director of Public
Prosecutions. The OSC's recommendations in this regard were not heeded to always. :
See Baillie, supra note 227, at 211-12 and n. 152. However, in 1966 the OSC was set up
as an independent government agency following the recommendation of the Kimber
Report. It is now a corporation without share capital. It, as an agent of Her Majesty the
Queen in right of Ontario, is entitled to exercise its powers. It is an administrative
tribunal. It has been given more autonomy with self-finance in June 1997. : See OSA, ss.
3(1), 3(12), 141(1), and OSC 1997-Annual Report, supra note 53 at 2.

"'

securities industï-yin the economic life of the province"'4'.

Simply stated, the Kimber

Repon envisaged that the OSC have a broader role pnmarily meant for the improvernent
of the securities industry. To that end it seemed to have suggested for the said
discretionary powers as the administrative mechanism of the OSC. Condon maintains this
view in interpreting the Kimber Report:
Since these discretionary powers could operate as controis over the
activities of corporations or industry members, it may be assumed that
Kimber, in rejecting the use of 'criminal and quasi-criminal law
enforcement,' saw discretionary sanctioning powers as more effective
tools to achieve 'the enhancement of the position of the securities industry
in the economic life of the province.'43
Ultimately, in spite of the antipathy of the other reports for discretionary
powers side by side with disclosure, the KNnber Report's recommendations blending the
two (disclosure and discretion) were accepted by the legislature and the Securities Act of
1 9 6 P was passed?45. Thus "Amphibianism", introduced in 1945, and reinforced and

"'

Kimber Report, supra note 233 para. 8.03.
242 Ibid. .(emphasis added).
243 Condon, supra note 225 at 74-75. (emphasis added).
244 OSA, S.O. 1966, c. 142.
245 The OSA of 1966 has thus been cornmented to be "the faithful conversion of the
(Kimber) report's recommendations" H.S.Bray, "Recent Developments in Securities
Administration in Ontario: The Securities Act, 1966" in J.S. Ziegel, ed., Studies in
Canadian Company Law, vol. I (Toronto: Buttenvorths, 1967) 4 15, at 418. Following the
1966 Ontario Securities Act amendments have been effected to the securities legislation
in other provinces. Hence, the Kimber Repor? is said to form the foundation of the
modem securities regulation in Canada, "even though it did not provide any greater
degree of permanence or of uniformity than the earlier instance of Ontario's leadership in
1930". : P. Anisman, "The Regulation of Securities Market", in R. Cumming, ed.,
Hannonizution of Business Law in Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986)
at 78 (footnotes omitted).

confirmed in 19643, was retained as the theoreticai base of modem securities Iaw of
Ontario and also of other provinces of

As to why the legislature of Ontario has

accepted this theoretical position Johnston wrïtesPresumably the legislative draftsman sought what he conceived to be the
b e s t of both worlds: the director should not be made to appear as an
irmplied guarantor of the success of a promotion but the statute should
emsure that he retains the power to nip in the bud a venture which he had
reason to believe would be wasteful and not financially viable.'47

Thus the legislatinre has intended to give the investing public the benefits of the both
theories. It enactezd the OSA primarily as a disclosure statute requiring the OSC to
emphasize disclosure so that the investors can make their own investment de ci si on^.'^^

The OSC is not d l o w e d generally to decide, on behalf of the investors, the ment of an
offering and thereby to provide fdlpaternalistic protection to them.249It may interfere
only in extreme cases affecting public interest?'

If the OSC were granted the full blue

sky jurisdiction, ir.t wodd encounter at l e s t two formidable problems. First, the OSC
would have to appoint experts of various fields concerned with security. 'The result
would be an econiomy heaviiy subject to public regulation, to a much greater extent than
Canadians have k e n accu~tomed."~'
Second, since the public would rely on its
--

-

'46 For the brief history of adopting "Amphibianism" in other provinces of Canada, see
Goulet, supra noce 16, at 83-89.
247 D.L.Johnstom. Canadian Securities Reguhtion, Toronto: Butterworths, 1977), at
159.
248 See the text a~companying
infra note 511.
249
See the text aaccompanying infra note 5 11.
2x1 See the text aaccompanying infra note 5 10.
25 1
Supra note 247, at 160.

judgrnent, it could claim compensation from the OSC in the event of such assessment
proving wrong with resultant loss to the public.'5'
However, under the new theoretical arrangement the investing public is
not totally deprived of the advantage of ment determination. For this purpose it may rely
on the underwrïtep3 of an issue who passes on the soundness of the issue before entering
into an (underwriting) agreementz4 with the issuer. An undemriter does not take the
prospectus discIosures as m e . He rather is supposed to check and c o n f m the tnith in
them. Based on extensive inquiry he then certifies the cornpleteness and accuracy of the
information disclosed in the prospectus.35 A good underwriter will, after such inquiry,
underwrite an issue of a company "with a solid record of earnings, good management,
and better than average growth prospects9 7 2 5 6 .He does so because bis success in the
security world depends on "a reputation for making good investment
252

Supra note 247, at 19.
An underwriter is defined as "a person or company who, as principal, agrees to
purchase securities with a view to distribution; or who, as agent, offers for sale or sells
securities in connection with a distribution; or who has a direct or indirect participation in
the distribution. Accordingly, an undenvriter may be a principal or an agent." : supra note
16, at 586.
254
"An "underwriting agreement " is an agreement pursuant to which an underwriter as
principal agrees to purchase securities with a view to distribution, or as agent agrees to
offer for sale and to seU securities in connection with a distribution." : supra note 16, at
586. An agreement by the underwriter of a f d y underwritten issue is know
"underwriting agreement", whereas a best efforts underwriter's agreement as "agency
agreement". :supra note 16, at 2 1%
" 5 See the text accompanying infra note 463.
E. L. Winter, A Complete Guide to making o Public Stock Offering (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962, at 28,
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reco~nrnendations".~~
Because of this role the underwriter is called "the gatekeeper of
public interest,'.">' But the fact of the underwriter's role does not nullify the need of blue
skying by the OSC. There rnay be circumstances requiring administrative interference.
For example, the OSC rnay require officers' and directors' or promoters' shares to be held
in escrow and rnay impose an embargo on the transfer of shares without its permission so
that they c m equaily share the nsk in the market with the shareholder~?~Administrative
interference rnay also be necessary to impose limits on the undenvriting commission, if it
is not futed by

In addition, such interference rnay be necessary where a

unreasonable advantage is given to the underwrïter by the issuer, e.g., the issuer rnay
agree to sel1 securities to the underwriter, in the event of the issue being undersubscnbed,
at a price less than the public offenng pnce.'61 Probably in contemplation of such
situations the legislature felt the need to equip the OSC with discretionary powers in
respect of prospectus registration with a view to enswing that "the public offering is
being made on a fair and equitable b a ~ i s " ' As
~ ~to how the OSC is equipped to
accomplish the given task Bray writes,
(t)he Iegislation provides the body, the regdations the clothing, while life
and purpose are given to the whole by the guide lines within which the
Commission (OSC) exercises its discretionary powers. These guide lines

Ibid., at 28-29.
Supra note 16 at 238.
See the text accompanying infra note 3 11 and 3 12W . M . Prifti, Securities: Public and Private Offerings, ( S t- Paul, Minn.: West
Publishing Co., 1974), at 42.
See ibid. at 36 and 40.
262
Lennox, supra note 227.
'58
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are to be found in its published decisions and policy declarations. ...since
1949-263

2-2.3.2 Bangladesh
Bangladesh is a component of erstwhile British India. During their 200year reign the British introduced their laws and legd system in this c ~ l o n ~When
. ' ~ they
wound up their Rule in 1947, two countries, India and Pakistan, came into being under
the Indian Independence Act of 1947'~' with the same laws and legal system. East
Pakistan, the eastem wing of Pakistan, achieved independence as the People's Republic
of Bangladesh in 1971. After independence, it adopted aU laws that were in force on the
day of declaratïon of independence, 25 March 197 1, by the Lows Con~irtuance
Enforcement Order, 1971. Thus Bangladesh succeeded the laws and kgal system of

English or common law ongin which were adopted in the Indian sub-continent.'66
After independence, in the area of corporate and securities laws
Bangladesh adopted The Cornpunies Act. 1913267,The Capital Issues (Continuance of
Control) Act. 19 4 f mand Securities and Exchange Ordinunce, 196P9.Of them The
Cuvanies Act. 1913 was the almost verbatim reproduction of the (English) Cornpunies
263

Bray, supra note 245, at 447.
For the details of the Indian legai system, see V.D. Kulshreshth, Landmarks in Indian
Legal and Constitutional History, (Lucknow: Eastern Book Company, 1981); M.P. Jaïn,
Outlines of Indian Legal History, (E4ombay: N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd., 1972).
265 10 & 1 1 Geo. VIc. 30.
266
See, for a brkf account of the Bangladesh laws and legal system, A.B.M. Mafizul
Islam Patwari, Legal System of Bangladesh, @haka: Hurnanist and Ethical Association of
Bangladesh, 1991).
267 Act NO. W
C of 1913.
268 Act NO. XXM. of 1947.

(Consolidation)Act of 1908.270
Since the latter, as described above, was based on
disclosure theory, the former had the same basis. The Capital Issues Act, 1947 was passed

by the British authority during the second World War "to channelize investment into war
related industries"271.The C o m p n i e s Act 1913 contained provisions conceming the
contents of a prospectus while The Capital Issues Act pïovided the procedure of its
approval by the Controller of Capital Issues (CCI). With regard to approval, however,
there occurred a shift from the original position of English law. If an issuer filed a
prospectus with required contents, the CCI, as a policy, reviewed the merit of the issue."'
This approval procedure continued even after the repeal of The Capital Issues Act in
1993, when the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)"'
269

was established in place

Supra note 157.

In re Mina Ahmed, 1924 M. W N . 582 cited in Patwari, supra note 266, at 77.
M.F. Ahmed, Stock Market Behavior in Bangladesh, @haka: Bureau of Business
Research, University of Dhaka, 1992), at 12.
270

"'

"'See ibid, at 15.
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Before 1993 the securities market in Bangladesh was regulated jointly by the
Controller of Capital Issues, the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies, the Bangladesh
Bank and the Chief Controller of Insurance. The development of the capital market was
faltering under that system. For instance, as of 3 1 December 1989 the market
capitalization of secunties in proportion to the Gross National Production (GNP)stood
only 2.5%, whereas it was 9% in India The administration was in a very lax state. The
investors got neither the information about the present fmancial position nor of the future
prospects of the cornpanies. The companies did not even file their annual financial
statements to the stock exchanges. Nor did they allot shares timely in the event of initial
offerings. AU these and others sapped down the investors confidence in the secunties
market. Given these circumstances it was felt necessary to establish a single body to
regulate the security industry in Bangladesh. This gave the way fo the Secwities and
Exchange Commission Act, 1993 under which the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), the present regulatory body, was established. SEC, a corporation without share
capital, is the administrative tribunal with respect to the security industry in Bangladesh. :
see supra note 27 1, at 22-24.

of the CC1 through passage of the Securities and fichange Commission Act, 1993.27"In
the sarne year an amendment was brought to the Securities and Exchange Ordinance,

1969 incorporating the provision of prospectus approval procedure as contained in The
Capital Issues Act, 1947.275
After the establishment of the SEC in 1993 it was expected that it would
be able to effectively regulate the share market. But that expectation remains unfulfded

mainly because of the fact that it is composed mostiy of retired civil servants without
knowledge of or experience in replation of securities market?

Hence, from the very

beginning it was the subject of public criticism, e.g. it takes an unreasonably long tirne to
review a prospectusm, its assessrnent of an issuer's financial projections very often tums
out to be wrongn8, and its oficers registering securities are c o r r ~ ~The
t ~cnticism
~ ~ .
culminates with the occurrence of the 1996 share market s ~ a m . 'With
~ ~ this backdrop the
Govemment of Bangladesh directed its attention to improving the share market and, to
that end, adopted the Capital Market Development Program (CDMP) supported by the

Act No 15 of 1993.
The amendment was made by the Securities and Exchange (Amendmen?)Act, 1993
(Act No. 16 of 1993). By this amendment sections 3-8 of The Capital Issues Act, 1947
were inserted, in effect, as sections 2A-2F into the Securities and Exchange Ordinance,
"4

1969.
"6
277
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See the Muktokantho (a Bengali national daily), (17 July 1998) at 9.
Supra note 38.
Supra note 39.
Supra note 40. Also see supra notes 41-43 and the accornpanying texts.
Supra note 11.

loan of the Asian Development Bank ( A D B ) . ~ The
~ ' SEC paid heed, with regard to
primary market reform, to the following finding of the ADB Report:

Market participants claim that there is considerable delay in securing
approval for IPOs fiom SEC. This is caused principdy by SEC still
applying a system based on merit regulation, insisting on fixing the pice
of new securities issues. A Xarge number of applications have k e n stuck
up in processing, at one point reaching as many as 60 proposed 1~0s.'~'
As such, the SEC has given up its policy of merit regulation and has adopted instead the

full disclosure philosophy as the basis of securities regulation in ~ a n ~ l a d e s h . ~ ~ ~

2.2.4 CONCLUSION

Bangladesh followed the blue sky theory of securities regulation until
1998. Since then it has radically changed its theoretical position and has been following
the disclosure theory. On the other hand, Ontario law is based on a mixture of the
disclosure theory and the blue sky theory. Both the jurisdictions have taken their
respective stands to boost public confidence in the markets. The theoretical position of
Bangladesh advocates that investment decisions be made by the investors thernselves in
light of the information disclosed and that the securities commission do not interfere
under any situations. The latter, however, requires that while the investors decide their
own fate considenng the disclosures the securities commission be vigilant at the same
time, lest public interests be hampered. Thus the fundamental distinction between the

' Supra note 1O.
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Supra note 10, at 13-14.

theoretical footings of Ontario and Bangladesh centers around the role of the respective
securities commissions apropos of prospectus registration.

2.3 PROSPECTUS DISCLOS=

AND THE ROLE OF THE OSC

AND THE SEC- COMPARISON OF THE LAWS

23.1 INTRODUCTION
In this Sub-Section a discussion will be undertaken, from a comparative
perspective, of the laws of Ontario and Bangladesh relating to prospectus disclosure and
the role of the respective securities commissions. The basic d e s of disclosure are
considered fust, Second, prospectus contents and their enforcement provisions are
compared. Finally, a comparative discussion of the role of the OSC and the SEC with
regard to prospectus disclosure is made.

2.3.2 PROSPECTUS DISCLOSURE
23.2-1 Basic Rules of Disclosure
Section 56 of the

OSA'^^ contains two basic principles of prospectus

disclosure. First, a prospectus must provide "full, true and plain" disclosure of al1
283
284

The texrs accompanying supra notes 44 and 45.
OSA, R.S.0.c. S.5, asarn.S.0. 1994,~.11, S. 367.

"material facts" concerning the securities issued or proposed to be distrib~ted.'~~
A
"material fact" means "a fact that significantly affects, or would reasonably be expected
~ ~ ~term is
to have a significant effect on, the market price or value of such s e ~ u r i t i e s . "The
of undefined scope because whatever fact has actual simcant

effect or is likely to have

such effect on the price or value of securities must be subject to disclosure. Whether a
particular fact bas such actual or probable effect depends on the circumstances of every
particuiar case. Though such facts have been specified for disclosure e l ~ e w h e r e , ~they
~'
are not exhaustive- The responsibility lies on the issuer to ensure disclosure of al1 such
facts, specified or not, accurately and in an understandable manner. Second, the
prospectus must comply with the requirements of the OSA'^^, and must contain or be
accompanied by financial statements, reports or other documents that are required by the
OSA or regulations.'89 This means that a prospectus must, in order to fulfill the
requirement of full, true and plain disclosure, conform to the prescribed form and contain
the facts, information and reports, etc. required by the securities

la^.'^^

Unlike the OSA, the securities regulation in Bangladesh does not lay down

any general provision relating to prospectus disclosure requirements. While it requires an
issuer to publish a prospectus to offer securities to the public, it does not clearly Say how

Zbid., S. 56(1).
286 OSA. R.S.0 C. S.5, S. l(1) "material fact".
287 See Ontario Securiries Acr Regularion (OSAR), R.R.O. 1990, Regdation 1015, Forms
12-15.
288 OSA, R.S.O. C. S.5, as am. S.O. 1994, c. I l , S. 367, S. 56(1).
289 Zbid., S. 56(2).
2* See Alboini, supra note 77, at 15-11.
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much disclosure the issuer should make through the prospectus. With regard to the
responsibility of the SEC in this connection the HR, however, provides that the SEC
shall "ensure that full and fair disclosures are made in the prospectus.. . ."29' From this
provision it may be gathered that an issuer is obligated to make full and fair disclosure
and the SEC shall ensure it only. However, the meaning of "full and fair disclosure" is
not defmed. The word 'W" meaning "complete"'g2 also occurs, as seen above, in the
general (prospectus) requirement principle of Ontario Iaw. The word "fair" does not
appear in the said Ontario principle which instead contains the words, "true and plain", in

addition to "Ml"- Does the Bangladesh requirement of "full and fair" disclosure stand, in
the sarne sense, for the Ontario's "full, true and plain" disclosure? Kinney's Law
Dictionary uses the word "fair" to mean "Just; equitable; equal; proper"'93 and Black's

Law Dictionary defines it as "Having the qualities of irnpartiality and honesty; free from
prejudice, favoritism, and self-interest. Just; equitable; even-handed; equal as between the
conflicting inter est^."^'^ In the present context, having regard to the policy reason of
disclosure provision (investor protection)295,it may be argued that it would be appropriate
29 1

PZR, r. 7.B(i).
J. Kendrick Kinney, Law Dictionary and Glossnry. (Colorado: Fred B. Rothman &
Co., 1987),S.V."Full".
293
Zbid. S.V. "fair".
294
Supra note 172, s.v, "fair".
295 This interpretation is based on the principle of hterpretation that "(a) statute should
be construed to harmonize with the intention of the Legislature and the aim and object of
the statute." Re Ontario Securities Commission and Brigadoon Scotch Distributions
(Canada)Ltd., (1970) 3 O.R. 7 14, at 7 17 (per Hartt J.) quoting Maxwell as follows:
292

to take "fair" to mean "justy'or "proper" or "impartial and honest", each of which is
synonymous or close to synonymous with the word "true". But neither of the dictionaries
uses "fair" to connote "plain7' or clearly understandable, a word that occurs in the generd
principle of Ontario law. Thus it may be said that the phrase '%Il

a d fair" disclosure

under Bangladesh law means full and true disclosure, but not plain disclosure.
But full and true disclosure of what? Although there i s no general
provision in Bangladesh law as in Ontario law in this regard, the PZR provides at one
place that

In addition to the information specifically required by this d e , the
prospectus shall contain all material infornation necessary to enable
investors and their investment advisers to make an inIformed assessment of
the business engaged in, or to be engaged in, by the Company, its assets
and liabilities, its financial position, its profits and losses and its future
prospects and the rights attaching to the secunties being offered.. . .296

The draftsman has specified a set of information297necessary for the purpose of enabling
the investing public to make investment decisions and has kept it open for the issuer to
include al1 other information provided it is "material" for the sarne purpose. In other
words, the drafisman has specified that information which, in his oplnion, is "material"

The tnie meaning of any passage, it is said, is to be found not merely in the
words of that passage, but in comparing it with other parts of law,
ascertainhg also what were the circumstances with reference to which the
words were used, and what was the object appearing from those
circumstances which the legisiature had in view. :Maxwell on
Znterpretation of Statutes, 11" ed. (1962), at 19.
296

PZR. r. 7.A.(1). (emphasis added).

and has made it obligatory for the issuer to include in the prospectus a l l b'materiai"
information which is in the knowledge of the issuer but was not visualized by the
draftsman at the time of making the law. Thus it may be argued that al1 information, both
specified and unspecified, must be "matenai" for the decision-making by the investors.

In other words, in Bangladesh a prospectus must make full and tme disclosure of d l
material information.
The P I . refers to the purpose of "material information", but does not
defme the tenn. As stated above, the purpose of such information is to help the investors
assess the issuer's business, assets and liabilities, financial position and so on, but what is
the ultimate effect of such assessment? Afier assessment of the issuer's business, etc. in
light of the information disclosed in a prospectus, if an investor thinks it to be profitable
to make an investment in securities, the investor can be expected to purchase the
securities offered at a fixed price. But if the assessment gives them a different idea (Le.,
the investment would not be profitable), an investor may not be prepared to invest at dl.
Thus the "material information" has direct bearing on the price or value of securities
offered by the issuer and, therefore, resembles the term "matenal factYa8 defined by the

OSA.
Like the OSA the CA enjoins every issuer to cornply with the form and
contents of prospectus prescnbed by it. Under the merit review system the CA was the

297 For discussion of the specific information required by the PIR, see Section 2.3.2.2,
below.
298
See the text accornpanying supra note 286.

only the law providing for prospectus form and contents. But it does not provide for full
disclosure. To bridge up this gap the PIR has been made, It is a piece of delegated
legislation and, therefore, subordinate to the ConzpaniesAct. 1994.2'' With respect to
prospectus disclosure these two should be read together.

In view of the foregoing discussion it may be concluded that with regard to
the first generd rule the laws of Ontario and Bangladesh differ in that while Ontario law
requires full, me and plain disclosure, Bangladesh law calls for, in effect, full and true
disclosure only but not plain disclosure. Apropos of the second d e , namely cornpliance
with the securities regulation, the laws of Ontario and Bangladesh are similar.

2.3.2.2 Contents of Prospectus
The OSA prescribes four different foms for different types of companies
specifying, in particular, various non-financial matters to be contained in a prospectus.
Those are forms 12, 13, 14 and 15, applicable to industrial, finance, natural resources and
mutuai funds companies respectively. It also calis for frnancial staternents and reports to
be added in the prospectus.3w In Bangladesh, as aforesaid, Parts 1and II of Schedule III of
the CA in combination with the PIR provide the form and contents of a prospectus, both

non-financial and financial. The SEC may, however, ask for information in addition to
p

p

p

p

p

-

While the CotnpaniesAct, 1994 is enacted by the legislame the Public Issue Rules
(PIR) is made by the SEC "(i)a exercise of the powers conferred (on it) by section 33 of
the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 (Ordinance XVII of 1969), and in
suppression of al1 guidelines and orders made in this behalf ...". :The Preamble to the
PZR.
3" Supra note 288.

that provided in a prospectus füed by an issuer for its approval. 301 The following wiil
compare the contents of a prospectus in Bangladesh with those of an Ontario prospectus
of an industrial Company, which is prepared according to Form

I ~ ~ O ' , because

Form 12 is

' ~ purpose of this section is to show
the most comrnonly used format in ~ n t a r i o . ~The
whether both laws, though broadly requiring full disclosure, provide for the disclosure of
similar categories of particdar information.

23.2.2.1 Non-financial Matters
The prospectuses in Ontario and Bangladesh contain some broad
categories of information-items.3MIn the following unnecessary details of the items
similar in both laws will be avoided; rather emphasis will be placed on the differences
between them.

Category 1: Share, Price, Market And Underwriting
With regard to this category both the laws, despite some minor differences,

are similar principally as follows:
(a) Under the Ontario law the fust page of a prospectus musc set out the selling price,
underwriting discounts or commissions and proceeds to the issuer both per unit and in

301

PIR. r. 7.A.(2).

OSAR,, R.R.O. 1990, Regdation 1015, S. 40.
303 See supra note 57, at 73.
304
For the broad categorization of items occurring in Form 12, see supra note 57, at 7576.
302

total arnount?

In Bangladesh the sarne information is asked to be disclosed in the

cover page of a prospectus.306The main purpose of this item is to help the potential
investors assess the degree of risk involved in the issue offered. For example,
investors can assess nsks involved in an issue from the underwriting commissions
stated in a prospectus. It is a principle of detemiinhg underwriting commission that
"the more difficult the issue is to seU, the larger wilf be the percentage of the issue
proceeds paid to the underwrïter for his services,7307 (b) Both laws ask for description of shares, debt obligations or any other securities being

offered by the prospectus. For exarnple, Ontario law requires that the prospectus must
provide an account or specification of the ciass of shares offered, together with the
details about various rights attaching to them, viz. dividend rights, voting rights,
liquidation or distribution rights, pre-emptive rights, conversion rights, redemption
rights, provision as to variation of theses rights and liability to further calls by the
i s s ~ e r . If
' ~any
~ of these rights is subject to any restriction or qualification imposed by

any rights of any other class of securities, information of such other securities must be
himished in the prospectus.309Bangladesh law calls for description of sirnilar rights to
and limitations on shares being offered?1°

OSAR. R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 1015,Form 12, Item 1-Distribution Spread.
3M PIR, r. 7-B-(1).
307 P. E. McQuillan, Going Public in Canada, (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of
Chartered Accountants, 197l), at 118..
'O8 OSAR, R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 1015., Form 12 Item 17(a).
' O 9 Ibid.,Form 12 Item 17 Ins. 2
''O
PIR. r. 7.B.(18).
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(c) An Ontario prospectus is required to provide information about sale of the securities
.~~'
among the sponsors (e-g. directors and oficers of the issuer c ~ r n ~ a n ~In) this
respect, it also requires disclosure of particulars of escrowed shares. The particulars
include classes of the shares held in escrow, their designation, number and
percentage. The name of the depository, and the date of and the conditions of the
release of the shares from escrow must be dis~losed?~'It may be noted that shares
held in escrow cannot be transferred without the 0 S C 7 spermission. In Bangladesh a
description of securities sold to the sponsors is r e ~ p i r e d ? Such
~
securities are subject
to a lock-in period for three years fiom the date of publication of a prospectus or from
the start of commercial operation, whichever is latere3l4By virtue of this provision
securities held by the issuer's promoters, directors and officers are kept in abeyance
for three years. During that period such persons are prohibited from freely transferring
their shares. They have to bring the fact of any transfer of such securities to the
knowledge of the SEC within seven days of such transfer?

This is to prevent any

sudden unloading of a huge number of securities held by the sponsors who are in a
better possession of market information (including issuer's inside information)
compared to the general investors. This mechanism keeps the SEC infonned of any
transactions made by the sponsors, which may help it detect if any insider trading has

OSAR, R.R.R. 1990 Regulation 1015,Form 12 Items 24 and 28.
Ibid.. Item 25.
313 PIR, r. 7.B,(14)@).
314
PIR, r. 9.
315 Order No. SEC/Section-7/98- 136.
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3'2

taken place. It may be noted that the lock-in provision like the screw provision of
Ontario evidences that the SEC has some blue sky jurisdiction in this regard, albeit it
relates mainiy to the control of the secondary securities market.
(d) In Ontario Item 26 of Form 12 requires a disclosure of the names, addresses and
holdings of the principal holders of each class of voting s e c ~ r i t i e sA
~~
~.
principal
shareholder rneans a shareholder (a person or company) who owns of record anaor
b e n e f i ~ i a l ldirectly
~ , ~ ~ ~or indirectly, more than 10% of any class of voting securities.
If any such shareholders are &diates

'18

or a ~ s o c i a t e of
s ~the
~ ~any other person or

company, details about such relationship must be d i s c l ~ s e dIn
. ~addition,
~~
the
prospectus must disclose the percentage of each class of voting securities held,
directly or indirectly, by the issuer's directors and senior officers, as a group, without
specifics about them- The purpose of such disclosure is to inform the public how the
principal shareholder(s) will control the voting of the issuer and thereby Save them

'16 Section l(1) of the OSA. R.S.O. 1990, c.S.5 defines voting security as "any security
other than a debt security of an issuer carrying a voting right either under al1
circumstances or under some circumstances that have occurred and are continuing."
317 Vcting shares held by a person or company as a trustee for the benefit of the children
of a settler of the trust may be an example of beneficial ownership of shares.
'18 E-g., a company which is a s u b s i d i q of some other company or both are controlled
by same person or company.: see Goulet, supra note 16, at 563.
319
E-g., relative, spouse of a person, or a partner of a person or company.: see OSA. S.

W.

330

The purpose of asking for such information is to unearth the identity of any person or
company who controls the principal shareholder. Therefore, it has been observed by the
OSC that "generaily a receipt should not be issued for a prospectus if the issuer is unable
to identiQ the individual, if any, who controls a principal security holder of that issuer." :
Interpretation Note 2- 1983 O.S. C.B. 4536 cited in T&or Holdings Co. Ltd, [October
19881 11 OSCB 4059 at 4088.

from manipulation, the primary purpose of securities laws?

In Bangladesh similar

kinds of information are asked where a person owns, beneficially or of record, 5% or
more of the securities of the companyF There is no provision calling for the
disclosure of the relationship where such a principal shareholder is an affiliate or
associate of any other person or Company.
(e) Item 2 of Form 12 requires setting out of the plan of distribution, that is, whether

securities are being offered through underwriters or by the Company as a security
issuer. If they are offered through underwriters, the prospectus must name them,
describing briefly the nature of their obligations to take up and pay for the securities,
speciQing the date by which they will do that.'= The prospectus rnust disclose
whether the underwriters, as principals, are committed to take up and pay for al1 of the
securities, or whether they, as agents under a "best efforts" arrangement, will take up
and pay for only such securities as they may sel1 to the public.3" If the undenvriting,
based on finn commitrnent or "best efforts" method, is subject to a "market out"
clause, the prospectus must contain a staternent to that effect.'= A "Market out"
clause is a statement to the effect that the underwrïter's obligation may be tenninated

321

T h r Holdings CO.Inc. &id.

3"

PZR?r.7.B .(l4).
OSAR, R.R.O.1990, Regdation 1015, F o m 12 Item 2(a).
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'*'

Zbid. Ins. 1. "A "best efforts offering" is an offering of securities of an issuer by an
underwriter, acting as agent, which agrees to use its best efforts to sel1 the securities, but
which is not bound to purchase any securities for its own account and normally does not
guarantee the successfûl placement of all of the offered securities".: Goulet, supra note
16, at 565.

at its own depending on the market condition or otherwise. From this item the
investors can know of the type of underwriting and thereby determine the risk in their
investments- When it is a "best efforts" issue, the investors may find "generally more
n,k"326

in purchasing the securities, "since the underwriter has no contractual

obligation which might help to steady, at least temporady, an after-market price".327
SimilarIy, although a "market out'' clause in a prospectus has become pretty much
standard in Canada, it may be a matter of concern for the investors in apprehension of
the fate of their investrnents after the termination of the underwriter's obligations-

In Bangladesh a Company making an 1 . 0is required to appoint one or
more undenilriters to underwrite the secwities on a fm cornmitment b a ~ i s . ~A' ~
prospectus must refer to the name(s) of the underwriter(s), foflowed by a guarantee by the
It does not
directon of the underwriters financial ability to meet their 0bli~ations.3~~
require any "market outy7clause. AIthough from these provisions it seems to appear that
Bangladesh law does not envisage "best efforts" underwriting, a close reading of clause
5(a) of Schedule III Part I of CA, 1994 reveals that there is scope of "best efforts"
underwriting as well. Clause 5(a) requires that where securities are offered to the public
for subscription, the prospectus must state "the minimum amount which in the opinion of
the directors or of the signatones of the memorandum must be raised by the issue of those

OSAR, R.R.O. 1990. Regulation 1015, F o m 12 Item 2 Ins. 2, supplemented by
National Policv No. 12.
326 P. E. ~ c ~ ; i l l a nsupra
,
note 307, at 119.
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shares ... ."330 A statement of minimum arnount requirement in a prospectus is made
when an issue is underwritten on best efforts basis. Thus in explaining Item 5 (the "Use
of Proceeds" derived by the issuer from the sale of the securities) one Canadian author
writes, "If the offering is not f d y underwritten, but is a best efforts offering, the
minimum amount required to accomplish the purposes in the prospectus must be

specified,. .."33'. This means that when an issue is fblly underwritten, there is no question
of c'minimum arnount". From this discussion it may be concluded that in Bangladesh law
there is scope for making both f m cornmitment and best efforts underwritings.

Category II: Surnrnary Of Prospectus
Item 4 of Ontario Form 12 underlines the need of a summary of
information contained in the body of the prospectus. It is usudly given immediateIy after

the cover page. The summary must highlight the merits and risks of the in~estment.~~'
This includes risk factors and the governing state of &airs of the issuer of the
secuntiesY3 The sumrnary page is usually followed by a table of contents of the
prospectus which can lead the readers to the text. Bangladesh law, on the other hand, does
not provide for inclusion of any summary in the prospectus. In practice, however,
- -
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CA. SC^. m p t . ICI. 11.
Ibid., cl. 5(a) (emphasis added).
Supra note 16, at 145. (emphasis added)
OSAR, R.R.O. 1990, Regdation 1015, Form 12 Item 4 Ins. 1.
Ibid.

"Summarized Information" is provided, though in very short compared to Ontario. Such
information includes particulars of the Company, risk factors and use of proceeds.334

Category III: Use Of Proceeds
Item 5 of Form 12 requires a prospectus to bear a statement of the
estirnated net proceeds after deducting the undewriting costs, which the issuer will gain
fkom the sale of securities to be offered. As well, be it a f d y underwritten or a best
efforts offering, it is required to reasonably spec* the principal purposes for which the
said proceeds are intended to be used and the roughly estimated arnount for each purpose

In case the actual proceeds are insufficient to serve those purposes, a statement is
necessary defining how the funds will be used dong with the order of pnority of their
use?" If any other funds, in a material arnount, are to be applied concurrently with the
sale proceeds, the arnount and sources of those other funds rnust be made
Although Bangladesh law asks for an account of how the Company will use the net sale
proceeds to meet the purposes of an offering, be it a f d y underwritten offering3" or

See prospectus, Samata Leather Complex Limited, The Daily Star (a national daily),
(29 June 1998) 17.
335 OSAR, R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 1015, Forrn 2 Item 5 Ins. 2.
336 Ibid.. hs.3.
337 PIR. r. 7.B. (4)(a). For instance, the prospectus of Samata Leather Complex Limited
discloses the utilization of the P O proceeds, in the Summarized Information, as follows:
334

Particulars
Plant, machineries and equipments
Working Capital
Preliminary and IPO expenses

Tk. in .O00
20,000
27,600
4,OOo

---------

best efforts o f f e ~ n ~it~lacks
~ * ,any provisions requïring an explmation of how they will
be expended to fulfill the purposes in order of priority in the event of a shortage of funds

compared to the actual needs.
Under Ontario law, where any material amount of the sale proceeds is
designed to be used to meet indebtedness, the prospectus must clarifi the use of the debt
money provided that money was borrowed within two years back fiom the date of the
issueTg If a material part of the said proceeds is to be expended to acquire assets outside
the ordinary course of business, it must give a brief description of the paaiculars of such

assets, their purchase price and their vend or^?^^ If the securities partiaily constitute the
consideration for acquisition of any of such assets, it must also provide, inter alfa,"brief
particulars of the designation, nurnber or amount. voting rights (if ~ I I ~ ) "By
~ ~contrast,
'.
Bangladesh law does not contain any provision calling for disclosure of the use of debts
where the proceeds WU be expended to repay such debts. Also, it does not require the

particulars of any assets, if purchased with the money raised by the sale of securities.
However, its asks for the disclosure of the terms of contracts covenng the Company
Total Utilization of Fund.. .. 5 1,600, supra note 334. One
recent prospectus merely States, without details, that "The
proceeds will be utilized for expanding our banking
business over a penod of two years, :prospectus, Prime
Bank Limited, (Dhaka: 29 August 1999). at 5.

CA 1994, sch. III pt. 1. cl. 5(a).
339
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Ibid.
Ibid. Ins. 4.
Ibid.

affairs, such as land purchase. 342 Where any propexty is purchased and any part of the
consideration consists of securities, Bangladesh Iaw, like its Ontario counterpart, requires
that particulars of the vendors, the amount so payable in kind, nature of title or interest in
that property, etc. must be d i s c ~ o s e d ? ~ ~
Item 5(b) requires a prospectus to embody a statement of "the particulars
of any provisions or arrangements made for holding any part of the net proceeds of the
issue in trust or subject to the fûlfillment of any conditions". In cornpliance with this
requirement, if an o f f e ~ is
g a best efforts one, the prospectus must mention the required
minimum arnount, and any subscriptions received must be held by a trust company or
other acceptable depository until the minimum amount is received3". The purpose of
such provision is to assure the investors that if the minimum subscription is not received
within a particular time limit stipulated in the contract between the trust company and
issuer, the investors money will be r e t ~ r n e d . ~Bangladesh
~'
law does not, however,
provide for depositing of subscription b d s in any depository until the minimum amount
is received and, therefore, there is no system of retuming money to the subscribers when a
particular issue is undersubscribed.
--
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PIR,r. 7.B.(4)(c).

CA 1994, SC^. m pt. 1, ci. 12(1).
OSC Policies,S. 5.1.
Ibid.

Where the issuer is a related issueP6 or connected issue?

of the

underwriter, an Ontario prospectus must disclose what type of relationship or connection
exists between the issuer and the underwriter and how much of the saIe proceeds of
securities "will be applied, directly or indirectly, for benefit of the underwriter or any
related issuer of the u n d e r w r i t e ~ A
~ ~cross-reference
~.
to Item 30 must also be made in
this connection. It requires, inter alia, details about the arnount of indebtedness and
security for it, "where the issuer has any indebtedness to the undexwriter or any related
issuer of the underwriter and that indebtedness is the basis on which the issuer is a
connected issuer of the ~ndenvriter"'~~.
Though there is no similar specific provision in
Bangladesh law, it contains a general provision calling for information about any loan
taken by the issuer, either from a subsidiary or associate concern or from any other party
The term "related issuer" has been defined to mean, "in respect of a person or
Company,
346

(a) any other person or company that influences the person or company,

(b) any other person or company that is influenced by the person or company,
(c) any other person or company in like relation to a person or company referred to in
clause (a) or (b) or any such other person or company, or
(d) any person or company designated by the (Ontario Securities) Commission as a
related issuer of the person or company in accordance with subsection 220(1)".:
OSAR, R.R.O., Regulation 1015, S. 219.
347 Tonnected issuer" is defined to mean, "in respect of a registrant, an issuer that h a ,
or any related issuer of which has, any indebtedness to, or other relationship with, the
registrant, a related issuer of the registrant, or a director, officer or partner of the
registrant or a related issuer of the registrant, that, in connection with a distribution of
securities of the issuer, is material to a prospective purchaser of the securities". :Ibid.
348 Ibid. Form 12 Item 5(c).
349 Ibid. Fonn 12 Item 30 Ins. 2.

or parties, giving fidl details of al1 related parties to the transa~tion?~~-The
words "any
other party" may include the underwriter or any other person or institution having control
over the underwriter. Thus this provision seems to have the same effect of the Ontario's
related or connected issuer provision, but it Iacks the methods of meeting such
indebtedness.

In summary, Bangladesh Iaw requires the disclosure of the methods and
purposes of the use of proceeds and thereby conforms to Ontario law. However, it lacks
provisions that require the depositing of the subscription money in a trust Company for

returning to the investors in the event of a %est efforts" issue being undersubscnbed.

Category IV: Risk Factors
To help investors clearly comprehend the nsks involved in and the
speculative nature of the investment enterprise, the Ontario Securities Act Regulation
requires disclosure of the factors that render the investrnent in securities a risk or
~ ~ e c u l a t i o nSuch
. ~ ~ 'factors include relevant govemment regulations, environmental
requirernents, the risk of product Iiabiiity, the necessity for and possible shoaage of

fuaher funding and so on."'

Such factors are mentioned in the Summary and then

detailed under a separate caption."" Likewise, Bangladesh law requires disclosure of the
nsk factors to the potentid investing public, which include, among others, poor financial

'
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PIR. r.l.B.(7)(7).
OSAR, R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 1015, Form 12 Item 10.
Supra note 16, at 148.

conditions, industry risks, market and technology-related risks and potentid or existing
g o v e r n e n t regulations.'"

However, in practice, such factors are ofien presented in a

summary and incomprehensible manner. For instance, sarnple risk factors contained in a
prospectus includes the following:
ii) The company has full reliance on export in the international market.
iii) Any new technology which drastically reduces the labour input rnay
change the competitiveness of ~ a a ~ l a d e s h ? ~
What can investors discern from this? If the company has full reliance on international
market, how can it be an investment risk? The statements require some clarification so
that investors, particularly lay investors, can understand the investment risks involvedFor example, as higldighted, new technology reducing labor input may change the
competitiveness of Bangladesh, but as a result of whose use of technology? How does it
affect the issuer in particular? These questions are important to the investing public, but
answers are not available here as the language and meaning are vague.

Category V: Current Status And History

Share And Loan Capital Stmcture
Item 7 deals with share and loan capital structure of the issuer. It calls for
detailed partïculars about the equity capital, secured loan, and unsecured long-term loan

353
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3"

See prospectus, Husky Injection Molding Systems, 28 O c t 1998, at 34-35.
PZR, r. 7.B.(3).
Supra note 334.

capital which extends beyond one year?56 A prospectus must contain, among other
things, a description of the priority of indebtedness, the terms of their repayment and the
security against the loans?

In addition, it must state the minority interests in preference

shares , if any, and common shares of the issuer and in its consolidated and
unconsolidated s~bsidiaries?~~
Under Bangladesh law there is no requirernent to give an
equity capital structure, though description of loans borrowed by the issuer is calIed
for?'

In practice, a section furnishing information about both equity and loan capital is

included in prospectuses.360
Description Of Business And Property

In Ontario, according to Form 12 Item 9, it is necessary for a prospectus to
describe the issuer's and its subsidiaries' past and future business, with the general
development of the business for the last five years. It must include an account of the
principal products or services, as the case may be. It must also contain a bnef description
of the principal properties ( e.g., plants, buildings, sales headquarters, etc.) of the issuer
and its subsidiaries defining the nature of title or encumbrance (e-g., mortgage), where

'" OSAR, R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 1015, Form 12 Item 7(1) Ins. 1.
357

Zbid., Ins. 1 and 4 together.

'"Zbid.,Item 7(3) and 7(4).
359 PZR,r. 7.B .(7)@)(7).

See for instance, the prospectus of Samata Leather Complex Limited, which contains
a very brief description of share capital only under the caption of "Capital Structure".:
Supra note 334, at 17. At two other places it mentions only the arnount of long term loan
under the sub-head of "Means of Finance". It does not even refer to the kind of loan, i.e.
whether secured or unsecured, the tenns of their repayment and particulars of security
against hem, if any. Nothing is also said about the minority interest in the share capital.
supra note 334 at 20.
'O

any of them is not held in fee or is held subject to any en~umbrance.'~'The purpose of the
description of business is to inforrn the investors about what goods are produced or what
services are rendered by the company. The statement about the issuer's property is
intended to "reasonably inform investors as to the suitability, adequacy, productive
capacity and extent of utilization of the facilities used in the e n t e r p r i ~ e " ~Sirnilarly,
~~.
a
Bangladesh prospectus must give a general description of the development and operation
of the issuer's business, which include its products or services, sources of raw materials,
sources and requirement of power, gas and water,

It also must describe the issuer's

property with particulars of its location, nature of the issuer's title in it and encumbrances,
if any, to which it is s u b j e ~ t ? ~ ~

Material ~ o n t r a c t s ~ ~ '
Item 33 of Ontario Form 12 calls for particulars of d i material contracts ( e.g.,
underwriting agreements) entered into by the issuer or its subsidiaries within the two
years fkom the date of the prelirninary prospectus or profonna prospectus. Particulars so
required cover the dates of, parties to, consideration and nature of the con tract^"^^ The
prospectus must give a reasonable time and place for inspection of such contracts during
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O S M , R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 1015, Form 12 Item 12.

36'

Ibid., hst.

PIR. r. 7.B.(5). See the prospectus, Bionic Seafood Exports Ltd., @haka, 25 August
1999), at 7-9.
364 Ibid., r. 7.B.(6). See Prospectus, ibid.
365 A ''mateTial contract" refers to "'any contract that can reasonably be regarded as
presently material to the proposed investor in the securities k i n g offered". : OReg., Form
12 Item Ins. 1. It, however, does not include a contract made in the ordinary course of
business of the issuing company. :Ibid., Ins. 2, and CA, sch. III pt. II cl. 16(2).
363

the distribution of the securities being offered. Such disclosure may, however, be
dispensed with by the Director of the OSC, if he or she thinks it to be unnecessary for the
protection of i n v e ~ t o r s ?In~ Bangladesh
~
a prospectus must describe the date of, parties to
and general nature of every material contract entered into within two years o r more than
two years before the date of the prospectus.368It must aiso indicate a reasonable time and
place for their inspection.'"

U m e those of Ontario, Bangladesh prospectuses are not,

however, required to disclose the consideration of material contracts. In practice, the
required particulars of material contracts are not usually discl~sed.-"~

Promoters
An issuer in Ontario is obliged to give the name of any promoter, the

nature and amount of value received or to be received by him or her or it from the issuer

366
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369

OSAR., R.R.O. 1990, Regdation 1015, Form 12 Item 33 Ins. 3.
Ibid., Ins. 4.
CA 1994, sch. III pt. 1cl. 16(1) and cl. 16(2).
Ibid., cl. 16(3).

370 For

instance, one prospectus reads as follows:
The following are material contracts not being in the ordinary course of
business which have been entered into by the Company.
#Underwriting Agreement between the Company and the Underwriters.
# Issue Management Agreement between the Company and the Manager

to the Issue, AAA Consultants & Financial Advisers.
Copies of the aforementioned contracts and documents.. .may be inspected
on any working day during office hours at the Company's Registered
Office. supra note 334, at 9
It does not give the dates of the contracts, the name of the underwriters, nor the
consideration of the contracts as it is not requùed by the concemed law.

or from any of its subsidiaries?

The issuer must also state the nature and arnount of the

consideration received or to be received by it or its subsidiary from the promoter for that
am~unt.'~'In addition, if the issuer or any of its subsidiaries has received or will receive

any property from the prornoter, it will be incumbent on it to state the acquisition cost and
the principle of determination of that ~ost."~In Bangladesh, as in Ontario, the issuer must
state the amount or benefit paid or given, or to be paid or given to any prornoter and also
the consideration for that amount or

In addition, it must disclose if it has

received any assets frorn the promoters who provide the pnce and the rnetbod of
determinhg that price."7s In this respect the requirements under both jurisdictions are
similar with the effect that the investors will have knowledge of the issuer's interest and
obligations in relation to the promoters.
As discussed above, the Items falling within the category of "Current
status and History", seem to cd1 for sirnilar kinds of information. However, in respect of
some matters Bangladesh law lacks provisions, e-g., equity capital disclosure, but in
practice such information are provided.3766 e r e are some other items under both laws,
which have not been discussed, but are similar in effect, e-g., "Intercorporate
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OSAR, R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 1015, Form 12 Item 15(a).
Zbid.
Ibid.. Item 15@).
CA, sch. III p. 1 cl. 15, and PZR. r. 7.B.(13)(a).
PZR,r. 7.B.(I3)(b).
See supra note 334 and the accompanying text.

~ e l a t i o n s h i p " But
~ ~ ~an
. important Item, namely "Dividend ~ e c o r d " ~is
' ~missing
,
in
Bangladesh law, and is not disclosed in practice either. From the Dividend Record the
investors can know how much dividends or what percentage of dividends the issuer has
declared and given in previous years and if there was any discrepancy between the
declaration and actual disbursement.

Category VI: Management
Directors And Oficers, Executive Compensation And Indebtedness
An Ontario prospectus is required to list the names and home addresses in

full of a i l directors and ofticers of the i s ~ u e r - Alternatively,
~~'
it must give solely their
municipality of residence or postal addresses. It must indicate ali positions and offices
held by such people and their principal occupations within five preceding y e a r ~ ? ~
Sirnilarly, in Bangladesh a prospectus must contain the names, addresses, descriptions

and occupations of the directors and ofticers, their positions and offices in the Company,
expenence in business and family relationships arnong themselves, if any."' According
to Item 22, an Ontario prospectus must add a Statement of Executive Compensation as
per Form 40, which includes annual compensation (salary, bonus, etc.) and long-term
See OSAR, R.R.O.1990 Regulation 1015, Form 12 Item 27, and CA 1994, sch. III pt.
1, cl. 22 and PIR, r. 7.B.(7)(b)(17). In connection with Bangladesh law, see for practice,
supra note 3 10 and Prospectus, Beximco Knitting Limited, in the Inefaq,(25 June 1994)
377
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OSAR, R.R.O. 1990 Regulation 1015, Form 12 Item 20.
Ibid., Form 12 Item 2 1.
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Ibid.

compensation (stocks under option, compensation for retirement ,mesignation or other
termination of employment) of the chief executive officer (CEO) axnd other "Named
Executive ~fficers"~~'.
Bangladesh law requires a prospectus to s t a e the yearly
r e m ~ n e r a t i o nand
~ ~compensation
~
for the loss of

of officers and directors. But

nowhere has "remuneration" been defmed?
Item 23 of Ontario Form 12 asks for detailed disclosure of the
indebtedness of directors, executive officers, senior officers, nornimee directors, and their
associates and affiliates to the issuer or any other entity. A Bangladesh prospectus must
disclose in detail if any loan has k e n given by the issuer to or takem from any director or

any person connected with the dire~tor."~
Unlike an Ontario prospoectus it does not
require the disclosure of any fact of indebtedness of such persons t o any entity other than
the issuer.

Interest Of Management And Others In Material Transactions :
CA 1994, SC^. III pt. 1 cl. 3(1) and PIR, r. 7.8.(8).
According to Item 1.3 of Form 40, other "Named Executive O ~ c e r s refer
"
to-

four most highly compensated executive officers of the issuer, other than the CEO,
who were serving as executive officers at the end of most recenrdiy completed
financial year, provided such an officer's total salary and bonus .exceeds $100,000;
would have been
those executive oficers for whom disclosure under paragraph (a)
required but for the fact that they were not serving as officers o f the issuer at the end
of the most recently completed financial year.
PIR, r- 7.B.(ll).
CA 1994, SC^. m Pt. I CI. 3(2).
In practice, remuneration paid to executives and aggregate amoauit of rernuneration
paid to the oficers and directors are stated in corporate prospectuses. See, for example,
supra note 337 at 24, and supra note 363, at 16.
386 PIR. r. 7,B.(lO)(f).

Under Item 29 of Ontario Form 12, a prospectus is necessary to provide a
bief description of any materiai interests of the company management and othen in any
material transaction during the last three years or in any material proposed transactions, to
which the company or any of its subsidiaries was or will be a party. "Management" is
defmed to include any director, senior offi~cerof the issuer, principal shareholder, and
their associates or affiliates. While this item requires disclosure of any material interest
received or to be received by the company management and others in any material
transaction in general, under Bangladesh law only the interests received or to be received
particulariy by directors or promoters in the promotion of the company or in any property
acquired by the cornpany must be made

Thus a provision requiring disclosure

of interest of the management in various transactions is absent in Bangladesh law.

Miscellaneous Category
Item 34 requires disclosure of al1 other material facts than those
categorized in rest of the items discussed above. This is "the catch-all provision, to ensure
that no information is omitted merely because it cannot easily be ~ate~orized"~".
Likewise, Bangladesh law, as already discussed, contains a provision requiring other
material information in addition to those specified therein?'

The non-cornpliance with

environmental laws by the issuer may be an example of such information. In both

"'~bid..cl. 18.
388
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Johston and Rockwell, supra note 57, at 76.
See the texts accompanying supra notes 296-298.

jurisdictions a corporation or its management is liable with heavy penalties for breaching
) ~ ~h~m, s the reputation of
environmentai obligations ( e.g, by polluting air, ~ ~ i l l swhich
the corporation's business. Such penalties and disrepute are shared by the securities
holders in that damages are paid out of the corporate earnings which affect the amount of

In Ontario corporate environmental Liability arises under common law and statutory
laws. Under common law a Company rnay be held liable applying the tort principles of
strict Iiability (e-g. for escape of noxious gases), negligence and nuisance (e-g.
discharging noxious fumes). Under the Environmental Protection Act (EPA), R.S.O.
1990, c. E.19, a discharge of contaminant or causing or permitting discharge of
contaminant into naturd environment below a prescribed limit (S.14(1)) or above that
limit (S. 6(1)), and "spills" into environment (ss. 9 1-93) by a company gives rise to its
liability. In Bangladesh, on the other hand, environmental wrongs committed by a
company rnay be redressed under common law, national constitution and statutes. A
company rnay be held Iiable for committing environmental negligence or nuisance under
common law. If such a wrong amounts to an infringement of any of the fundarnental
nghts to life (Arts. 3 1 and 32), property (Art. 40) and trade (Art. 42) entrenched under the
Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, then it will attract the wrÏt
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. ( Art. 102). Thus, for instance,
environmental matters were addressed in the garb of fundamental nghts in Dr, Mohiuddin
Farooque v. Bangladesh and others, 1 B.L.C. (AD) (1996) 189-2 19, and Dr. Mohiuddin
Farooque v. Bangladesh, 48 D.L.R.. 438-446. A rnischief of discharging pollutants by a
company in excess of prescribed Limit will corne within the purview of S. 9 of The
Bangladesh Environmental Conservation Act (BECA), 1995.On being found guilty an
Ontario company rnay be fined a maximum amount of $ 5 0 , 0 for the first convictions
and $100,000 for the subsequent convictions for each day the offense occurs. (EPA,
R.S.O. 1990, c. E. 19, S. 186). Moreover, the courts rnay impose additional penalty equal
to the monetary benefit received by or accmed by the a corporation. (EPA, R.S.O. 1990,
c. E. 19, S. 189. The courts rnay also order such a company to prevent or decrease or
eliminate the effects on natural environment of the offence. (EPA, R.S.O. 1990, c, E.190).
Where the management is liable, corporeal punishment rnay be imposed (EPA, S. 193). In
Bangladesh, on the other hand, there is no defined amount of fines for commission of
environmental wrongs other than discharging pollutants in excess of the prescribed limit.
It depends on the discretion of the courts. In respect of discharge of pollutants exceeding
limit the concemed personnel of the company will be liable to be punished with
impnsonment for a period not more than five years or with fme not more than 1ûûûûû
taka (approx. Can. $3000)(BECA, ss. 15 and 16).
390

their dividends and the disrepute hampers the business resulting in Iess earnings.
Furthemore, they adversely impact the secondary market and, as result, the value of the
securities is likely to decline. Thus it rnay be concluded that corporate environmental noncompIiance has an effect on the price of securities and, therefore, is subject to discIosure:
"[EJnvironmental non-cornpliance would likely be considered a material fact under
Canadian Securities legislation if the non-cornpliance had a significant effect on the value
of the securities

9,

391

Therefore, an author observes in this connection that "Material facts

are, however, broader than just balance sheet considerations and will clearly encompass
environmental factors.9,392
It may be summarized that the laws of Ontario and Bangladesh require, in
general, disclosure of al1 material facts and, in particular, sirnilar categories of facts. An
issuer is solely responsible to disclose each and every piece of information, specified or
not, having a bearing on the price or value of securities. That a particular matter is not
specified in the law does not mean the matter need not be d i ~ c l o s e d . ~ ~ ~

2.3.2.1.2 Financial Matters
Financial Statements
M. E. Deturbide, "Corporate Protector or Environmental Safeguard? The Emerging
Role of fie Environmental Audit", 5 J.Env..L.& Pract.. 1 at 10 note 29. To meet the full
disclosure requirement environmental auditing is suggested by this author as a due
diligence defence for corporations in Canada
392 S.H.T. Denstedt and S.R. Miller, "Due Diligence in Disclosing Environmental
Mormation for Securities Transactions", (1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 23 1, at 239391

In addition to the non-financial rnatters discussed above, a prospectus both
in Ontario and Bangladesh must contain certain financial statements. In Ontario such
statements are prepared according to the generally accepted accounting pnnciples
(GAAP) in canaddg4,which are defined in the Canadian Znstitute of Chartered

Accountonrs (CZCA) and book^^' The financial statements required of an Ontario

a statement of surplus397,a statement of
prospectus include an income state~nent~'~,
changes in financial position3g8and a balance sheet?" The OSC Director may, however,
exempt the issuer from the requirernent of any of these statements?

In Bangladesh the

requisite statements include a summary statement of earnings401,balance sheets4O2,profit
& loss staternents and cash flows statements?

They are to be prepared and presented as

per international accounting standards (IAS) adopted by the Institute of Chartered
Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB)!'~
In Ontario a prospectus contains together, in a consolidated form, the
statement of income for each of the last five financial years and the statement of retained
For the liability of an issuer with respect to prospectus misrepresentation, see
Johnston and Rockwell, supra note 57 at 179-183.
394 OS&
R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 1015, S. 2(1).
395 Nafional Policy NO. 27, sub-pts. 3.1 and 3.2.
396 OSAR. R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 1015, S. 53(l)(a).
397 Ibid., s.53(1)@).
398 Ibid. S. 53(l)(c).
399 Ibid., S. 53(l)(d). The financial statements required of a mutual fund prospectus are
somewhat different.: see ibid., S. 54.
400 Ibid.. S. 53(6).
PIR, r. 7.B.(20)(a).
402 Ibid., r- 7B.(20)@)(i).
403 Ibid., r. 7.B.(20)@)(ii).
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"'

earnings. They include income from sales and other sources, expenses under different
405

heads, arnount of dividends, if any, and the surplus or deficit at the end of each year.

I,

Bangladesh each of the income statement, and the profit and loss statements, is prepared
for a period of the last five fmancial years and their contents are similar with those of an
Ontano prospectus.4" The Ontario prospectus discloses cash-flows of the issuer from the
operating, investing and financing activities. 407 The Bangladesh prospectus aiso contains
a cash-flows staternent for the same period with cash-flows from sunilar broad sources.408

The balance sheet in the Ontario prospectus must be as at a date not more than 120 days
prior to the date of issuance of the receipt of the preliminary prospectus or other date
It must be accompanied by a balance sheet for
permitted or required by the ~irector.~*
the corresponding date of the previous financial year.410Where the balance sheet is as at a
date other than the financial year end, the said balance sheet as at the corresponding date
of the previous year may be omitted if the prospectus contains comparative balance sheets

as at the most financial year end and as at the immediately preceding financial year
end.411Bangladesh law differs from Ontario law in this respect. A Bangladesh prospectus
must provide balance sheets for the five preceding financial years?12 Al1 these financial

Ibid., r. 7.B.(20).
4
0
'
See supra note 353, at 40.
406 For contents of profit and loss accounts, see supra note 334, at 19.
4
0
' See supra note 353, at 41.
408
For contents of cash-flow statement, see supra note 334.
409 OSAR, R.R.O. 1990, Regdation 1015, S. 53(l)(d)(i).
410 Ibid., S. 53(l)(d)(ii). See supra note 253, at 39.
41 1
Ibid., S. 53(2).
4'2 PIR, 7-B.(20)@)(i)..

statements, under both the systerns, are followed by notes thereto explaining the items
and figures, where ne~essary.~"

Both the laws of Ontario and Bangladesh require that the financial
statements be audited and the audited statements to be accompanied by auditor's
reports.414The Ontario auditor's report must be prepared in accordance with the generally
accepted auditing standards (GAAS) recommended in the CICA

andb book"^ and any

applicable provision of the Ontario securities regdation. The CICA Handbook requires
that "(t)he examination should be performed and the report prepared by a person or
persons having adequate technical training and proficiency in auditing, with due care and
with an objective state of mind'*16. In addition to this condition, an auditor must not be

Policy No. 3 defines who is unacceptable as an
unacceptable to the ~ i r e c t o r ?National
~
auditor. An auditor is unacceptable if he/she or hisher partner, employer, employee, or
associate is a director, officer or employee or security holder of the issuer or its affiliates.

In Bangladesh an audit report must be prepared by an auditor who is a regular member of
the ICAB applying the international standards of auditing (ISA) as contained in the
Members Handbook published by the ICAB .41 Like Ontario, in Bangladesh an auditor
See supra note 353, at 43-49, and supra note 334, ,at 19-20.
OSAR, R.R.0- 1990, Regdation 1015, S. 2(5), and CA 1994, sch. III pt. LT ci. 24 and
PIR, r.7.B.(20).
415 Supra note 396.Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, CICA Handbook,vols.
1-III ( Toronto: CICA, 1997).
416 CICA Handbook, Zbid., Section 5100.
417 OSA, sub-sec. 61(2)(i).
418 PIR, r. 7.B.(20). Here "international auditing standards" refer to the auditing standards
issued by the International Auditing Practices Committee of the International Federation
413
414

must be qualified within the meaning of the Companies Act (CA) 1994. Accordingly,
persons including an officer or empIoyee, partner or debtor of the issuer, director or
member of its managing agent are disqualified from being the issuer's a ~ d i t o r . ~ ' ~
From the foregoing discussion it can be seen that the laws of Ontario and
Bangladesh requke similar kinds of financial statements with similar contents. Financial
statements in Ontario are prepared applying the G

M contained in the CICA Handbook

while in Bangladesh those are prepared according to the IASs adopted by the ICAB.
Audit reports are prepared according to the GAAS and ISAs in Ontario and Bangladesh

respectively. The (Canadian) Accounting Standards Board, in pursuance of its objective
of international harmonization of accounting standards, works with the IASC to minimize
differences between the IASs and the corresponding Accounting Recornmendations
contained in the CICA

andb book^" A comparison between the IASs and Handbook

recommendations done by the Board shows that they ''correspond very closely, with the
result that application of one set of standards often results in cornpliance with the
~ther.'*~'Simultaneously the Assurance Standard Board (ASB) compares the
International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) with the corresponding CICA Handimok
standards.42zCornpliant with the ISAs the Handbook is modified unless Canadian
position isfindamentally different fkom the international standing with regard to any

of Accountants. : The Securities and Exchange Rules, 1987 (am. No. SEUSection7/SER/03/132), sub-ruie 12(2), explanation to sub-rule 2.
419 CA 1994, S. 212(2).
420 CICA Hnndbook. supra note 4 15, ss. 1501-02.
42' Zbid. S. 1501 appendix.

panicular

natter.^* Thus the GAAP and the GAAS contained in the CZCA Handbook are

similar with the IASs and ISAs respectively which, as seen above, are followed by
Bangladesh in preparing financial statements. In other words, in preparing the financial
statements and auditing reports both Ontario and Bangladesh follow, at least in theory,
the same principles and standards.
It may be noted at this point that the requirement of applying KASs and
ISAs was introduced in Bangladesh in late 1 9 9 7 following
~~~
the recommendation of the

ADB Report-4xThe ICAB is still in the process of adopting these standards. It has not
been able to keep Pace with the latest changes and improvements occurring at the
international ~ e v e l . ~Also,
' ~ there remain contradictions between the domestic laws and
the

standard^.^" Moreover, there are some practical difficulties in the application of IASs

5101.04.
423 Zbid, S. 5101.04.
424 See No. SEC/Section-7/SERI03/132 dated 22 Oct. 1997.
425 See ADB Report, supra note 10, at 14.
426 For example, as of 25 June 1998 the ICAB did not adopt the IAS 7 (revised in 1992)
on cash-flow statements which was issued by the International Accounting Standards
Cornmittee (IASC) replacing the original IAS 7 : M.H. Kabir, "International Accounting
Standards -IAS 1 (Revised 1997)- Presentation of Financial Statements", ( a paper
presented in a seminar on International Accounting Standards- IAS (Revised 1997),
ICAE3, Dhaka, 25 June 1998) (unpublished) at 14.
427 For example, with regard to preparation of a balance sheet IAS l(revised 1997)
requires current and non-current assets, and current and non-current Iiabilities. It uses the
term "non-current" to include tangible, intangible and operating and financial assets (e-g.,
investments) of long term nature while "current7' assets include inventories, trade and
other receivable, etc. On the other hand, the CA 1994 (sch. XI, S. 185) and the Securities
and Exchange Rules, 1987 (SER) (sch., r. 12.(2) as am. 22 Oct. 1997) use the term
"fured" assets to include tangible and intangible assets grouping investments, loan and
advances separate fiom the fixed assets. Thus differ expianations of terms and order of
presentation as contained in the IAS and the CA and SER. Again, in making cash-flow
4"

Ibid.

S.

in Bangladesh. For example, often conflict arises between the provisions of LASs and the
income tax law of Bangladesh triggering double taxation. Additional hassles are created
by the tax authonties, This is reflected as follows:
[Tlhe Income Tax Authorities on many occasions, misunderstand and
misinterpret the disdosure & information presented in FSs. More
disclosures, no doubt, bring transparency. But more transparency causes
more trouble, and is costlier in Bangladesh. One will face Ieast trouble and
pay less for not being transparent (because of practices and mindset of the
people, particularly in the revenue adrninistrati~n).~'~

Zn order to avoid "trouble" companies in Bangladesh, in practice, tend not to present full
and true financial information notwithstanding the requirement of cornpliance with the
IAS.~~'
This is very natural for a Company noi to "forgo voluntarily the financial

advantages of avoiding accurate financial reporting, 4 3 0 . It is a common allegation in

Thus
Bangladesh that companies do not produce full and true fmancial ~taternents.~~'
"accounting and auditing standards in Bangladesh Vary widely between theory and
practice.'*32 For this both the issuer and auditors are ~ i a b l e . ~ ~ ~
statements the IAS encourages to use "direct" or "indirect" method, but the SER requires
only the "direct" method. : Kabir, ibid, at 12-14.
428 Kabir, supra note 426. at 16.
'" For a cornplaint of corporate tax evasion, see Financial Express (a national daily), (17
July 1998) 1.
"O
Treestyle Not to Let Loose" B. Account. 67, (0ct.-Dec. 1996) at 73.
43' See the text accornpanying supra note 49 . Also see M.H.R. Khan and S. R.
Howlader, "Bangladesh Securities Market- Challenges and Prospectus", (1984) D. U.
Stud., Pt. C, at 132432 Supra note 44 at 6-7.
433 See M-MeHoque,"Capital Market Development in Bangladesh- Problerns and
Prospects", Challenges of Market Economy, (Dhaka: The Instinite of Chartered
Accountants of Bangladesh, 1994), at para. 6.04.

Trading in securities "is one in which opportunities for dishonesty are of
constant occurrence and ever present'*Y. Ontario is also affected by this tendency of
securities trading. Recently the Chairman of the OSC, David Brown, reveaied a good
number of instances of "aggressive" accounting and a u d i h g practices~35

In some cases, the issue is overstatement o f current income, perhaps by use
of aggressive and inappropriate revenue recognition practices- Ln others, it
is understatement of current income, whether through excessive "one
time" charges for reorganizations and restnacturings or unreasonably short
arnortization penods for so called acquired in-process research and
development, thus making the future look better?

The OSC Chair referred to some public comments which reflect the public's concern:
"the need ...to sustain equity pices has aMicted corporatie behaviour ... and there are

many dubious accounting practices regarding how eamings results are prepared, ,9437

Financial Forecasts/Projections

In Ontario, according to National Policy No.48, a "Future-Oriented
Financial Information" (FOFI) may be published in a preliniinary prospectus and a final
prospectus.438It discloses "information about prospective results of operations, fmancial
position or changes in financial position (of the issuer), based on assurnptions about
434

Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795, 803 (8th CU. 1943), cert- denied, 3 19 U.S. 767D. A. Brown, "'Public Accounting at a Crossroads", remarks (June 1999) 22 O.S.C.B.
3507.
436 Iblii. at 3507.
437 Ibid.
FOFI may also be used in other documents, e.g., rights affering circular, some
offering memoranda, take-over bid circular, issuer bid circular, etc.

"'

future economic conditions and courses of action"439 ,FOFI may either be a forecast or a
projection.40 Both of them reflect the issuer's planned courses of action normdy during
a maximum penod of 24 months with the only clifference that " ~ ~ ~ o t h e sare
es'~~
additionally used to prepare a projection.*'

A projection, based on hypotheses, is less

reliableM3and, therefore, the prospectus with a projection must caution (in bold type) the
investors that "there is significant rkk that actual results wiil Vary, perhaps materially,
fiom the results projected1,444
Using a forecast or projection in a prospectus is the option of the i s ~ u e r . ~ ~ '

If, however, FOFI is used in the prospectus, it must be accompanied by an auditor's
report without any r e s e r ~ a t i o n sThe
. ~ issuer has an obligation to compare previous FOFI
to the actual results and to update it and then to disclose both the cornparisons and
updates?

Tt is encouraged that the updates be accompanied by auditor's report-*' The

issuer is responsible for the publication of FOFI?' In practice, a tendency of fluctuations
between FOFI and actual results is observed. An OSC survey shows that as of 1994 only

National Policy No. 48, pt. 2.
Zbid.
"'Hypotheses" are defined as "assumptions that assume a set of economic conditions
or courses of action that are consistent with the issuer's intended course of action and
represent plausible circumstances". : ibid.
442 See ibid. pt. 2 and sub-part 4.2.
443 Ibid. sub-part 5.2.
Ibid sub-rule 5.1.
445 Ibid. pt. 1.
446 Ibid., sub-part 9.1.
447 Ibid. pts. 6 and 7.
Ibid., sub-part 9.1.
Ibid. pt. 1.
439

440

"'

.

23% of the (selected) seasoned i s s ~ e r s ~
and
' ~ 18% of the start-up i s s u e r ~ 'were
~ ~ able to

gain results (net earnings) better than FOE"'

In Bangladesh there are no legal provisions or guidelines for making any
financial forecast or projection in a prospectus. There is, however, a liability provision for
fiaudulent forecast in

CA.^'^ From this a scope of making financial forecast may be

assumed. In practice, almost a l l prospectuses in Bangladesh carry financial forecasts for
five subsequent

whereas an Ontario FOFI can be for a maximum penod of two

year~.~"
Unlike Ontario, no audit reports on these forecasts are attached to such
prospectuses. in these prospectuses the terms "forecast" and "projection" are
interchangably used with a caution at the top ( though not in bold type iike Ontario):
"These are forecast, not actual. Actual rnay vary from forecast. Prospective investors
should read the forecast carefully before taking investment decisi~n'*~~.
Sometimes a
forecast is highlighted even without such a ca~tion.~"
Again, some prospectuses mention
Seasoned issuers are those who have a significant operating history.
Start-up issuers refer to issuers without a significant operating history.
"FOH in Prospectuses- An OSC Staff Survey", (Jan. 1994) 17 0 . S .C.B. 6 at 7.
453 See CA 1994, S. 147.
454 E g , prospectus, Samata Leather Complex Ltd., in The Ittefaq, 29 June 1998, at 9 and
20; prospectus, Mona Food Industry Ltd., in The Share Bazar (Bengali national
fortnightly), 3: 17 (1 Nov. 1997) 23; prospectus, Gachihata Aquaculture Farms Ltd., The
Share Bazar (Bengali national fortnighdy), 3: 17 (1 Nov. 1997) 23., at 34-36. But in some
recent prospectuses no forecast or projections are found. See for example, Prospectus,
Bionic Seafood Exports Ltd., supra note 353, and Prospectus, Prime Bank Ltd., supra
note 337.
4"
Supra note 378 pt. 4.2.
456
Supra note 334, at 20.
457 See prospectus, Gachihata Aquaculture Farms Ltd, supra note 454, at 35.
450

451

"'

In practice,

the bases of the assurnption of the forecastPs8 while others do

according to one survey, 95% of the issuing companies failed to gain their projection
targets during the period of 1993-97.460This failure rate is sirnilar to that of ontario?'

OSA requises a prospectus to contain certificates by the issuer,

underwriter(s) and the auditors. The issuer's certificate signed by the chief executive
officer (CEO), chief financial offïcer (CFO) and any two directors (other than the C E 0

and CFO)states that "(t)he foregoing constitutes full, true and plain disclosure of ail
material facts relating to the securities offered by this prospectus"

462.

The underwriter's

ceaificate is sirnilady worded with the difference that the certification starts with "(to) the
best of our knowledge, information and belief
must accornpany the prospectus.*

In addition, an auditor's certificate

It states that "(i)n our opinion, these financial

statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of the

"'See prospectus, Sarnata Leather Complex Ltd., supra note 334, at 20.
459
461
462

463
464

465

Supra note 454, at 35)
Gachihata Aquaculture Farms Ltd, Share Bazar, supra note 38, at 5.
See supra notes 450-452.
OSA, S. SS(1). Also, for specimen, see supra note 353, at 50.
-Ibid.,S. 59(1). Also see supra note 353, at 51.
OSAR. R.R.O. 1990, Regulation 1015, S. 2(5).
Supra note 353, at 38.

h Bangladesh, the issuer's and underwriter's certificates are not required
by law to accompany a prospectus. The only requirement is the auditor's ~ertificate?~
Those two certificates are, however, used in p a ~ t i c eThe
.~~
auditor's
~
report certifies,
inter alia,that (t)he annexed Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss Account exhibit a true
and fair view of the state of the Bank's affairs"?

This is similar to an Ontario auditor's

certificate as both of them attest the "fair" state of the issuer's financial &airs.

2.3.2.2.4

Statement Of Purchaser's Rights

In Ontario a prospectus must embody a statement of a purchaser's
~ i ~ h t snamely
~ ~ ' , nghts to prospectus delivery and withdrawal from purchaseoo and

rights to damages against civil liability:71 Under the fust nght provision, a dealer4" must
send the latest prospectus or an amendment thereto to the purchaser either before entering

See CA, 1994,sch. III p t 1 cl. 24 and PIR. r. 7.B.(20).
For example, the issuer's certificate as contained in a prospectus States, among others,
that "(w)e also confirm that full and fair disclosure has been made in this prospectus, to
enable the investors to make an infonned decision for investmentT'The underwriter's
certificate reads, inter alia,thus-"We c o n f m that.. .al1 information as are relevant for Our
underwriting decision has been received by us and that draft prospectus forwarded to the
Commission has been approved by us": Prospectus, Prime Bank Ltd., supra note 337, at
1 and 3. This certification does not, unlike Ontario, directly confirrn the "full, true and
plain" disclosure. But as it approves the draft prospectus in general and the issuer's
certificate in particdar as a component of the prospectus, it indirectly endorses the true
and fair disclosure in the prospectus certified by the issuer.
Prospectus, Prime BankLtd., supra note 337, at41.
469 OSA, R.S.O. 1990, c.S.5, S. 60.
466

467

470
471

Ibid., S. 71.
Ibid,S. 130.

into the agreement of purchase and sale or by the end of the second day after entering into
such agreement (excluding weekends and ho~ida~s)!'~ The purchaser then has two days
to review the disclosure in the prospectus and to decide whether to withdraw from the
purchase. A withdrawd decision is made by simply giving a written notice to the
dealer!74

Secondly, the purchaser has also a right of action for damages or, instead of

darnages, a nght of rescission of the purchase, if the dealer fails to deliver him or her
(purchaser) a copy of prospectus or amendrnents thereto as required under section
7 1(1).4~'A prospectus, stating these rights, advises the investors ?O refer to any

applicable provisions of the securities legislation ..for the particulars of these rights or
consult with a legal a d ~ i s o r ' ~ ~ ~ .
Bangladesh law does not require such a staternent of the purchasers' right
nor is it, in practice, contained in a prospectus. In Bangladesh securities are offered to the
public publishing the fmal prospectus in two national dailies within ten days from the
date of receipting by the

SEC.^'^ The public can also procure copies of prospectuses from

the issuer, stock exchanges, SEC,underwriters and other market intermediaries."'

The

intending purchasers apply in prescribed forms to the issuer for allotment of securities.
472

"A dealer is a person or Company that trade in securities as principal or agent and
includes an underwriter or registered securities issuer with respect to a prospectus". :
supra note 16, at 257.
473 OSA,RS.0. 1990,~.
S.5,S. 71(1).
474 Ibid., S. 71(2).
475 Ibid., S. 133.
476 Supra note 353,at 37.
477 PIR,r. 4(1).
478 Ibid., r. 4(4)(a).

M e r allotment is made, no purchaser can rescind the purchase under the securities
legislation, but can clairn for darnages if the prospectus contains any untrue ~taternent.~'~
However, no damages suit for prospectus misstatement has yet been reported, the SEC
takes administrative actions only.480The probable reason is that litigation is costly and

time consurning in ~ a n ~ l a d e s h ? '

2.3.3 ROLE OF THE SECURITIES COMMISSIONS
As said earlier, in Ontario the distribution of securïties presupposes a
prospectus to be accepted by the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) unless filing of a
prospectus is exempted by the statute or an exemption order has been granted by the
OSC. Where an exemption is not available, an issuer must fde a preliminary prospectus

with the OSC with full, true and plain disclosure of material facts and accompanied by
requisite documentation including the board of directors' resolution approving it,
technical reports, auditor's cornfort letter and financial statements except the auditor's or
accountant's report(s).482If it seerns to substantially cornply with the requirements of the
479

Investors have a right to compensation available through the court of law for
prospectus misstatement against, inter alia, (a) every person who is a director of the company at the tune of the issue of the
prospectus;
(b) every person who is a promoter of the company; and
every person who has authorized the issue of the prospecnis (e-g., an expert). : The
Companies Act (CA), 1994,S. 145.
480 Supra note 48.
48 Supra note 5 1.
482 See, for example, OSA, R.S.O.1990, c. S.5, S. 54, OSAR, R.R.O. 1990, Regulation
1015,ss. 53-55 and OSC Policies, ss. 5.1 and 5.7.

'

securities l e @ ~ a t i o n ~the
~ ~Director
,
shall issue a receipt right away.484Thereafter the
Director entrusts two members of the Corporate Finance Branch, usually prospectus
lawyer and prospectus accountant, to review the preliminary prospectus and to determine
whether it constitutes Ml, m e and plain disclosure of al1 material f a ~ t s . ~ ~
After
' . such
review the issuer is given a comment letter requiring it to make corrections to defaults, if

any. Afier removing the defaults, the issuer can file the fmal prospectus attaching
supporting documents and receive the receipt for it.486

In between the issuance of preliminary receipt and the final receipt
("waiting penod )487 a dealer488is allowed to make communications to any person or
,Y

Company (e-g., through newspaper, or radio or television) identi*ng

the security, its

pnce, the place where and the person from whom the security can be purchasedP89The
dealer is also allowed to distribute the preliminary prospectus and to solicit expressions of
interest fiom potential paities for the purchase of s e c ~ r i tThe
~ . dealer
~ ~ must supply a

OSA, ibid., S. 54(1).
484 Ibid., S. 55. This section r a d s - "The Director shall issue a receipt for a preliminary
prospectus forthwith upon the filing thereof '.
485 Alboini, supra note 77 at 15-9.
486 OSA, R.R.O. 1990, c. S.5, S. 61(1).
487 Ibid., S. 65(1).
488 See for the definition of "dealery7supra note 472.
489 Ibid., S. 65(2)(a).
490 Ibid. S. 65(2)(b) and 65(2)(c).
483

copy of the preliminary prospectus to every interested

No sale of security is,

however, perrnissible in this period because
m t would defeat the whole idea of having a prospectus with statutory
liability for misrepresentations in a prospectus. If representations were
allowed pnor to the finalization of the prospectus the investor would not
be protected by the statutory liability provision if representations were
fâ~se?'

Through the above process of distribution if the dealer receives an order or
subscnption from any party, he or she must deLiver a (final) prospectus and amendments
thereto upon which that party may either confirm or reject the purchase. Thus the final
receipt is the key to the purchase and sale of securities.

In Bangladesh, if an issuer intends to offer securities to the public for sale,
it must file an application, including a prospectus, to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) for its approval before the prospectus is released to the press for
publication.493The application is vetted by the SEC, which will comment on its
"incompleteness" generally within 15 days of submi~sion?~
Thereafter within thirty days
the incompleteness must be removed and the complete application must be fded by the
is~uer?~'
If, however, no comment on the incompleteness is cornrnunicated to the issuer
within fifieen days, the application shall be deemed to be complete unless the issuer is

Ibid., S. 66.
M. R.,The Securfties Regulation in Canada, (Scarborough: Carswell, 1992), at 108.
493 SEO,
S. 2B and PIR, rr. 3 and 4..
494 PZR, r. 18(2). Lïix~mpletene~s''
should be read with regard to the f o m and contents
of a prospectus as the SEC does not determine the merits of an issue.
495 Ibid. r. 18 (3).
491
492

notified that the SEC needs additional timePg6Within sixty days of receipt of a complete
application, the SEC shall issue a letter of consent subject to such conditions as it may

think fit, if such application is acceptable to the SEC, or the SEC shall issue a rejection
order with reasons upon which the applicant may apply for review to the SEC. The SEC'S
decision after review is final.497The word "acceptable" should be construed with
reference to the completeness of the application. The condition of acceptability is
attached to a complete application that is received by the SEC after its correction by the
issuer according to the comment letter. This is not added to an application which is
judged by the SEC to be complete fiom the very beginning. Thus the said acceptability
condition does not mean that the SEC has a "blue sky" type jurisdiction. This is
confirmed by another provision which requires the following statements to be contained
on the front cover page of a prospectus:
Consent of the Securities and Exchange Commission has been obtained to
the issueloffer of these securities under the Securities and Exchange
Ordinance, 1969, and Public Issue Rules, 1998. It must be distinctly
understood that in giving this consent the Commission does not take any
responsibility for the financial soundness of the Company, any of its
projects or the issue price of its share or for the correctness of any of the
staternents made or opinion expressed with regard to them, responsibility
for which lies on the issuer, its directors, investment adviser, issue
manager, valuer and/auditor. II is, however, the Securities and Exchange
Commission's responsibility to ensure that full and fair disclosures are
made in the prospectus in terms of the Public Issue Rules, 1998, so that the
investors can make informed investment de ci si on^.^^^

49i

497
498

Zbid., r.18(5).
Zbid., r. 18(7).
PiR,r. 7.B.(l)(i).

In respect of any queries about the prospectus the public is directed by another statement
to consult a "broker or dealer, bank manager, lawyer, professional adviser' ,499
,
However, when the SEC accepts an application and issues a Consent
Order allowing the publication of a prospectus, the issuer must file with the Registrar of
Joint Stock Companies (RJSC) the fïnal application dong with its enclosures including
the Consent Order of the SEC, The RJSC checks whether the necessary documentation is
enclosed, prescribed fees are paid and the prospectus is duly signed by the directors.
Then, if satisfied, the Registrar will register the prospectus?

Within ten days of

receiving consent to the issuance of a prospectus, it is advertised arnongst the public in
general inviting applications for purchase of securities offered."'
From the above discussion the laws of Ontario and Bangladesh may seem
to conform in that each of the OSC and the SEC, after vetting, gives consent to a
prospectus provided they are satisfied that the information required by the law concemed
have been furnished and that neither of the institutionsjudges the merit of the securities
proposed to be offered. But Ontario law requires the OSC to go beyond the statutory
-

requirement of disclosure and to refuse receipting a prospectus in "public interest,9502 in
general and on some defmed grounds5" in particular.
499

'Oo
O
'1
'O2

'O3

Ibid., r-7.B.(l)(h).
CA, 1994, S. 138.
PIR, r.4(1)OSA, R.S.O. 1990 C. S.S.,
Ibid., S. 61(2).

S.

61(1).

Section 61(1) of the OSA, incorporated in 1 9 7 8provides
~ ~ ~ ~that "the
Director shall issue a receipt for a prospectus ...unless it appears to the Director that it is
not in the public interest to do so." But it does not define the term, "public interest".

Black's Law Dictionary defines it to mean, inter alia,"(s)omething in which the public,
the community at large, has some pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal
~~~
power is bestowed on the OSC to decide "what
rights or Iiabilities are a f f e ~ t e d . "The
the public interest is and whether the issuance of the given receipt is con-

to that

public intere~t."~'~
For instance, in one case the OSC interprets the term to connote "not
only the interest of residents of Ontario, but the interest of al1 persons making use of
Ontario capital markets. 9,507 In this connection it may be noted that in forming its opinion

as to public interest the OSC must take into account "the exigencies of the individual
cases that corne before it".508
Today the "public interest" phenornenon has become a comerstone of the
securities IegisIation in Ontario and in other provinces of Canada for the purpose of
protecting the investing public. There are rnany cases in which the OSC has shown its
concern and refused to accept prospectuses on this ground. Even before formal insertion

of this provision the OSC exercised its discretion, under the previous Securities Act, in

'O4

'O5

OSA. R.S.O. 1978 c. 47 S. 60(1).
Black's Law Dictionary,supra note 172, s.v. "public interest".

Alboini, supra note 77, at 15-29.
O
'7
Per McKiniay J.A. in Asbestos Cor-.,[1992] 15 O.S.C.B. 4973 at 4999,58 O.A.C.
277-97 D.L.R.144, 10 O.R. (3d) 577 (Ont. C.A.).
'O6

public's interest. In Rivalda Invesîrnent Corporation ~ t d . , ~
a company
'~
proposed to seek
funds from the public to invest in purchasing securities of speculative mining companies.
The Directors of the company did not have any experience in the proposed business. The

OSC considered them as the asset or Iiability of the company because "(u)pon their ability
to assess the ments of the securities they propose to purchase will depend the success or

failure of the c ~ r n ~ a n ~ . Therefore,
'"'~
on the public interest ground it declined to accept
the prospectus of the company until qualified directors were appointed. The OSC gave its
reasonings as follows:

The Securities Act is prirnarily a disclosure statute but Section 44(1) (now
S. 61(1) and 61(2)) does give the Director a discretion in accepting
prospectuses. This power must be exercised with caution. The Director or
the Commission, should not, except in the clearest cases, impose their
judgment on the ments of an issue, in place of the judgrnent of the
investing public. The decision to purchase securities ofXered for sale must
be that of the purchaser. However, there are situations where the Director
and the Commission are entitled under the discretion in Section 44, to
require that certain safeguards Se adopted for the benefit of the public.

The inexperience of the Directors in the present case in our view calls for
the imposition of some safeguards beyond that of disclosure. One hesitates
to leave the responsibility for the investing of funds provided by the public
solely in the hands of these inexperienced persons.511

Ontario (Securities Commission)v. Mitchell,[1957]O.W.N. 595 at 599, cited in
Gordon Capiral Corp. v. Ontario Securities Commission (1991), 1 Admin. L.R. (2d) 199,
at 21 1 (Ont. Div. Ct.) (per Craig J.).
mec. 19651 O.S.C.B. 2.
'Io Ibid.. at 3.
511 Ibid., at 4.
508

That the OSA is not merely a disclosure statute was also upheld in
subsequent decisions. In Great Pines Mines ~td.,"' for example, the OSCyspower to
issue policy statements513as guidelines for exercising its discretion was questioned.
CouId the OSC issue and maintain such policies under the discretion provision (section
44) of the then Securities Act? The OSC relied on Rivalda and said that it had the

necessary authonty in view of the broad discretion provided under section 44 and in the

Feb. 1966) 0.S.C.B. 7.
With regard to the Director's discretion under S. 61 various prospectus guidelines are
laid down in Policy 5.1, which include the following:
51Z

"Under S. 6 1(2)(c) of the Securities Act (Ontario) (the "Act") requires
the Director of the Ontario Securities Commission to refuse to issue a
receipt for a prospectus where it appears to him that proceeds received
from the sale of securities to be paid to the treasury of the issuer,
together with other resources, will be insuffîcient to acccmplishing the
purposes stated in the prospectus. One major resource is people.
Sufficient of the directors and officers of the issuer should have
knowledge and experience in the business for which funding is to be
sought so that the Director will not conclude that the human and other
resources are insufficient to accomplish the purpose stated in the
prospectus. Where such knowledge and ability is not apparent in the
directors and officers the Director may be satisfied where it is shown
that the issuer has contracted for such services."
2. "In a "bat efforts" offering, the minimum subscriptions necessary to
accomplish the purposes embodied in the prospectus must be
specified. Section 27(1)7 [38(1)(7)] of the regulations made under the
Act (the "Regulation") restricts this offering period to a maximum of
60 days or, with the consent of the Director and those already
subscribing, for a longer period. During this period any subscriptions
received must be held by a trust Company or other acceptable
depository who will, when the minimum amount necessary is received,
turn it over to the issuer or will, if the minimum is not received within
the time specified, return the money to the individual subscnbers."
1.

light of the purpose of protecting the investing public. Justice Kelly cornrnented such an
authonty to be "a self-conferred extension of the power exercisable, under section 44"514.
The OSC justified its authority interpreting the word "self-conferred" as follows:
(T)he Legislature having failed to speciQ the grounds upon which the
director could and the grounds upon which he could not exercise what is
on its face an unfettered discretion to refuse to accept a prospectus, the
Commission had, lacking the guidance of the Legislature, been forced to
work out those grounds for itself?

In United Security Fund 'I6the Deputy Director of Filings refused to issue
a receipt because the proposed Fund lacked the basic principle upon which mutual funds
are based, narnely diversification and liquidity. On appeal the Commission held that
We are of the view that it is not in the public interest to accept this
prospectus. As presently framed the essential element of diversification is
lacking. Liquidity, from the point of view of Canadian investor, is
questionable. The decision of the Deputy Director Filings will therefore be
afEnned?17

'Where securities of a class may be partially redeemed or repurchased,
the marner of selecting the securities to be redeemed or repurchased
should be clearly stated."
In Great Pines, supra note512, the OSC quoted Justice Kelly from the Reporî of the
Royal Commission to Investigate Trading in the Shares of Windfall Oils and Mines
Limited, saying as follows:
3

h absence of a clear delineation of its purpose, responsibilities and
powers, over the years, the Securities Commission h a , by administrative
practice, established a workable control over the issue of securities of
those companies required by The Securities Act to file prospectuses. This
ha s been accomplished by a self-conferred ...extension of the power
exercisable, under Section 44, to reject prospectuses. (at 95)
Great Phes, ibid.
Pept. 19711 OSCB 133.

In Loki Resources ~ n c . ~ it' ~was
, determined that the issuer had no
resources, properties or prospects nor even any intention to acquire any. The Director,
therefore, decided that in absence of any assets or business activities or any expectation
therefor, any disclosure by the issuer would be meaningless. Similady, existence of

In. that case the prospectus
business was considered in Inland National Capital ~ t d . . " ~
indicated, arnong others, that Inland Ltd. had Iimited assets with no pian for future. It also
had debts and lack of funding. The OSC refused to issue receipt in the public interest
interpreting the financial position as amounting to non-existence of business.

In Tricor Holdings Co. ~nc-"' because the company was controlled by a
convict, the Director refused to accept the prospectus. He based his decision on section

6 1(2)(e) which provides for refusal of receipting a prospectus when the past conduct of
the issuer or an officer, director, promoter or controlling shareholder forms reasonable
grounds for belief that "the business of the issuer will not be conducted with integrity and
in the best interests of its security holders". On appeal the majority of the Commission
upheld the decision of the Director, but the minority dissented on the ground that there
was no evidence that the actual business of the issuer had not k e n conducted with
integrity. The majority maintained that:
So to hold would reflect a narrow view of the legislation and would be
inconsistent with prior Commission decisions and the decisions of the
courts. But if clause 60(2)(e) [rnowS. 6 1(2)(e)1, narrowly constmed, did
-
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Ibid, at 134.
(Feb. 1984), 8 O.S.C.B. 583.
(1996), 19 0.S. C.B. 773.
Tricor Hotdins, supra note 320.

not strictly apply the Director would still be obliged to consider the public
interest test under subsection 60(1) [now S. 61(1)1.~"

Med-Tech Environmental Ltd.522,addressed the central issue whether a
private company exemption could be used to issue special warrants. The Director
determined that a special warrant offering was, in substance, a single distribution under a
prospectus and therefore a public offering. As such special warrants could not be
distributed under the camouflage of the private company exemption. The Director's
decision was prodded by the spirit of investor protection. In her own words:
The Private Company Exemption does not require the investor to have a
specified level of investment expertise, nor does it require that the investor
be provided with independent investment advice. There is unlikely to be a
dealer involved so there will be no dealer familiar with the transaction to
whorn the investors may go for advice with respect to the prospective
investment. Also, in these circumstances, there is a risk that the investor is
not someone who is tmly able to protect their own interests without the
benefit of the protection that the prospectus and registration regimes of the
Act provide?u

It has been observed in the preceding discussion that unlike the SEC the
OSC, legally empowered, does, in practice, exercise its discretion in giving approval to
prospectuses in addition to its responsibility of ensuring the fûlfillment of the disclosure
requirement under the OSA because "public interest" constitutes "the paramount
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5"

Ibid., at 409 1.
M a y 19961 19 O.S.C.B. 2679.
Ibid., at 268 1.

consideration" for the O S C ~ 'It~does
.
so always keeping in mind the tenet of investor
protection. Thus it c m be concluded, in the words of Alboini, that
(In Ontario) (f)ull, tme and plain disclosure of aii materiai facts in

accordance with the Act and Regulation does not guarantee the issuance of
a receipt. The manner in which the Director has exercised his or her
considerable discretion, and the existence of certain provisions in the Act
and Regulation have resulted in the administration of the Act going
beyond a purely disclosure approach and into the realm of a '%lue sky"
sys tern?
As such the following statement required to be inscribed on the outside front cover page
of a prospectus has become ~ u ~ e r f l u o u s ~ ' ~ :
No secwities commission or similar authority in Canada has in any way
passed upon the merits of the secuities offered hereunder and any
representation to the contrary is an offence."
Whiie a general discretion, as discussed above, has been conferred on the

Director under S. 61(1) in the fashion of "public interest",

S.

61(2) requires the Director to

refuse a receipt for a prospectus under some specified circurnstances. "The Director is the
judge of whether such circumstances exist, and this has the effect of confemng additional
discretion upon the ~ i r e c t o r . "A~bief
~ discussion of those grounds ensues below.

Material Non-compliance and Misstatement
Three situations corne wiùiin this prohibition as contained in S. 61(2)(a)
where the Director c m refuse to accept a prospectus. In the first place, if the Director is of

Terence Edward Robinson, Il9961 19 O.S.C.B.2643 at 2669.
525 Alboini, supra note 77, at 15-27
526 See ibid., 15-12.
527 OSAR, R.R.O. 1990 Regulation 1015, reg. 5 1.
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the opinion that the prospectus or any document accornpanied by it does not cornply, in

any substantial respect, with any requirement of the OSA or OSAR the Director can
exercise the refusal power.5'9 The word "substantial" qualifies the situation, so niinor
non-cornpliance with any requirement of prospectus should not trigger the refusal of
receipt. Information about the principal shareholders is, for exarnple, a substantial
requirement of the OSAR f0rms.5~~
The non-fulfrllment of this requirement rnay,
therefore, be a ground of the Director's exercising of such power. The Commission sets
out the guidelines in this respect as under:
Issuers ... should organize themselves in a manner which will enable thern
to obtain and disclose information concerning principal security holders.
If, however, the issuer has exercised reasonable efforts to obtain the
information conceming the principal security holder and has been unable
to do so, the Commission may, in appropriate circumstances, issue a
receipt for the prospectus and rnay exercise its powers to deny access to
Ontario capital markets to the principal security holder which has not
disclosed the required informati~n.~"

Secondy, the Director rnay not receipt a prospectus where the prospectus or any
document required to be filed therewith contains any staternent, promise, estirnate or
forecast that is misleading, false or de~e~tive.'~'
For instance, in F a m e r s & Merchants
was not accepted because the fact that a Company had
Mutual Funds ~ t d - . 'a~prospectus
~

Alboini, supra note 77, at 15-32.2.
OSA, S. 61(2)(a).
"O
See the text accompanying supra note 3 1 1.
Suprn note 320.
532 OSA, R.S.O. 1990 C- S.5, S. 61(2)(a).
533 [April 19621 O SC.B. 4. AIso see Great Divide Explorations Lirnited, [July-August
19651 O.S.C.B. 10,
528
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''

undertaken services as a tmst company, when it was not legally a tmst company, was
misleading. Thirdly, the prohibition on accepting a prospectus applies when a prospectus
n .M
~ ~&
~M
or any document required to be filed therewith contains a m i ~ r e ~ r e s e n t a t i oIn
, ~ ~ ~effecting disposition of certain property had
Porcupine Gold Mines ~ t d .a contract

been negotiated before filing the prospectus and entered into before the final prospectus
was accepted, but the issuer did not include that fact in the prospectus. Therefore, the
Director held the prospectus having the effect of concealing material facts and ordered
cessation of the primary distribution based on the prospectus.

Unscmpuious Consideration
Section 61(2)@) of the OSA requires the Director to refuse a prospectus on
the ground that an unconscionable consideration has been paid or given, or is intended to
be paid or given, for promotional purposes or for the acquisition of property. For instance,
in Harvard Growth Fund ~ t d .the
, ~
Commission,
~ ~
on appeal, did not accept a prospectus
for filing by a mutual fund company because it appeared to the Commission that a
provision contained in it permitting the promoters to purchase shares at figure less than
534

OSA, R.S.O. 1990 C. S.5, S. 61(2)(a). "Misrepresentation" is defined in OSA, R.S.O.
1990 c. S.5, S. l(1) "rnisrepresentation" as
(a) an untrue statement of material fact, or
(b) an omission to state a material fact that is required to be stated or that
is necessary to make a statement not misleading in the light of the
circumstances in which it was made.
For the definition of "material fact", in this context, see the text accompanying supra note

286.
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p e c . 19651 O.S.C.B. 10.

net asset vaiue was unconscionable. The Commission took into consideration that the
OSA is not exclusively a disclosure statute and that the mutual funds are primarily

directed to those who are least experienced in assessing the merits of securities. It then
assessed the unconscionabfiity of the right granted to the promoters in the following
words:
One cannot Say, at this moment, what the eventual benefit to the promoters
may be, but there is an unlimited possibility for future benefit. ...
In addition to the potential benefit the promoters rnay receive from the
increase in the value of the fund, their profit aiso increases according to
the number of the shares sold to the public. A portion of each dollar
invested by the public accrues to the benefit of the promoters regardless
whether the net asset value of the fùnd increases or

Inadequate Proceeds
Under section 61(2)(c) the Director has the authority to detennine whether

the proceeds fkom the sale of securities proposed to be offered by the prospectus, together
with other resources of the issue?38, would be sufficient to accomplish the purpose of the
issue as stated in the prospectus. If the Director considers the proceeds to be insufficient,
the Director rnay reject the prospectus. Thus in Si. Anrhony Mines ~td.1'.where the issuer
was carrying on a costly business, mining exploration, the Director estimated that though

the funds then available were sufficient to complete the initial step of the proposed
-

-

[Sept. 19651 O.S.C.B. 7.
Zbid., at 9.
538 Other resources include people, cg., directors, officers of the issuer. See supra note
513, para. 1.
539 [Oct. 19661 O.S.C.B. 23.
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exploration, the money likely to be raised by the sale of the unissued shares would fa11
short of the requisite fimding. As such the Director refused to accept the prospectus.

Peeuniary Condition and Previous Performance
The OSA empowers the Director not to receipt a prospectus in
consideration of the financial condition540or the past conductS4' of the issuer or an
officer, director or promoter or a person or Company or combination of persons or
companies holding a sufficient number of securities to affect materially the control of the
issuer. As described earlier, the prospectus fom(s) asks for an account of the past and
present state of the issuer's business and ownership of property, names and addresses and
positions held, in the past and at present, by the directors and officers, etc. Beyond the
disclosure of such information the Director will determine whether the issuer or the
persons specified can be reasonably be expected to be financially responsible in carrying
out the businesss2 or whether from their past conduct it can be expected that the issuer's
business will be conducted with integrity and in the best interest of the security h01ders.S~~
If the Director, after such determination, forms a negative impression, the Director may

decline receipting the prospectus. In other words, the Director will resort to these
provisions when " i t is relatively clear that the persons in question are experiencing
financial difficulties, or have been subject to disciplinary or enforcement proceedings in
--

"O
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542

OSA, R.S.O. 1 9 9 0 ~S.5,
. S. 61(2)(d).
Ibid., S. 61(2)(e).
Tricor Holdings. supra note 320.

securities or criminal matters,7544- These provisions, ''derived from various consumer
protection statutes in ~ n t a r i o " ~
are
~ ,meant to "ensure a minimum standard of quaiity for
the offering itself or the issuer offering the s e c ~ r i t i e s " ~ ~ ~ .

Required Agreements
As discussed eariier, there is an obligation on the issuer to disclose
information concerning shares held in e s ~ r o w . ' Despite
~~
that provision the OSA clothes
the Director with power to look into whether there is any need of executing an escrow
agreement. If the Director is of the opinion that such an agreement is required but has not
been done, the Director may not issue a receipt until that agreement is not executedT8
Thus in Kolvox Communications ~ n c . the
~ ~Director
~ ,
underlined the need of escrowing a
substantial number of control block shares and refused to accept the prospectus until an
agreement to that effect is accomplished. The Commission upheld that decision upon a
review motion by the issuer. The Director can also exercise the refusal power on the
ground that the issuer has not made an agreement to the effect of holding the sale
proceeds in trust pending distribution of securities, albeit the issuer, in the Director's
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TriCOr Holdings,supra note 320 and the accompanying text, at 4091.
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Alboini, supra note 77, at 15-37.

" Ibid.,at 15-36.
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Ibid.

See the text accompanying supra notes 3 1 1 and 3 12..
"8
OSA,R.S.O. 1990 C. S.5, S. 6 1(2)(f). See in this c o ~ e c t i o nOSC policies 5.2 and
5.9which set out the circumstances necessitating an escrow of shares of an industriai
company and the escrow requirements for a naturai resource company respectively.
549 w a r c h 19941 17 O.S.C.B. 1521.

judgrnent, should have done such an agreement."'

In the guise of this power the Director

cm, for example, require the issuer of a best efforts offering, as already dwelt upon, to
escrow the proceeds until al1 or a minimum number of securities are sold."'

Unacceptability of Professionals
If any of the professionds like lawyers, engineers, accountants who have

prepared or certified any report or valuation used in or in connection with a prospectus is
not acceptable, the Director wili refbse to accept that prospectus."'

Though the Director

has discretion, as seen above, to assess the financial fitness and past conduct of the issuer

and certain persons involved in the issuer's business, this provision has given greater
discretion to "the Director to make subjective assessments about persons involved in the
preparation of a prospectus, and (thereby) .., to refuse to issue a receipt for a
prospectus"s53. Thus if an audit is not done according to the generaily accepted auditing
standards, that will be a ground of prospectus r e f u ~ a l . ~ ~ ~
As the OSC cm refuse prospectus receipt on certain grounds discussed

above, it may lead one to the conclusion that the OSC has a limited "blue sky"
jurisdiction. In fact, it enjoys much discretion when it decides whether a particular
circumstance merits the application of its discretion on any of those grounds. In addition,

'
3
1

"'
5'2
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OSA. R.S.O. 1990 c. S.5, S. 61(2)(g).
OSC Policy 5.1.
OSA. R.S.O. 1990 c. S.5, S. 61(2)(i).
Alboini, supra note 77, at 15-40.
See Price Waterhocse, [April 19901 13 O.S.C.B. 1473.

the "public interest" provision further expands this jurisdictimn- Zn practice, as appears
from the foregoing discussion, the OSC takes such a broader view in the application of
this jurisdiction?"

Lest the OSC become unscrupulous or tyranniad in the exercise of this
power, the Legislature has subjected the OSC decisions to judicial appeal. The OSA
requires the Director to give the person or Company fding the prospectus an opportunity
to be heard before issuing a refusal order?

A person or comTany who is directly

aggrieved by a decision of the Director may seek and be entitled to a hearing and review
thereof by the ~ommission.~"Such a person or Company m a y prefer an appeal to the
Divisional Court from the review decision of the ~ o m m i s s i o i 7Before
- ~ ~ ~ refusal the
Director may refer to the Commission for determination a question involving public
interest under S. 6 l(1) or a new or novel question of interpretation under s- 6 l(2) which
might result in such r e f u ~ a l ? Before
~
referral, however, the Director shouid "make every
effort to resolve its comments (relating hie question) through discussion with those
responsible for filing the prospectus. Only when it is clear tbxt such discussion will not be
productive should consideration be given to (such) a referral'7560. Upon refend the
Commission, after holding a hearing of the parties, determines the question and refers it
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Alboini, supra note 77, at 15-34.
OSA. R.S.O.1990 c. S.5, S. 61(3).

557

Ibid.. S. 8.
Ibid.,S. 9.
Ibid.. S. 61(4).

560

Chmmdlor Futures Fund II,Eeb. 19801 0 . S C . B . 77, at 77-78.
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back to the Director for final c~nsideration.'~'The Director must act upon the decision of
the Commission subject to any order of the Divisional Court on appeaLs6'

2.3.4 SUMMARY

The foregoing discussion may be put in a capsule form as follows:
(a) Under both the jurisdictions of Ontario and Bangladesh a prospectus is required

mainly for sale of securities from an issuer's treasury. Unless an exemption is available,

an issuer must qualiw a prospectus with the respective securities commission for the
purpose of fumishing &formation to the potential investors so that they can make
inforrned decision on investrnent.
(b) Bangladesh is based on the disclosure theory while Ontario law on the combination

of the disclosure and merit review theories. So far disclosure is concemed the former
requires full and fair disclosure of al1 material information through prospectus to the
public, which, in effect, conforms to the Ontario requirement of full and true disclosure of
al1 material facts. The two laws, however, differ in that Ontario law calls for plain
disclosure, but Bangladesh law does not.
(c) According to the said broad requirement of disclosure both the laws of Ontario and
Bangladesh set out various categories of information, financial and non-financial. Ontario
prospectus Form 12 enlists 34 items of non-financial items to be contained in a
prospectus. Some of the information required by the Ontario form are absent in the

"'

OSA. R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5,

S.

61(7).

Bangladesh form, but are contained in prospectuses in practice, e-g., equity capital
structure- There are some other matters which are totally absent both in law as well as in
practice, e-g., dividend record, returning money to the investors in the event of a best
efforts issue being undersubscrîbed. Each of the laws, however, contains a miscellaneous
item in the respective fonn having "catch-dl" effect. As a result, an issuer is obligated to
disclose material facts even not specified by the laws for incorporation into the
prospectuses.
Both in Ontario and Bangladesh sa&e kinds of fmahcid statements, reports and
certificates are provided in the respective prospectuses. The Ontario income and cash-

flow statements and the Bangladesh loss and profit ,and cash-flow statements cover the
same length of time, namely five years. In Ontario balance sheets are prepared for current

year and imrnediately previous year ,in Bangladesh they are made for five preceding
years- In Ontario financial statements and audit reports are prepared according to the

GAAP and GAAS, and in Bangladesh they are prepared according to IAS and ISA
respectively. In practice, it is doubted if any full and true financial disclosure made in
prospectuses in any of the jurisdictions.

In Ontario forecasts/projections are made for 24 months only, whiie in Bangladesh they
cover a 5-year period subsequent to the issue. Unlike Bangladesh's, Ontario
forecasts/projections are required to be supported by an auditor's report.

"'Ibid.,

S.

6 1(8).

(d) In Ontario both vetting and receipting of prospectuses are performed by the OSC,
while in Bangladesh vetting and approval is done by the SEC and receipting by the WSC.

In Ontario during the "waiting period" the public c m have knowledge of the issue. The
public has a nght to compensation, if no prospectus is supplied. A member of the public
can enter into a purchase agreement with the dealer, and can also terminate that
agreement, at its own, after the fmal prospectus is delivered, if any misrepresentation is
made in the prospectus. A statement of such right is also made in the prospectus in
Ontario. In Bangladesh a prospectus, after approval, is published giving 15 days for
application for allotment of shares, But if shares are allotted, a purchaser cannot cancel
the purchase. Of course, he or she has the right to compensation, if a prospectus contains
any misrepresentation.

(e) The OSC is empowered to review the merit of an issue and refuse receipts on "public
interest" ground in general and on some specified grounds in particular. In Bangladesh
the SEC does not have such power either in law or in practice.

3 CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE COMPARISONS

1. Absence of Specific Items
As already discussed, Bangladesh law provides for full and fair disclosure of al1 material
information, which, in effect, is sirnilar to the full and true disclosure of Ontario law. To
fulffi this requirement both the laws prescribe almost a sirnilar set of items to be
contained in a prospectus. But some items, though required by the Ontario form, do not
have any place in the Bangladesh form. For example, as aforementioned, provisions of
dividend record and undenmiters responsibility in a best efforts offenng are missing in
Bangladesh form. From the dividend record of an issuer the intending investors cm make
a taliy of the percentages of the prornised dividends and the actually declared/disbursed
dividends. If it is found that the issuer could disburse the promised percentage of
dividends or an amount close to it, the investors wodd feel cornfortable to invest in the
proposed project. If the tally gives a reverse picture, they may not have an interest to
invest. The dividend record is an important item that should be subject to disclosure and a
clear provision in this respect should, therefore, be put in a Bangladesh prospectus.
Secondly, the Bangladesh law does not require information about best efforts
underwriting, whereas, as pointed out previously, there is a scope of such underwriting
under the CA, 1994. An underwriter is most unlikely to agree to fülly underwrite the
offering of a new issuing Company because he may have doubts if d i of the issuer's
securities would be purchased by the public. The investing public may have an idea of the
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performance of the companies that have issued securities earlier. As such when a
cornpany with a good past record offers securities, the public may be expected to be more
enthusiastic and confident to purchase those securities. But when a . issuer is quite a dark
horse in the market, the public is not likely to eagerly invest in its securities. In
consideration of this fact an underwriter may be reluctant to fully underwrite a new
issuer's securities. Rather the underwriter may agree to underwrite on the best efforts
bais. In that case, to quote Prifti,
the underwriter acts as an agent for the company and simply uses its best
efforts to try to sel1 as many securities as he can. If none is sold, there is no
liability to the underwriter and no proceeds to the cornpany. When

securities are sold, the net proceeds are rernitted to the issuer-company, the
underwriting commission being ~ i t h h e l d . ~ ~ ~

Keeping in view this practical situation Ontario law, as discussed earlier, requires, in
respect of a best efforts offering, the issuer to disclose the minimum amount to be raised
for running a proposed project. It also requires the issuer to deposit that amount in a trust
company so that in case the required amount of money is not raised, the subscnption
money can be returned to the investors. Since Bangladesh law does not contain any such
provision, the public may not have faith in the issuer and may fear if the issuer, absconds
with the public money or if the minimum amount is not raised and he star& business with
l y on the business
money below the minimum amount and fails to s u c c e s ~ ~ lcarry
ultimately incurring loss. If such a provision is incorporated in the law, that will help

bolster the public confidence in the market. Thus Ontario law in this respect seerns to be
better than Bangladesh lawThough there is a provision for fixed underwriting of issues and the
underwriter is under obligation to subscribe securities in the event of
~ n d e r s u b s c r i ~ t i oin
n ~practice
~,
this obligation is not always carried out. When a hilly
underwritten issue is undersubcribed, the underwriter who is obligated to purchase the
unsold securities at a futed rate charges more commissions.56sIn some cases the
underwriter proposes to buy the remaining securities at lower price than the face value.
Thus such securities of 100 taka value each has to be sold by the issuer to the underwriter
at oniy 70-80 taka. As a result, a lesser arnount of funds is raised and the issuer cannot
defray the costs of the investment project and fails to make profits?66 The investors
purchase shares at a price higher than the underwriter does. Once they have subscnbed,
their money is locked in the hands of the issuer who cannot make profits. This is one of
the reasons why the investors have lost their confidence in the securities market of
Bangladesh. In this connection the disdosure of the interest of the promoters and
management of the issuer in materid transactions, which is not required by Bangladesh
law, deserves special attention of, fore example, a director of the issuing company is aiso

a director of the underwriting company, when an issue is undersubscribed and the
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William M . Prifti, Securities: Public and Private merings, (St. Paul. Minn.: West

Publishing Co., 1974), at 80.
PIR. r. 15(2).
565 Share Bazar, supra note 38, at 3.
566 Ibid., at 3-4.

underwriter buys the rernaining securities at a lower price than the pnce at which the
investors have purchased, that director will gain a benefit from that buy. Or he or she may
play a role in influencing the issuer to sel1 those securities at the lower price proposed by
the underwriter. Thus that Bangladesh law does cal1 for information about the interest of
the promoters and management in material transactions is a colossal oversight.
Though it may be argued that under the miscelIlaneous item provision of
the PIR such matters as are mentioned above are subject to disclosure, specific provisions
reIating to them will facilitate the disclosure. From such categorization the issuers can
leam what they are obliged to disclose and the investors cm d s o know what sorts of
information they are legally entitled to be fimished through a prospectus. If such
categorization did not have any justification, merely a general provision calling for
disclosure of al1 material information like the miscellaneous oene would have been laid
down in the law giving al1 the responsibility to the issuer. But the law-makers have

preferred specific disclosure so that the investors understand t h e risk involved in the
security offered for sale. So, specific provisions effecting discilosure of the
aforementioned matters are of great value,
It has also been observed that both the laws require similar kinds of
financiai statements to be furnished in respective prospectuses and that the veracity of
thosz statements is questionable. Sornetimes the issuers prepaxe, contrary to the purpose

of prospectus in generd567,false or partiaily tme statements and the auditors overlook
them. In this manner the auditors become accomplices to the issuer-clients paying no
heed to the public interest, even though they have, as the US Supreme Court rnaintains, "a
public responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the ~ l i e n t ~ " ~ ~ .
However, in spite of the fact that both jurisdictions are experiencing problems of noncornpliance with the requirement of fuII and tme disclosure particularly of financial
information, the Ontario position may be argued to be better in consideration of two
factors. First, the OSC, in the exercise of its public interest mandate, may refuse to issue
receipt where any questionable accounting or auditing practices corne to its

vie^.^^^ Thus,

for example, the OSC staff refused to receipt a prospectus where an issuer wanted certain
costs, previously spent as incurred, to be treated as costs of creating an internally
generated intangible asset. The effect of the recognition of such intangible was to make a
profit instead of loss. The OSC staff considered such recognition having Iittle or no
justification. Another ground of the refusa1 was that the issuer "inappropriately"
recognized certain revenue before it had earned. The auditor of the issuer failed to
buttress the issuer's position with reasoned arguments.570In the s m e vein, the Director
may refuse receipting if the FOFI provided in a prospectus is not acceptable in public

bbIts(prospectus's) primary purpose is not to be a sales tool or to "hype" the offenng
corporation and its securïties, but rather to provide tnithful and- complete
information to
.
the investor ...-.". : Goulet, supra note 16, at 122.
568 Supra note 435, at 3509.
569 Ibid.
no Ibid., at 3506.
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interest. Thus in Petro-NIM 1988Limited ~ar~nershi~"'
the Director refused to issue a
receipt by reason of the inclusion in the prospectus of certain FOFI in the nature of a
forecast without the Director's permission. The Commission confirmed the Director's
decision in the public interest. But since in Bangladesh the SEC does not have such
power, there is no scope for looking into the ment of financial disclosure. This is a
S ~ ~ O defect
U S
of

Bangladesh law, which will be further dealt with

Secondly, in

Ontario after securities have been distributed, if any misrepresentation is found in the
' ~ may
prospectus disclosure the investors have a right of action for d a n ~ a ~ e s ?They
invoke justice in an individual or class capacity. The settlement of such a matter may not
take an unreasonably long t h e . The Bangladesh investors have a sirnilar right:74 but to
avaii of that right is difficult. There is no court of law specially meant to deal with
securities matters. The general courts are overburdened with cases. A host of matters
remain undisposed for years. The disposal of a case takes five to ten years. Added to this
is the fee-burden for legal counseling. Moreover, the ultirnate fate of the action is
uncertain and unknown. All these factors hinder the investors, individudly or
collectively, from resorting to the legal system in Bangladesh. However, in such
situations the SEC may apply its administrative mechanism provided for under the PIR
and impose penalty on the responsible issuer or its representative?75But this does not
.
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[Sept. 19881 11 O.S.C.B. 373 1.
See the discussion accompanying the infia notes 590-99.
Supra notes 469476.
Supra notes 477-48 1 and the accompanying texts.
PZR,,r. 19. Atso see supra note 5 1.

help the investors who have lost their money or have not received the forecast dividends
because o f false financiai statements. The money received by the SEC as fines is
deposited in the government treasury; none goes into the pockets of the investors.
Preventive measures by the SEC, that is merit determination, may be necessary in
Bangladesh.

2.

No Plain-Disclosure Provision
As already discussed, another drawback in Bangladesh law is that unlike

Ontario it does not cal1 for plain disclosure of material information. In practice,
sometimes information is presented in prospectuses in highly technicd terms. For
exarnple, a guideline used in preparing the financial statements of a Company has been
stated as follows: "Fixed Assets except Land & Land Development are depreciated on
reducing balance rnethod.,9576 Persons having good knowledge of accounting can
understand such an expression, but people with littie learning in accounting may not.
Moreover, in practice, prospectuses are published in English which is a foreign language
for the people of Bangladesh. It is difficult or impossible to read a prospectus in English
for those investors who have little or no learning in the English language. This is another
barrier to understanding a prospectus. Ontario law provides for plain disclosure so that a
prospectus can be "read by investors generaily and not only by security andysts and other

Supra note 334, at 19.

trained persons7,577 .Readability, in the present context, means that a prospectus must be
understandable. In other words, information must be presented in such a manner so that
even lay investors can read and understand i t The following (US) SEC'S instruction that
forms the basis of Ontario law is relevant.
The purpose of the prospectus is to inform the investors. Hence, the
information set forth in the prospectus should be presented in clear,
concise, understandable fashion, Avoid unnecessary and irrelevant details,
repetition or the use of unnecessary technical Ianguage. ... .578

In this connection it may be acknowledged that security is an "intricate
m e r ~ h a n d i s e "and
~ ~may
~ not be so plainly presented to be "intelligible by school
children"

In other words, lay investors may not understand prospecnis disclosure,

speciaüy financial disclosure:
There are also the perennial questions of whether prospectuses, once
delivered to the intended reader, are readable, and whether they are read.
The cynics answer to both questions is 'No'; the true believer's is 'Yes';
probably a more accurate answer than either wouid be: 'Yes7-by a
relatively s m d l number of professionals or highly sophisticated nonKnnber Repon, supra note 233, para 5.09. (emphasis added).
Ibid., (emphasis added). The SEC instruction for plain disclosure has been camied
fonvard by the United States Securïties and Exchange Cornmittee, Disclosure to
Investors: A Reappraisal of Administrative Policies Under the 1933 and 34 Act ( 1969)
(popularly called and hereinafier referred to as Wheat Report). The Wheat Report has
been echoed by the judiciary in Feit v. Leaseco Data Processing Equipment Corp., 332 F.
Supp. 544, (ED NY 1971) at 565-566.
n9 H.R. Rep. No. 85,73d Cong. 1st Sess. (1933) 8, cited in Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky
Law. supra note 212, at 1. This report was based to prepare the bill that becarne the
Securities Act, 1933.
"O
"New Approaches to Disclosure in Registered Security Ofierings- A Panel
Discussion", (1973) 28 Bus. Law. 505 at 528.
578

professionals; 'No7- by the great majority of those investors who are not
soPhisticated."l ...
But this does not negate the need for plain disclosure for two reasons. First, such
disclosure will help the sophisticated investors comfortably understand the prospectus
discIosure and make sober investment decisions. The securities legislation is meant to
protect the "investors", not only lay investors. So, the sophisticated investors will benefit
from plain disclosure. Secondly, if the unsophisticated investors themselves do not
understand, they may purchase the services of the securities brokerage f m s , securities
consultants, lawyers or other intermediaries who may advise them whether an investment
in a particular security would be profitable in light of the prospectus disclosures. This
process of passing information through the intermediaries to the investors has been
termed by the Wheat Report as "filtration" of information:
Indeed, it was recognized from the beginning that a M y effective
disclosure policy would require the reporting of complicated business facts
that would have little meaning for the average investors. Such disclosures
reach average investors through a process of filtration in which
intermediaries (brokers, bankers, investment advisers, publishers of
investment advisory literature and occasionaIly lawyers) play a vitai
r01e.~~'

M.H. Cohen, "Truth in Secunties" Revisited, (1966) 79 H m .L. Rev. 1340, at 13511352. One recent survey in USA shows that many investors are unable to understand
correctly even basic questions about investment. The knowledge of 64% of them in
financial matters is described as "Only fair" or "poor". 49% do not know that
diversification of investment reduces nsk. : Princeton Survey Research Associates, The
Investor Protection Trust Invesror Knowledge Survey: A Report on the Findings (1996),
cited in Thomas W. Joo, "Who Watches the Watchers? The Securities Investor Protection
Act, Investor Confidence, and the Subsidization of Failure", supra note 3 1, at 1132, note
295.
581

The importance of such "fdtration" to investors protection in Bangladesh has been
underscored as follows:
There is a dark spot here between the information given out by the
companies and corporations and the investors' ability to choose these lines
of investrnentsThere is a need for collecting many other information about the Company
and andysing those information before the investors can decide to invest.
...This kind of information processing work cannot be done by al1
potential investors. It has to be done by the brokerage fms. It is the
brokerage firms which do these work and present the investors with their
recornmendations to purchase or not purchase.583
Of course, in Bangladesh no notable professional f m s have yet been e ~ t a b l i s h e d ?To
~~
improve their services training programs may be conducted by the SEC.
Thus if the plain disclosure provision is added to the full and fair
disclosure requirement of the PZR and the 'Tiltration" system is improved, both
sophisticated and unsophisticated investors may get the benefits of the disclosure regime
in Bangladesh. They will gradually get used to taking nsks, and making profits and
enduring los se^?^^ Various investment opporhmities will be available to the investors
from which they will make their choices according to their varying abilities to bear risk:
-
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Wheat Report, supra note 578, at 52.
K. U. Ahmad, supra note 43.
584 See Share Bazar, supra note 38, at 35.
585 In this process investors will l e m investing taking the normal business nsk of profit
and loss just like the children who learn walking through walk-and-stumble process. If
the children are kept in a m , they will not leam walking. They must be aiiowed to walk
and stumble and, through this process, to leam walking. At the
same time it is the parents' responsibility to watch out if any life-threatening danger lies
on their way, which they must remove to Save the children's lives.

"'

"'Investors have differing a b i l i ~ e to
s bear risk. Although no investor wants to bear a Ioss
on his or her investment, some are better able, financially and psychologically, to assume
general risk."

586.

In the present cantext, risk refers to investment risk free from fraud.
Investment risk is of two types: external risk and transactional r i ~ k ?The
~ former is
commonly thought of business investment but is not directly connected with the
investment transaction. It incliades the risk that the econorny wiIl enter a recession or that
the "bear" will tum out the "buil" from the market or that a change will take place in the
issuer's

Transactional nsk, unlike external risk, is directly connected

with the investment transaction itself. It includes two types of risk- fraud risk and
structural risk. Fraud nsk takes place through omission or misstatement of material fact.
Structural risk results frorn the terms of the investment offenng itself, e.g., underwrïting
commission, voting rights, options and warrants.589Under the disclosure regirne investors
are protected against fraud nsk: "Pubicity is justly commended as a remedy for social
and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the
.

most efficient policeman".

Thus there remain only the external rïsk and structural nsk

to be borne by investors.

Supra note 181, at 148 note 50. This risk bearing capabilities should be given way,
otherwise economic development will be thwarted. See infra note 59 1.
5"
Gorder, supra note 181 à t P45.

1'3'

Ibid.
Ibid., at 146.
590
L.D. Brandeis, Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use Zt, (Washington:
National Home Library Foundation, 1933) at 62. Brandeis kas recently been cited as a
588

3. Want of Paternalistic Protection
As seen above, under discIosure regime investors are, as a general nile of
securities business, supposed to bear extemal and structural risks, but to what extent?
They should be expected to bear those risks which are "normal" extemal and structurai
risks. Patemalistic protection is not desirable against such risks because that will blunt the
risk-bearing abilities of the investors, which will eventually affect economic
d e v e l ~ ~ r n e n tBut
. ~ ~risks
'
which are likely to jeopardize public interest should be

justification of mandatory disclosure as a fiaud prevention mechanisrn in Toronto Stock
Exchange, Interim Repon of the Cornmittee on Corporute Disclosure, Towurd Improved
Disclosure (1995) (hereafter Allen Report), at 24. But at the same time it is contended by
some scholars that disclosure alone cannot prevent fraud. They referred to some major
fraud cases that took place in USA after the 1933 and 1934 securities acts, e.g, Re E q u i ~
Funding Corp. of Arnerica Securities Litigution, 603 F.2d 1353; Re OPM Leasing
Services Inc., 769 F.2d 9 11.: see, for example, F.H. Easterbrook and D.R. Fischel,
"Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors", (1984) 70 Virg. L. Rev. 669, at
670. Most recently a critique goes to the extent of eclipsing the role of disclosure as a
means of preventing fraud. For instance, at one place it says, "Indeed, any.effectiveness
mandatory disclosure might have in preventing fraud occurs primarily because mandatory
disclosure is coupled with a criminal prohibition against fraud." :C.J.H. Donald, "A
Critique of Arguments for Mandatory Continuos Disclosure", (1999), 62 Sask. L.Rev.
85, online:QL (SASL), at para. 13. For critique of mandatory disclosure fiom Australian
perspective, see J. Azzi, "Disclosure in Prospectus" (Aug. 1991) Co. and Sec. L.J. 205 at
205.
"A registration system can fail in two ways. If the investor purchases a security with
more risk than the investor is willing to bear, then the registration system is skewed to

591

much in favor of the issuer, not enough investor protection is provided. When, however,
the investor is precluded fiom purchasing a high nsk securir- (which is done under blue
s b system), even though the investor is willing and able to accept the risk that the
security represents, the system is weighted too much in favor of protection, economic
expansion and innovation will be retarded-" : supra note 181, at 149 note 54.

precluded from coming to the market as "unacceptable" or "abnormal" nsks. But that is
not possible under disclosure system:
Under the disclosure approach, administrators can control issuers to
prevent risk but not to prevent structural or external risk. Once those nsks
are hilly disclosed, the administrators' power over issuen ends. Ment
review, through its preclusion approach to protection, however, gives
administrators the power to control issuers even in the areas of structural
and extemal nsks. With preclusion power, administrators c m prevent
unacceptable structural and extemal risks, regardess of how they are
disclosed. This power can provide investors with impo~antprotections
greater than those that are possible under a disclosure systern a10ne.~~'
For example, such an "unacceptable" risk situation rnay occur when
issuers of bad repute are allowed to offer securities. Such issuers may not do fair dealings
with public money. In respect of such risks a securities commission should not limit itself
to the disclosure review only, rather should prevent such risks, refuse consent to the
offering of securities. This point has been recognized recently in Ontario by the AIIen
Report which States:

In fact, there are no pure "merit" ccdisclosure"regimes as neither is capable
of addressing d l potential abuses. it would be unrealistic to expect a
securities commission to do a "due diligence" examination of each
Company that wanted to raise money from the public to ensure that the
enterprise was viable. Even if such an examination were made, if there
were no detailed disclosure requirements, potential investors would not be
able to determine whether the pnce of the public offenng was attractive. It
would be equally improbable that a securities commission in a disclosure
regime would approve a prospectus that said, tmthfully, that the promoters
of the Company intended to abscond with the proceeds of the public
offering, or that the company's business enterprise had no hope of
success.593
592
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Gorder, supra note 181 at 150 (footnote omitted and emphasis added)
Allen Reporî. supra note 590, at 25.

Earlier the Kirnber Report conceded, by indication, the paternalistic role of the OSC in
the event of "abnormal" or "unacceptable" business risks. It States:
At ail times, it must be made clear that the risks that are being evaluated
by the capital market are normal business risks of success or failure, and
every effort must be made to ensure that the public understands those
nsks. This is not to suggest that the public must be protected against itseg
rather, it is a matter of ensuring that the investing public has the fullest
knowledge to enable it to distinguish the different types of investment
activity available. In such circurnstances, the public would have reasonable
assurance that its losses are genuine economic losses, just as its gains are
genuine economic gains.594

A close reading of this paragraph irnparts the'idea that paternalistic protection is not

suggested as long as ''normal" business nsks are involved in an offering. In other words,
such protection is appropnate where occurs an "abnormal" or "unacceptable" business
risk. This Ied the report to recommend entrusting the OSC with discretionary powers?95
The report's recommendation has been materialized by incorporating the OSC7s
discretionary power provisions into the OSA. By virtue of ihat power the OSC cm, as
already discussed, refuse to receipt a prospectus in the public interest in general and on
some specific grounds in particular which also relate to public interest protection so that
the contemplated ''abnomal" risks situations can be addressed.
It is a serious defect and shortcoming both fkom the investor protection

and economic development perspectives that Bangladesh law does not contain such a

594

'''

Kimber Report, supra note 233, at para. 1.12. (ernphasis added).
See supra note 240-243.

blue sky provision. For example, it has been reported that the SEC aUowed some
companies, which had failed to comply with their underwriting commitments within the
time-frarne as determined in the underwriting agreement, to offer IPOs in Bangladesh.
This created confusion amongst the i n v e s t o r ~How
. ~ ~ ~can investors be protected in such
situations? Should the SEC allow such discredited companies to corne to the market and
play with public money? There is possibility that they wiU not be fair in their dealings
with the investors. They may not keep their cornmitment of providing dividends to thern
on time or they may even fiee with their money f ~ r e v e rThus,
. ~ ~ ~for example, recently it
was reported that 10 subsidiary companies of a large holding Company of Bangladesh,
Beximco Ltd., had defaulted in paying dividends within the stipulated period of 60 days
from the date of declaration, though they declared the dividends last year. The SEC has
failed to take any steps against the defaulters. The Chairman of SEC has said that
penalizing such big companies may impact the market adversely, whereas the SEC has
penalized many other small companies on the sarne ground. It is also reported that the
market has not improved since May 1999 when the cornplaint of the non-payment of
dividends was made to the

SEC?^^ Under the given circumstances, the public interest

philosophy should suggest that such companies be precluded from offering securities so

"Defadters allowed to offer POs" The Bangladesh Observer (a national daily), (3
Feb.1998)l and 12.
597 A member of the public cornplains that money raised by the public limited cornpanies
has been "swindled, cheated misused or siphoned off by many chairmen, directors,
executives of those public limited companies ": M. Rahman, supra note 49.
s98 ''SEC Bends Securities Law" The Daily Star, online:chttp://www.daüystarnews.com,>
20 Oct., 1999.

that public confidence c m be sustained, Mere disclosure review should not be the sole
function of the SEC. It should, it is suggested, be weI1 armed with discretionary powers to
review merits of the offerings in addition to disclosure review so that no "rotten egg9"''
can enter the market to cause food poisoning to the investors. Granting such discretionary
powers to administrative bodies is, in general, an essential trait of modem statehood?
Particulariy in the security administration practical necessity and convenience of
discretion is overemphasized:
The exercise of discretion is an essential tool for the effective supervision
of an industry as compiex as the secunties industry. From a practical point
of view, it would be impossible for the Commission (OSC) to carry out its
mandate, in either a long-term or day-to-day sense, without the broad
discretionary powers delegated to it by the &t and ~ e ~ u l a t i o n s . ~ ~ '

While cornmenting on the US securities statute (which is cornpletely a disclosure
statute), Sommer cailed it a "rotten egg statute". He went on, "You could sell a i l the
rotten eggs you wanted if you told people fully how rotten they were- Alas, a lot of rotten
eggs were sold under this statute and you suspect that a lot of them are continuing to be
sold." "New Approaches to Disclosure in Registered Secufity Offerings- A Panel
Discussion", supra note 580, at 505.
O
'0
Condon writes:
A distinctive feature of the modern state is the extent of governance
devolved onto specialized trîbunals- Administrative statutes, which gant
these tribunals their power, are characterized by the g a n t of significant
discretionary powers to the relevant agency."
599

Supra note 225, at 89-90. Also see D.J. Galligan, Discretionary Powers,(Oxford:
Newyork: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1986); B.P. Bellmore, "The Ontario
Securities Ccmmission as an Administrative Tribunal" (1967) 5 Osgoode Hall L. J. 2 10;
J.M. Evans, H.N. Janisch & D.J. Mullan, Administrative Law: Cases, Text and Materials,
4th ed. (Toronto: Edmond Montogomery, 1995). Patrick Moyer, 'The Regulation of
Corporate Law by Securities Regdators: A Cornparison of Ontario and the United
States", (1997) 55(1) U.T.Fac.L.Rev. 43, oniine:QL (UTFL), para 32 note 112.

Under the proposed jurisdiction the SEC, like the OSC~",would be entitled to define
what constitutes "public interest" in a given circumstance. It will be able to issue policy
statements as guidelines for the issuers which would facilitate exercising of its power. But
those staternents must not be treated as laws.603
Ainsely Financial Corporation (Aug. 1993), 16 O.S.C.B. 4077, at 5010.
'06
In Ainsely, i b i d at 5001 ir was said that "[ilt is beyond dispute that the Commission
(OSC) is entitled to particular judicid deference and "a particularly broad latitude in
formulating its opinion as to the public interest in matters relating to (securities)." (note
omitted)
603 This point came before the court for determination in Ainsely. In this case the extent
and nature of the OSC's power of promulgation of policies within its public interest
jurisdiction was challenged. It was alleged that the OSC promulgated policy 1.10 which
assumed the effect of law and, therefore, violated the basic pnnciple that Policy
Statements do not have the force of law and are not intended to have such effect".
Ainsely, ibid. at 5004. The impugned policy was held to be have been made outside the
statutory mandate of the OSC- "[TJhe Commission must be exercising a public interest
discretion entrusted to it ...within the scope of its statutory mandate." Ainsely, ibid. at
409 1 . As an explmation of why the OSC policies should not have the effect of
substantive law the following quote by the court is interesting:
'O1

It is vitally important to recognize, however, that the 'public interest
power' was never intended to be, nor could it be logicaily be constnied to
be unlimited in nature. Had the legislature intended it to be unlimited, then
it need not have troubled itself with the task of devising a Securities Act.
The Ontario legislature, for example, need only have created the Ontario
Securities Commission, ceded to it p l e n q powers, and instmcted it to act
'in the public interest'. It need not have outlined in great detail precisely
that which the Lieutenant Govemor in Council can (and ,implicitly, that
which he cannot) do to add to the statutory niles by way of regulation.
That the provincial legislatures have both created legislative law and limits
to the regulatory powers is not merely accidental.
While it is clear that the ability to act remedially 'in the public interest'
cedes some residual discretionary authonty to the regulators, it was
obviously the intention of the legislature not to delegate to the Ontario
Securities Commission the power to make substantive law of a legislative
or regulatory character. Indeed, had the legislature wished to do so, it

It was described that the SEC had the blue sky jurisdiction, but it failed to
provide the benefits of its power to the public. The concerned officiais could not even
correctly assess the financial projections and some of them were alleged to be
dishonest?

Therefore, before vesting the proposed power to the SEC it is an imperative

to ensure that it is cornposed of professionally efficient and morally upright persons.
Traditionally, in most cases, the Chairman and members of the

SEC^'' are appointed

could have easily accomplished that objective by giving the OSC rulemaking authority like that possessed by the SEC in the United States.
However much this might be a good idea, it has not been done. It is thus
impossible to escape the conclusion that policy statements must not be
used [to] create substantive legal requirernents of a legislative or
regulatory character. Any other conclusion would be inconsistent with the
Rule of LAW." J. G. MacIntosh, "The Excessive Use of Policy Staternents
by Canadian Securities Regulators", (1992), 1 Corporate Fin. 19, at 20,
cited in Ainsely. ibid.. B. 4077.. at 5005. (emphasis in original quote).
However, following this case a task force (The Ontario Task Force on
Securities Regulation) was entmsted to assess, inter alia, its implications
and to recornmend proper Iegislative responses to it. The Report of the
task force (Daniels Report) recommended that the OSC be given rulemaking power. A. Anand, D. Johnston and G. Peterson, Securitiies
Regulation- Cases, Notes & Materials. (Toronto and Vancouver:
Butterwortsh, 1999) at 56-60. The Ontario legislature adopted the
recommendation of the Daniels Report and vested the OSC with rulemaking power. Johnston and Rockwell, supra note 57 at 46.
604
Supra notes 3940.
605 The SEC consists of two strata, Commission and Staff. The Commission is composed
of the Chairman, four permanent members and two part-time members. The Commission
(permanent) members are appointed by the Govemment and the part-members are
nominated by the h4inistq of Finance and the Bangladesh Bank, the central bank,
respectively. The Staff consists of officers and employees appointed by the Commission.
SECA, 1993, s. 5(1) and S(2). The Commission is assigned with the responsibility of,
inter alin. registration of securities market intermediaries, approval of the issuance of
securities and exemption therefiom ( SECA.. ss. 8(2), s.23, PIR, S. 18), conducting

frorn amongst retired civil servants606who do not have any knowledge of or experience in
securities industry607.This practice of the Govemment evidences a deviation from the
strict cornpliance with law which requires the Govemment to give prionty to persons with
standing in the securities industry or in some closely related fields. The Government
seerns to overexercise its discretion in this regard.608Political considerations influence
investigation and inquj., hearing appeal frorn an officer's decision or order, ( SECA, 21)
and enforcement of administrative sanctions (SEO, 22 and PIR, 19)
'06 Rashid, S.M., "SEC-te ki dakhkha byaktider sthan habe na" ('Wili not There be any
Place for the Skilled Persons in the SEC?"Muktakantha (a Bengali national daily), (17
July 1998) at 9.
'O7 See Star Magazine, supra note 44 at 7.
S. 5(4) of the SECA. 1993 requires that
"the C h h a n and other full-time members shall be appointed from
amongst the persons of capability and standing who have shown capacity
in dealing with problems relating to company matters, securities markets
or have special knowledge or experience of law, finance, economics,
accountancy and such other disciplines as, in the opinion of the
Government, shall be useful to the Commission.

"'

The wording of this sub-section shows that with regard to the disciplines from which
people should be selected to the offlces of the Commission the Legislature has ascribed
priority, by specification, to the security, company, law, finance, economics and
accountancy. The Legislature's intent seems to be that if people frorn these fields are
available, the Government must give preference to them because it considers their
appointment would be "useful" to the Commission. The discretion applies where people
fiom the specified fields are not available. Again, before exercising the discretion the
Government must detennine what the Legislature has intended to mean by the phrase
"such other disciplines". The words "such other" point to disciplines which are sirnilar to
the specified ones. This interpretation is based on the rule of ejusdern generis which
requires general words following particular words pertaining to a class, category or genus
to be constnied to refer to the similar kind of things as are entailed by the particular
words. In light of this argument the Government may select persons from fields similar to
those specifiedprovided such fields are useful to the Commission in the opinion of the
Government. In short, the Government may choose persons for the offices of the
Commission who are fiom the similar kind of disciplines as are specified and whose
service would be useful to the accomplishment of the fûnctions of the Commission.

appointments to the SEC. It has become a neo-political culture in Bangladesh that
whichever party cornes to power politicizes ail possible institutions by placing its proparty men regardless of whether they are fit or unfk The same consideration influences
replacement decisions as well?

This proclivity may hinder the SEC from becorning

While appointing persons to the offices of the Commission the Government must satisfy
these two conditions.
'O9 Under S. 6(1) of the SECA the Chair or a full-tirne member shall be removed by the
Government fiom the office if he or she
(a) is, or at any has been, adjudicated as insolvent by a competent court;
(b) is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court;
(c) has been convicted of a criminal offence involving moral turpitude;
(d) has, in the opinion of fhe Government, so abused his position so as to render his
continuation in offlce detrimental to public interest;
(e) is appointed a director or official of a Company or any other organization registered
with the Commission. (emphasis added).
A condition has been attached to this sub-section that before taking an action under clause
(d) or (e) agsùnst the Chair or any full-tirne member a hearing must be held. [S. 6(2)1.
Under this provision the tenure of the Chair or any full-time member is secure unless he
or she is liable on any of the specified grounds. His or her liability would not, however,
result ipso facto in the vacation of the office. The Government must first take a positive
action of rernoving the a commissioner; unless this is done, the Commissioner will not be
liable to quit his or her office, : See K.R. Chandratre, B. Acharya, S.D. Israni and K.
Sethuraman, Bharat's Compendium on SEBI Capital Issues & Listing, vol. 1 (New Delhi:
Bharat Publishing House, 1996) at 12. Since mostly political consideration forms the
cnterion of the Govemment action, it is questionable whether the it will take any
"positive action" against its pro-party person in spite of his or her actual liability under on
any of the said grounds. Besides, clause (c) invites special attention. The applicability of
that clause depends on the subjective judgment of the Government that a particular
commissioner has abused his or her position and that that abuse is deleterious in "public
interest". There is no objective standard of public interest. Whether an abusive act makes
a commissioner's holding of the office h
m in public interest is determinable by the
Government. And that determination depends on the Government's pditical liking for or
disliking against a particular commissioner. Though a right of appeal has been granted by
section 6(2) mentioned above, it can help little an aileged commissioner because the
Govenunent is not, by law, bound to accept the explanation of the commissioner, it may
disregard the explanation and remove the commissioner unless and until the removal
order is vitiated by the court of law. Thus, for instance, previously two Commission

professionally efficient Given the esotenc nature of the securities industry people having
standing or at least an orientation to securities as a discipline should be chosen, as a top
priority, for the offices of the ~ o m m i s s i o n
and
~ ~their
~ teriure should be secure.

members were removed by the Governrnent and subsequently the removal order was
annulled by the court of law, but that could not benefit the victims because by the time of
the coua decision their office tenure was over. Supra note 606. B y contrast, the OSC
commissioners hold their office "at pleasure" of the Lieutenant General in Council who
can turn them out remove before the formal end of their tenure. This seems to be a sword
hanging over the head and may fa11 on the neck any moment, but has not yet cut anyone's
neck since the birth of the OSC. This evidences the long deep-rooted sound political
practice in Canada. To the contrary, with regard to the given situations in Bangladesh it
may be said that political masters, as the executives, drive the legal vehicle with
discretionary brakes and may, depending on their political will, reach their selfish
olitical goal derailing from the leeway and goal intended by the legislature.
In Ontario there are not statutorily defmed criteria for selecting people for the offices
of the Commission, though the Kimber Report recommended a Chair with a legal
background and cornmissioners with special ski11 or experience in security matters, such
as accounting, brokering, investment dealing and financial analysis. However, in practice,
selection is made from amongst people with backgrounds in fields related to security and
commodity futures industry, e.g., lawyers, accountants, securïty analysts, dealers and
investors. : 1992 Annual Report of the OSC excerpted in H. L. O'Brien, Securities
Regulation Cases and Materials, (Halifax: Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University, Fall
1995), at 301.

4 EPILOGUE
4.1 CONCLUSION

Bangladesh is pursuing solely a disclosure regime while Ontario has an amphibious
system that reflects both the disclosure and ment regimes. Though both have a disclosure
review system, Bangladesh lacks some significant requirements that are essential to make
the disclosure meaningful. Ontario law requires prospectus disclosure to be full, û-ue and
plain, but Bangladesh Iaw does not cal1 for plain disclosure which is a must for investors,
specially the Iay ones, to understand the information furnished in a prospectus, either by
themselves or with the aid of securities market intermediaries. Some important nonfinancial rnatters, though required by Ontario law, are missing in Bangladesh law (for
example, dividend record). Both juisdictions face troubles in respect of true disclosure of
financial matters in particular. Misstatement or faise statement of financial information is
common. Ontario law, however, provides two safeguards which may mitigate, if not
eliminate, the degree of the probIem. It allows investors to repudiate the securÏty sale
contract odand claim damages invoking the jurisdiction of civil courts. Secondly, the

OSC staff keeps vigilant eyes on the disclosure and sometimes refuses to issue a
prospectus receipt where the staff deems it necessary in public interest The staff
exercises this power to ensure that a proposed investment project is free h m "abnormal"
or "unacceptable" business nsks. Investors are expected to bear "normal" business risks

only and to make their own investment decisions in light of the information made
146

available through prospectuses. Bangladesh law provides for civil remedy for prospectus
misstatements, but heavy litigation costs and excessive delay in the disposal of suits are
the barriers to invoking the remedy the provision. Secondly, the SEC does not have any
"blue sky" type of jurisdiction. As a result, the investors are deprived of protection
against "abnormal" business risks.
It is encouraging that Bangladesh has made a shift h m ment to disclosure
regime. In this regime the investors have available various investment opportunities with
varying nsks. They choose which of those risks they can bear depending on their own
financial and psychological capabilities. In choosing the investment risks the investors
needs professional advisors' help. Therefore, for obtaining the benefits of the disclosure
regime developrnent of the interrnediq bodies is a must. As well, the underwriters must
play their role sincerely to venQ the soundness of the securities offered. At the same
time, however, the SEC should have the "blue sky" jurisdiction to discem "abnormal"
risks involved in an investment enterprise. Moreover, the access to Iegal justice for
redressing securities fiaud must also be ensured by the state. By introducing the
disclosure approach the Govenunent of Bangladesh has opened the field of cornpetition
for investment in the securities industry, which was absent in the previous "blue sky"
system. It had in mind that this would mobilize resources into various production sectors,

which would ultimately affiicts national economic development. But unless a sense of
security can be instilled that the prospectus disclosures underwritten by the underwriters
are tme, that the services by the intermediaries are reliable, and that the SEC is ever

vigilant against an intrusion of unacceptable or abnorrnal risks in the market, the mere
introduction of the disclosure system in Bangiadesh wiU not heIp- The SEC has a greater
role to play in this regard As a watchdog it should not only to watch, but should also bark
and bite, where necessary, for investor protection and economic development of the

country. To that end, the SEC must be reconstituted with professionally capable persons.

6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

From the above discussion Ontario law appears to excel Bangladesh law.
Ontario law may be borrowed, where proposed, to bring about improvements of
Bangladesh law. To that effect the following recommendations may be put forward for
consideration:
1- To fulfill the full disclosure requirement there should be added provisions calling for

information about the issuer's past dividend record- In respect of best efforts offerings it
should be required by law that the security sale price be deposited in a trust company. If
the minimum amount needed for conducting the proposed project and fuced by the
underwriting agreement is raised by sale, it may then be received by the issuer. If,
however, it is not, the investors will get their money back. Another provision should be
added to the concerned law that if an issue firmly underwritten is undersubscribed and the
underwriter rcfuses to purchase the remaining securïties at the face value at which the
investors have purchased, the issues must notiw the SEC. Thereupon the SEC may, after
giving an opportunity of being heard, fine the underwriter and disqualiQ him for five

years from underwriting any further issue. Again, if it is reported that the issuer bas sold
securities at a lesser pnce, the SEC must, subject to a hearing, fine it and disqualiQ it for
five years fiom offering any issue.

2. In order that the investors, with or without the aid of market intermediaries, can

understand the prospectus disclosure, it is recommended that a provision requiring plain
disclosure in Bengali be inserted in the Public Issues Rule (PIR). At the same time, to
ensure that the market intermediaries can provide correct investment advise to the
investors, the SEC should conduct a training program. The provisions concerning the
qualifications611required for registration as intermediaries should be strictly enforced to
ensure entry of qualified persons or institution to this profession.
3. As there is no court of exclusive juilsdiction to deal with security matters, one

Division Bench of the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, should
be given original junsdiction, as in Company matters, to receive disputes for decision, e.g.

misstatement or false statement in prospectus. This is recommended for two reasons:
frrst, security being a discipline of an esoteric nature, should be dealt with by the highest

court of the land. The lower courts do not have any grasp on this field, as they are
concerned with general matters of civil and criminal nature. Though there is a specialized
commercial court, Artha Reen Adalat (Court of Financial Debt), it is not recommended
that it deal with securiq matters because it does not have any orientation to securities
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' Eg., educational qualifications, financiai cornpetence and professional training and

experience. : S. 3B and S. 4 of the SEC (Stock-Dealer, Stock-Broker and Sub-Broker)

matters and also it is otherwise overburdened with cases under its present jurisdiction,

The second reason for proposing jurisdiction to be given to the Division Bench of the
High Court Division is that in disposa1 of suits the Division Bench would require, as in
other matters, less time compared to the courts of subordinate jurisdiction.
4. The SEC,like the OSC, may be granted a discretionary jmïsdiction to review the merit

of securities and to refuse consenting to the application in the public interest in general

and on the similar grounds on which the OSC c m refuse receipting in particular. This
would strengthen the SEC to safeguard the investor interest which is the principal
objective of the securities legislation in Bangladesh. The decisions of the SEC under the
proposed jurisdiction should be made subject to judicial review by the proposed court
(viz., High Court Division Bench) in order to "to safeguard notions of fair play,

-. This would strike a balance between the investors'
substantial justice and due process>,61'
interest and the security industry in Bangladesh.
5. Since securities, as a discipline, is understandable by persons having particular

orientation to security or closely related fields, in choosing people for the offices of the
Commission of the SEC the Government should give priority to those who have standing
in the fields specified by the statute, namely securities, law, finance, economics and
accountancy. The Government should not normalIy exercise its discretion in this regard.

Similar consideration should be made by the Commission in appcinting officiais of the
--

Regulation. 1994; S. 5 of the SEC (Merchant Banker and Portfolio Manager) Regulation.
1996.
Smith, supra note 149, at 464.

SEC. AdditionalIy, at the tirne of selection of both cornmissioners and officiais special
regard should be had to the moral stature of the appointees. To this effect required

amendment should be made to the law concerned.

6. In order that the commissioners may work with the sense of security of their tenure the
provision effecting removal by the Government on the ground of abuse of position should
be amended. The amendment may be made to the effect that if a three-member inquiry

committee headed by a sitting judge of the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of
Bangladesh finds a commissioner guilty of abusing his or her office or position, the
Government of Bangladesh shall issue a removai order after giving him or her an
opportunity of k i n g heard. The proposed amendment will subject the Govemment7s
subjective opinion about a comrnissioner's guilt of position-abuse to an objective scmtiny
by an inquiry cornmittee and thereby reduce the likelihood that the present provision be
used capriciously.
By the above recommendations a fundamental refonn is suggested in the
securities regulation of Bangladesh, namely a compromise between the disclosure and
merit review approaches. Both of these approaches have their own merits. To foiiow the
extreme line of either approach is to miss the advantages of the other. The principal
benefit of the disclosure regime followed by Bangladesh is that it encourages cornpetition
for investment among the pubtic offering various (investment) opportunities, which has
the effect of mobilizing resources towards productive areas. These opportunities cary

both ' ' ~ O I T Y
and
EL
"'abnormal"
~"
business risks. Under the proposed system the investors of

Bangladesh will bear normal business risks and the SEC will preclude the abnormal
business risks. Thus the investors will have double protection, which will, it is expected,
increase their confidence in the securities industry of the country,
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